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Abstract 
This study investigates three aspects important of performance  for Zambia commercial banks. 
Specifically, the thesis addresses the aspect of cost efficiency and the factors that affect inefficiency 
performance. The study also empirically answers the policy question regarding the banks‟ exercise of 
market power and the low degree of competition. Using a richly assembled panel data set obtained 
from the Bank of Zambia on individual banks from 1998 to 2006, the thesis utilises theoretically 
sound methodologies in addressing these research questions.  
The results from the analysis reveal the following. Firstly, using stochastic frontier estimation 
approach, cost inefficiency was estimated to be 8 percent. This means that mismanagement of 
resources was an impediment to the efficiency performance. Nonetheless, we observed a reduction in 
cost inefficiency over time, with domestic private banks displaying remarkable improvement. A 
combination of bank-specific and  exogenous factors deterred banks from attaining optimal cost 
efficiency. Notably, impaired loans, asset concentration and macroeconomic instability undermined 
the banks‟ ability to operate optimally. Regulatory factors did not exacerbate cost inefficiency.  
Secondly, Zambian banks operated in an oligopolistic set-up. Based on a methodology 
anchored in the New Empirical Industrial Organisation literature, the results of a competitive test 
showed that banks earned their revenue under conditions of monopolistic competition. This finding 
was buttressed by the estimated time varying Lerner Index, a measure of market power. The index 
showed that commercial banks set their prices above marginal cost by more than 50 percent. 
However, the degree of market power narrowed towards the end of the sample period. Market 
concentration, efficiency performance, diversity in revenue sources and regulatory intensity 
accounted for much of the banks‟ exercise of market power. On the other hand, the high proportion 
of interbank deposits, credit risk exposure and inflation dampened the banks‟ exercise of market 
power.   
To our knowledge, this study is the first of its kind in Zambia. Therefore, the results of the 
thesis have important policy implications. More significantly, since there is room for deepening the 
degree of competition and furthering efficiency gains, regulatory authorities should strengthen 
measures aimed at ameliorating risk problems in the banking industry in a bid to lower the banks‟ 
exercise of market power. The authorities should also accelerate should also accelerate efforts of 
reducing recourse to Treasury bills as a deficit financing tool in order to negate the banks‟ appetite 
for securities as a source of revenue. This can be done by placing more emphasis on the legal and 
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 institutional framework for resolving problem credit situations. This will intensify competition and 
propagate efficiency gains in the banking market. The authorities should also expeditiously tackle 
instability in the macroeconomic environment, particularly the high rate of inflation which hampered 
the banks‟ revenue performance and exacerbated the exercise of market power. 
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C h a p t e r  O n e   
 
Introduction and Background  
 
1.1 Introduction 
Banks play a crucial role in the economy, shaped mainly by the nature of the functions they 
perform. These functions distinguish banks from other financial and non-financial firms. The first of 
these functions is that of intermediating between borrowers and lenders. In the course of undertaking 
financial intermediation, banks process different types of information pertaining to creditors and the 
ability of debtors to meet their obligations in a timely manner. The second and related function is 
acceptance and transformation of risks and providing liquidity in order to facilitate transactions. 
Liquidity creation and risk management and transformation are aimed at preventing financial 
instability emanating from bank runs (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Amelioration of information 
asymmetries and liquidity provision uniquely define bank managers‟ incentives in producing 
financial services more prudently, competitively and efficiently.  
The role of information processing, liquidity creation and risk transformation is particularly 
relevant in view of the imperfections that characterise financial markets. Gurley and Shaw (1955) 
observed that financial intermediaries play an important role in alleviating the problem of trade 
frictions between borrowers and lenders. Inefficiencies in trade can arise when one or more of the 
transacting parties have superior information than the counterpart (van Damme, 1994). However, 
until the 1970s, these aspects were not incorporated into formal models of financial markets. 
Akerloff (1970) and Leland and Pyle (1977) were among the first to offer a formal analysis of 
information asymmetry in financial markets. Later works by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Santomero 
(1984), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Freixas and Rochet (1997) showed that severity of 
market imperfections in financial intermediation can lead to sub-optimal outcomes.  
Banks also enjoy economies of scale in transactions costs by pooling resources from many 
small investors and investing in bulk assets. Therefore, banks use their informational advantage to 
invest funds into profitable investment projects in order to minimise the opportunistic behaviour. 
Banks also engage in client screening to reduce the risk of default by borrowers. In so doing, they 
perform the function of delegated monitoring (Diamond, 1984; Allen & Santomero, 2001). 
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Furthermore, banks facilitate payments directly to the economy in the form of cheque clearing and 
wire transfer services. Since bank accounts are generally more attractive than holding cash, payments 
through the banking system are more preferred to cash payments. Therefore, any breakdowns in the 
banking system could produce gridlock to the payments system with harmful effects on the 
economy.  
Finally, a competitive and efficiently functioning banking system is critical to the transmission 
of monetary policy to the rest of the economy. The highly liquid nature of bank demand deposits 
makes them readily acceptable by the public as the most widely used instrument of exchange in an 
economy. Given that deposits command a significant component of money supply, commercial 
banks play an important role in transmitting monetary policy actions to the real sector. Banks should 
be able to effectively undertake this task when operating in a more competitive and efficient 
environment. It is against this background that McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that a 
financial system that efficiently generates and allocates financial resources can contribute greatly to 
productivity and growth of the economy. Thus, informed by the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, many 
developing countries embarked upon the liberalisation of financial markets with a view to correct the 
imperfections and financial repression policies that characterised these economies. This hypothesis 
rests on the premise that liberalisation of financial markets ushers in market incentives that generally 
lead to efficient allocation of resources and improves performance of financial intermediaries, 
particularly commercial banks.  
This thesis evaluates the performance of Zambian commercial banks during the post-
liberalisation period. Specifically, the study focuses on cost efficiency, competition and market 
power during 1998-2006. Zambia undertook comprehensive economic reforms beginning in 1992, a 
significant component of which was financial liberalisation (see Appendix I for chronology of 
selected policy changes). Reform measures included liberalisation of interest rates; deregulation of 
movements of capital and elimination of portfolio restrictions, including foreign exchange 
transactions; easing of banking activity restrictions and strengthening of the regulatory and 
supervisory framework. In addition, the central bank adopted indirect instruments of monetary policy 
and streamlined its operations, focussing more on price stability as the core objective. Reforms also 
entailed restructuring the banking system to make it more responsive to the dictates of price and 
regulatory incentives.  
After many years of interventionist policies, a major objective of financial liberalisation was the 
removal of operating obstacles in the banking sector in order to foster competition and efficiency. 
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This was in recognition that competition and efficiency would induce banks to provide the much 
needed funds for private sector investment to support rapid and sustainable economic growth. 
 
1.2 Statement of the research problem 
The opening up of the financial sector was followed up by a banking crisis between 1995 and 
1998. However, since the end of the crisis, Zambian banks have posted significant gains, breaking 
the cycle of vulnerability that characterised the industry in the years following the implementation of 
sweeping financial reforms. The banking sector is now deemed relatively stable, with most banks 
boasting of health balance sheets and adequate levels of capitalisation. These gains have been 
credited to the improvement in the regulatory framework which was put in place after the banking 
crisis. Notwithstanding these gains, doubts about the level of competition and efficiency continue to 
linger in the minds of many. These concerns have been motivated by observed conduct and 
dominance of some commercial banks.  
The Zambian banking system is one of the most concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). 
The three bank concentration ratio for assets, deposits and loans averages above 60 percent. Lending 
rates are also significantly higher than deposit rates and sticky downwards, resulting in very large 
interest rate spreads in excess of 20 percent. These spreads are also among the highest in Africa (IMF 
and World Bank, 2002). All these factors have been attributed to the dominance of few banks in the 
industry, which raises concern of possible collusive behaviour. The World Bank (2004) observed 
that the oligopolistic nature of the Zambian banking sector is one of the main causes of the rigidity in 
bank lending rates and wide interest spreads. According to economic theory, high levels of 
concentration and wide bank interest rate spreads may be evidence of the banks‟ exercise of market 
power and uncompetitive conduct in the industry. It may also suggest that banks operate inefficiently 
and therefore mask their inefficiencies through large interest margins.  
The above factors, coupled with other structural problems continue to place the Zambian 
banking sector at the centre of policy debate. In particular, recent policy debate has focussed on 
improving accessibility to financial resources and making the banking sector an engine of economic 
transformation. Furthermore, policy makers continue to ponder on how best to stimulate 
competitiveness in the banking industry while balancing the act of ensuring safety and stability and 
prevention of unwarranted risk taking behaviour. Given that the banking industry has undergone 
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structural transformation after the crisis, the increasing dominance of few large (foreign owned) 
banks is especially of major concern regarding the degree of contestability in the industry.
1
  
 
1.3 Observations from industry assessment policy studies 
In 2002, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank conducted an assessment 
of the financial sector under the auspices of the Financial Sector Assessment Programme (FSAP). 
Although this study did not empirically analyse the performance of the banking system, the report 
concluded that competition and efficiency among Zambian banks were low. The report noted further 
that the continued public ownership of the Zambia national commercial bank (ZNCB), one of the 
largest banks (by size of assets and branch network) particularly hindered competition in the 
industry. Accordingly, the report proposed that the bank be privatised in order to stimulate 
competition in the banking system. The assessment also noted that further prudential and regulatory 
reforms were necessary to remove bottlenecks that hindered banks from exploiting alternative ways 
of raising efficiency and increasing competitiveness. The reduction in government borrowing 
requirements was also seen to be particularly beneficial in bringing down interest rate margins which 
had curtailed financial intermediation.  
The above factors were echoed in a Financial Sector Development Programme (FSDP) report 
launched by the Zambian government (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2004). This 
report was in response to the issues raised in the IMF/World Bank (2002) FSAP report. The FSDP is 
a comprehensive strategy to build and strengthen the financial sector infrastructure to enable it 
support economic diversification and sustainable growth. This financial sector blueprint suggested 
that dominance of foreign owned banks may be a possible source of collusive behaviour. High 
service fees and wide interest spreads were also seen as evidence of cost inefficiency responsible for 
the low level of financial intermediation and lack of innovation in the banking industry. The report 
also observed that the portfolio composition of banks‟ assets was little diversified as shown by a 
relatively high proportion of Treasury bills and foreign currency deposits held in off-shore accounts. 
Lending to the domestic private sector remained rudimentary, making the Zambian banking sector 
one of the least developed in sub-Saharan Africa.  
                                                          
 
1
 Generally, it is understood that a large number of relatively similar sized banks have better chances of competing 
amongst themselves than would otherwise be the case. 
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In 2006, the Zambian government commissioned the first in a series of studies to assess the 
impediments to accessing financial services. This study, conducted by FinMark Trust (2006) looked 
at the demand side of the market. Based on survey evidence, the main observation was that the 
Zambian banking sector was characterised by high transactions costs which were passed on to 
customers in form of fees and other service charges. The study attributed the low level of financial 
accessibility to these factors, among others.
2
 The second study implemented by Oxford Policy 
Management (2007) in conjunction with FinMark Trust, focussed on the supply side. The conclusion 
from this second survey was that the key constraints to financial accessibility were mainly bank-
specific rather than of macroeconomic or regulatory nature. They were inherent in the internal 
organisational and structure of the banking market characterised by the cycle of heavy dependence 
on fees, net liquidity and high spreads which had resulted in very high costs for bank users.  
All the issues discussed above were also raised in de Luna Martinez‟s (2006) study of the 
accessibility to financial services in the Zambian banking sector. Using descriptive analysis, the 
author observed that despite the policies of open doors to foreign bank participation, existing foreign 
owned banks have not been able to widen the range of bank products offered to both households and 
firms. This may suggest that there is inadequate level of competition and innovation in the industry. 
According to Aryeetey, et al. (1994) these shortcomings broadly reflect deep-rooted 
information and other structural problems characteristic of undeveloped financial systems. The 
implication being that financial liberalisation measures may have ignored such structural factors as 
branching and accessibility to financial services, loyal customer base and creation of a market niche 
by incumbents, which dissuade new entrants and other fringe banks from gaining a competitive 
position. Thus, due to the inherent nature of banking systems in developing countries, policy reforms 
may not yield a 'critical level' of competitive pressure in the aftermath of deregulation as envisaged.  
This perceived failure of reforms may also be due to the rapid pace at which the policies were 
implemented and the inability to recognise that each economy embodies intrinsic features which 
uniquely define its response to policy options. For example, in the banking industry, incumbent 
banks with an already entrenched position tend to have little motivation to embrace measures aimed 
at improving their cost efficiency levels (Sarkar & Bhaumik, 1998). Combined, these forces may not 
bring optimal outcomes in the banking sector and may in fact result in a financial crisis, as did 
                                                          
 
2
 Other impediments were the generally low levels of incomes among Zambians and the concentration of banks in urban 
centres, leaving a large part of the Zambian population in rural districts unbanked.  
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happen in Zambia. Indeed, the benefits of removing institutional and structural impediments to 
fostering banking competition and enhancing efficiency are well established (Northcott, 2004).  
 
1.4 Justification of the research 
Commercial banks in Zambia are the most active players in the financial sector, ahead of other 
financial sector participants.
3
 However, the amount of credit dispensed to the private sector is low 
and this is evidently clear from the low accessibility to financial services by a large segment of the 
population. At 8 percent, the ratio of banks‟ private sector credit to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) is one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Zambian banks provide a relatively similar 
amount of credit to the public sector. This has tended to keep interest rates at high levels, resulting in 
financial disintermediation (crowding out of the private sector). In this regard, Zambian banks have 
had a limited impact on the economy in terms of private credit provision.  
The assessment of the Zambian banking industry by the IMF and World Bank (2002), FinMark 
Trust (2006), de Luna Martinez (2006) and others, demonstrates a genuine concern of the 
predicament facing the Zambian banking sector vis-à-vis competition and efficiency. For bank 
practitioners, competition and operational efficiency are important parameters of evaluating 
performance in a dynamically changing environment. These changes affect the behaviour of 
individual banks to unimaginable proportions. Therefore, bank managers should comprehend these 
changes in order to gain an insight into the potential effect on the level of performance relative to 
their counterparts. Specifically, bank managers need to bring strategic planning in their organisation 
in order to enhance cost effectiveness and aim at delivering high quality banking products and 
services to their customers.  
For the authorities, concerns about inadequate competitive conditions and low efficiency should 
serve as indicators of a poorly performing banking sector with adverse implications on service 
delivery and social welfare. Without doubt, knowledge of commercial banks‟ performance helps in 
understanding the role banks play in the national economy. However, without knowledge of 
indicators backed by theoretically plausible and empirically tested methodologies, the policy analysis 
and response would be lopsided. Therefore, research on the performance of banks is a relevant area 
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 As at end 2008, commercial banks had more than ten times the value of assets relative to other financial sector players 
put together.  
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of empirical enquiry especially for a low income country faced with numerous social challenges and 
perception about failed financial reforms.  
This thesis is the first attempt at such an undertaking. The main theme of the thesis is to 
empirically respond to the policy concerns highlighted in the preceding sections. Given the existing 
research void in this area, the Zambian banking sector presents a strong case for the empirical 
analysis of its performance. This is achieved by appealing to tested methodologies based on sound 
theoretical microeconomic foundations.
4
  Results from this exercise should guide the authorities in 
better understanding the dynamics affecting the banking industry in Zambia. Accordingly, the study 
is both timely and relevant to the present policy concerns. 
 
1.5 Objectives of the research 
The objectives of this study are shaped around the three empirical chapters and stem from the 
title of the thesis, that is, to evaluate the performance of the Zambian banking system. First, as 
observed in the preceding analysis and as will be shown further below, Zambian banks are alleged to 
operate inefficiently. Key indicators of cost inefficiency include high operating costs and poor 
delivery of financial services. Second, the high level of concentration and dominance of large banks 
and state ownership of some banks have been blamed for the inadequate level of competition. 
Whereas these indicators may be used to analyse competition, they fall short of adequately capturing 
banks‟ actual behaviour. Related to this, to the extent that few banks dominate the sector, collusive 
pricing may be the natural outcome. Therefore, the third aspect of the study relates to the banks‟ 
exercise of market power. This is empirically investigated using pricing and cost data. In sum, the 
study aims at investigating three pillars of bank performance, vis-à-vis cost inefficiency, competition 
and related market structure, and evidence of market power. These are important factors in devising 
anti-trust policy.  
In answering these research questions we also seek to evaluate the degree to which 
macroeconomic and regulatory factors influence the banks‟ behaviour. For example, to the extent 
                                                          
 
4
 In the FSAP report, the IMF/World Bank regress spreads on other factors to measure causes of high interest rate spreads 
while Mbewe (2004) uses descriptive analysis to undertaken this task. A study by Mwilwa (2007) was the more 
comprehensive analysis of determinants of interest rate spreads, but even this took an aggregate view. As has been 
argued elsewhere, this approach is inadequate as a measure of competition and efficiency in banking, see World Bank, 
(2006), among others. 
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that regulatory policy does not promote competition in the banking industry, banks‟ exercise of 
market power could be sustained over a longer period. When regulatory policy stimulates 
competition among banks, this could drive banks‟ price-cost margins down, thereby eroding their 
market power. The price-cost margin, typically defined as price less marginal cost divided by price 
or the Lerner Index, has a long history of theoretical presence and empirical applications in industrial 
organisation. We also analyse the role of internal bank specific factors in perpetuating inefficiency 
and engendering market power in the banking industry.  
Specific objectives, methods of analysis and tested hypotheses are articulated in each of the 
three empirical chapters investigating the elements of bank performance highlighted above.   
 
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter One has introduced the main theme of the thesis by providing a description of the 
statement of the problem, outlining the research questions and rationale of the study. In addition, the 
chapter has highlighted observations made by previous assessments of the Zambian banking sector. 
These issues serve as a basis for the general direction of the thesis.  
Chapter Two puts the study in a policy and historical context, highlighting the nature of the 
Zambian banking industry and reforms that occurred to usher in the current financial landscape. 
Chapter two also brings together different performance indicators in the Zambian banking industry. 
These measures form a basis for the empirical analysis in later chapters.  
Chapter Three is a presentation of some of the microeconomic theories/models of the banking 
firm. This chapter is critical to the understanding of the analytical approach taken in the empirical 
sections because it highlights the importance of these theories to the analysis of efficiency 
performance and competitive conduct in banking.   
Chapter Four is the beginning of empirical analysis. Specifically, chapter four addresses the 
concept of cost efficiency in Zambian banking and how this is affected by banks‟ own internal 
factors as well as the regulatory and macroeconomic environment in which they operate. The basis 
for this analysis is underscored by the high level of operating costs and wide spreads observed in the 
banking industry. To be able to get a better understanding of banks‟ performance, a solid analytical 
framework is needed and this chapter brings out this aspect very clearly. In particular, the 
investigation of cost efficiency and its determinants is undertaken in the context of the single step 
methodology proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995).   
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Chapter Five begins by highlighting the importance of competition in the banking sector. 
Accordingly, in this part of the thesis, we investigate the state of competition in the Zambian banking 
sector, drawing from previous research and utilising tools of analysis based on the New Empirical 
Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature. Specifically we address the problem by applying the 
methodology proposed by Rosse and Panzar (1977) and Panzar and Rosse (1982; 1987). The 
investigation is motivated by concerns of the high level of concentration in the banking sector and 
claims that subsidiaries of multinational banks which dominate the industry pose a threat to overall 
competitiveness and development of the Zambian banking sector.  
Chapter Six extends the concept of competition by analysing the banks‟ exercise of market 
power using the time varying Lerner Index estimated from a translog cost function. Since the Lerner 
Index is estimated for each bank across time, we assess the evolution of market power and examine 
in detail the possible factors that influence the banks‟ conduct.   
Chapter Seven is a concluding chapter of the thesis and brings together a summary of results 
from chapters four, five and six. This chapter also presents policy recommendations arising from the 
analyses. This is important for the authorities, bank practitioners and market analysts alike to make 
informed decisions.   
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C h a p t e r  T w o   
 
Financial Policies and Peformance of the Banking Sector  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The Zambian banking sector has emerged from the constraints imposed by financial repression 
policies to the current open policy with no explicit entry barriers, save for the mandatory minimum 
paid up capital for setting up a bank. In the following sections, we conduct an analysis of the 
performance of the banking system during the interventionist regime and in the post-reform period. 
This assessment is important because it puts the empirical analysis developed in subsequent chapters 
into context and enables us to appreciate the achievements and shortcomings in the level of banks‟ 
performance.  
 
2.2 Financial repression policies and the banking Sector  
After independence in 1964, Zambia adopted the import substitution industrialisation strategy 
as a development strategy. To achieve this objective, the government announced sweeping measures 
in 1968 and 1969, which included nationalisation of financial institutions, except foreign commercial 
banks despite their dominance in the industry (Harvey, 1973; Brownbridge, 1998).
5
 Instead, foreign 
banks were incorporated in the country and operated as subsidiaries of foreign banks under the 
Zambian banking law which stipulated that half the directors of these banks should be resident in the 
country. However, the lending behaviour of foreign owned banks largely favoured the expatriate 
community and foreign owned companies.  
Therefore, to avail funds and serve the interests of the indigenous businesses and parastatal 
companies not reached by existing foreign owned commercial banks, the government established 
state banks (Brownbridge, 1998). In addition, the government also created agricultural and 
development banks to provide long-term credit to „strategic‟ sectors of the economy such as mining, 
and agricultural industries. To further provide impetus to the development agenda, the government 
                                                          
 
5
 Commercial banks were not nationalised because the expatriates threatened to withdraw their management staff and the 
Zambian government was not confident that the banks would perform without them.  
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also imposed controls on interest and exchange rates, transactions in and allocation of foreign 
exchange and applied stringent reserve requirements as tools of credit control. In addition, banks 
were required to seek permission from the central bank before they could extend credit to foreign 
companies or engage in bank-to-bank refinancing. In this regard, state enterprises were especially 
given preferential treatment in accessing foreign exchange while foreign companies were mandated 
to surrender foreign exchange to the central bank. This meant that the central bank maintained 
monopoly on the allocation of foreign exchange which was used as a credit rationing tool.  
The authorities also imposed minimum paid up requirements for both domestic and foreign 
banks. However, these requirements were never revised; making them worthless in view of high 
rates of inflation. For example, by 1991 before reforms were undertaken, soaring inflation had 
reduced the real value of the minimum capital requirement to around US$0.3 million. At the time 
reforms were being initiated in 1992, this figure had been eroded to just more than US$50,000 in real 
terms. The reduction in paid up capital severely undermined safety and soundness of the financial 
system (Brownbridge, 1998).   
During the interventionist period, regulatory rules governing the operations of the banking 
system were archaic and outdated leading to delinquent lending practices. The poor state of banking 
supervision and prudential regulatory framework was cited as the main cause of severe 
undercapitalisation of the banking sector. For many banks, the capital-to-assets ratio fell below the 
internationally recommended threshold. To aggravate the situation, interest rate controls meant that 
banks could not adequately make allowance for loan maturity or risk. Accordingly, prudence was 
undermined and by the early 1980s, banks had accumulated huge non-performing assets precipitated 
by non-repayment of loans by state enterprises, mainly because most investments were made in 
commercially unsuccessful ventures.  
Unlike public banks, foreign owned banks successfully resisted political pressure to support 
unviable projects and their lending practices were guided by strict commercial criteria (Brownbridge, 
1998). Therefore, the low quality of assets was not a major problem. Nonetheless, due to limited 
international competition arising from tight restrictions on current and capital account transactions, 
their scope of operations remained rudimentary and undiversified.
6
  
                                                          
 
6
 All foreign capital flows and investments were tightly regulated and subject to approval by the authorities.  
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Lack of data on the microeconomic performance of the banking sector during the 
interventionist period hampers an informed assessment of the performance of the banking sector 
under a financially repressive regime.
7
 However, the above narrative suggests that government‟s 
involvement in the financial system coupled with numerous administrative controls had a deleterious 
effect on the performance of the banking system and on the quality and quantity of the banks‟ assets. 
It also undermined financial expansion and intermediation because its policies produced different 
forms of distortions which negated efficient functioning of a larger section of the economy. For 
example, ceilings on interest rates, subsidies and directed lending intended to promote economic 
growth constrained the expansion of credit thereby starving the economy of much needed 
development finance. When lending occurred, banks charged interest rates that were not 
commensurate with perceived risk. The subsidies and other distorting incentives granted to the public 
sector banks only helped perpetuate uncompetitive behaviour in the sector.  
At a macro level, available statistics indicate that the spread between the lending and deposit 
rate averaged 5 percent between 1980 and 1989 while both these rates were negative in real terms 
due to a sustained high level of inflation. As a measure of financial depth, broad money to GDP ratio 
was less than 30 percent on average over the same period. On the other hand, credit to government as 
a share of GDP averaged 12.4 percent over the same period against 12.0 percent lending to the 
private sector, also expressed as a proportion of GDP. These numbers suggest financial 
disintermediation which was induced by financial repression policies and crowding out effects of 
government borrowing. 
 
2.3 Financial liberalisation and the changing landscape of the Zambian banking industry 
Financial sector reforms in Zambia commenced in 1992 after the change of government and 
were implemented in the context of a broader adjustment and stabilisation programme under the 
auspices of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
8
 Generally, the reforms 
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8
 Faced with mounting opposition in the late 1980s as a result of increasing political autocracy and a discredited 
economic strategy, President Kaunda whose United National Independence Party (UNIP) ruled Zambia for nearly three 
decades, yielded to pressures for the restoration of multiparty democratic politics and voluntarily stood for re-election in 
1991. However, he was defeated by Frederick Chiluba of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) which 
heralded the beginning of major political and economic reforms.  
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progressed unhindered in the early years, spurred mainly by the need to redress the structural 
imbalances that characterised the previous regime. The major policy changes included liberalisation 
of interest rates, removal of restrictions on foreign exchange transactions and allocation mechanisms, 
easing of banking restrictions and improvement in the regulatory and supervisory framework with 
concomitant efforts to improve the efficiency of the existing banks. The deregulation of interest rates 
and removal of restrictions on credit advances were aimed at exerting increased pressure on banks to 
adopt more competitive practices in the pricing of bank products while allowing them to cut 
operating costs in order to stem inefficiency.   
The reforms also entailed restructuring of the banking system by emphasising recapitalisation 
of problem banks in order to improve the state of the financial sector. Thus, changes were made to 
the regulatory framework while amendments to the Banking and Financial Services Act (BFSA) and 
the Bank of Zambia Act were also undertaken. These changes granted the central bank greater 
authority over banks and nonbanks. Licensing of commercial banks also shifted from the Ministry of 
Finance to the central bank, thereby consolidating the functions of the latter and giving it greater 
degree of oversight. These amendments helped realign regulation by function rather than by type of 
bank as was previously the case when public sector banks received preferential regulatory treatment 
compared to those imposed on foreign owned banks. In line with international best practices, the 
Bank of Zambia as the regulatory authority introduced a set of reporting requirements for 
commercial banks and guidelines for asset valuation and loan-loss provisions.  
The reforms also redefined the central bank‟s responsibilities, focussing principally on price 
stability rather than on multiple roles as was the case in the previous system of control. 
Complementary to these policies was the lifting of restrictions on capital flows following the 
liberalisation of the capital account in 1994. The authorities also reformed the reserve requirements 
regime and allowed banks to operate foreign currency accounts in the same year. A year later, the 
central bank granted licences to the bureaux de change, allowing them to trade in foreign currency.
9
  
Prior to 1992, there were only three local private banks existing alongside foreign and public 
sector banks. But these banks operated on the fringe of the market, and therefore accounted for a 
minute share of the industry assets. As shown above, the banking sector was subjected to a myriad of 
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 Subsequent to this, the foreign exchnage market has undergone significant reforms, culminating in the implementation 
of the broad-based interbank foreign exchange market (IFEM) system in July 2003, which undoubtedly has introduced 
transparency in the allocation and trading of foreign exchange.  
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distortionary policies, including restrictions on branching and cumbersome licensing requirements, 
which prevented entry into the sector. For this reason, incumbent private foreign and government 
owned banks took up much of the market share, accounting for over 70.0 percent of total assets. The 
removal of implicit and explicit entry restrictions into the banking industry beginning from 1992 saw 
an increase in branching activity by both foreign and public sector banks.  
More importantly, the liberal operating environment saw a rapid increase in the number of local 
private banks, completely altering the landscape of the Zambian banking industry. Specifically, 
between 1992 and 1996, 12 new commercial banks were registered, bringing the total to 26 banks. 
By mid-1996, there were 13 local private sector banks operating in Zambia. It must be noted that the 
majority of these banks sprung up before reforms to the regulatory and prudential system were 
implemented. For instance, financial entry requirements remained low due to high inflation 
(Brownbridge, 1998). Therefore the low real paid up capital served as an entry stimulus for these 
banks. The period between 1992 and 1996 was also marked by a credit boom, with private sector 
credit as share of GDP increasing from 4.7 percent to 8.8 percent.   
Nonetheless, the majority of these banks engaged in foreign exchange transactions and 
government securities trading. According to Brownbridge (1998) the extent to which the local banks 
relied on Treasury bills (Tbs) for their income was indicated by the high proportion of Tbs in total 
assets. Just in two years (1992-1993), Treasury bill holdings accounted for 28 percent of total assets 
while the share of bank credit was only 15 percent. The FSAP report by the IMF/World Bank (2002) 
makes similar observations that foreign exchange trading has traditionally been the main source of 
non-interest revenue for Zambian banks while revenue from Treasury bills accounts for a substantial 
amount of interest income.  
In view of these conditions, local private banks took up enormous amounts of deposits while 
lending was mainly to the small traders which had been shut out from credit by large foreign owned 
banks.
10
 Insider borrowing presented another problem. This exposed many of the banks to credit and 
exchange risk, exacerbated by instability in the macroeconomic environment characterised by high 
rate of inflation, depreciating currency and deteriorating external terms of trade. As a result, they 
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 Although the entry of new local private banks introduced some level of competition on the deposit side of the market 
(Brownbridge & Gayi, 1999), the ratio of total deposits to GDP did not increase proportionately, averaging only 13 % 
between 1989 and 1995. More than anything else, this reflected a shift of deposits away from large banks to new small 
ones due to an aggressive marketing strategy and attractive terms they were offering.  
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started to experience severe liquidity problems due to an increase in the level of impaired assets 
relative to short-term liabilities. Within a short period, some of these banks became insolvent, 
resulting in wholesale liquidations between 1994 and 1998. During this period, nine local banks were 
closed (see Table 2-1 below). The economic cost of these bank failures has been estimated at 
approximately 7.0 percent of GDP (de Luna Martinez, 2006).   
 
 
The banking crisis has been blamed on a weak regulatory framework and an understaffed 
supervisory authority which caused banks to engage in imprudent lending behaviour (Maimbo, 2002; 
IMF and World Bank, 2002). Thus, in an attempt to prevent future crises, the central bank responded 
by strengthening its prudential regulatory and supervisory capacity, culminating in a restructuring 
programme of other ailing but solvent banks. Accordingly, since 1998, only three banks have been 
closed down, two because of failure to recapitalise and the third had its operating licence revoked in 
2001 due to imprudent banking conduct related to money laundering activities. At the end of 2006, 
there were 13 commercial banks operating in Zambia. These comprised six subsidiaries of foreign 
Table 2-1: Types of banks in Zambia  
Name of bank (Year established)    Type of ownership   Failed local banks
b
 
 
  
Barclays Bank (1918) 
 
 Foreign private 
 
Chase Trust Bank (1995-1997) 
Standard Chartered Bank (1906) 
 
 Foreign private 
 
Credit Africa Bank (1994-1998) 
Stanbic Bank (1956) 
 
 Foreign private 
 
First Merchant Bank (1994-1998) 
Citigroup (1979) 
 
 Foreign private 
 
Manifold Investment Bank (1987-1997) 
African banking corporation (2000) 
 
 Foreign private 
 
Prudence Bank (1994-1997) 
Intermarket Banking Corporation (1995) 
 
 Foreign private 
 
Meridien BIAO Bank (1984-1995) 
Zambia National Commercial Bank (1968) 
 
 Local Public 
 
Union Bank (1979-2000) 
Indo-Zambia Bank (1984) 
 
 Joint (defined as foreign public) 
 
Commerce Bank (1984-2001) 
Bank of China (1996) 
 
 Foreign public 
 
United Bank of Zambia (1997-2001) 
Finance Bank (1986) 
 
 Local private 
 
African Commercial Bank (1984-1995) 
Investrust Bank Plc (1996) 
 
 Local private 
 
Safe Deposit Bank (19923-1996) 
First Alliance Bank (1994) 
 
 Local private 
 
Mercantile Bank (1993-1995) 
New Capital Bank (1989) 
 
 Local private 
 
Continental Bank (1993-1995) 
Cavmont Merchant Bank (1993) 
 
 Local private 
 
 Ital Bank (1993-1996) 
Cavmont Capital Bank (2004)
a 
   Local private 
  
Source: Bank of Zambia [http://www.boz.zm]; IMF/World Bank (2002) and Maimbo (2002) 
a
Merger between New Capital Bank and Cavmont Merchant Bank 
b
Period of operating in brackets.  
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banks, five domestic private banks, and three public sector banks. Public sector banks included one 
wholly owned by the Zambian government and two other foreign public banks.
11
 
 
2.4 Selected performance indicators in the banking sector 
This section presents indicators of performance for the Zambian commercial banking industry. These 
indicators pertain to major asset items, branching activity, market concentration, cost structure, 
profitability and aggregate risk.  
 
2.4.1 Major assets of Zambian banks 
The asset composition of all commercial banks shows that the share of loans and advances to 
total assets increased to 36.8 percent in 2006 from 21.0 percent recorded in 2002. Treasury securities 
accounted for a further 20.5 percent in 2006, down from 22.7 percent in 2002. The growth in the 
proportion of loans indicated a rebound in credit extension which coincided with favourable 
macroeconomic environment characterised by high economic growth and a slowdown in the rate of 
inflation. It also manifested a shift from securities holdings as yields became less attractive. This is 
evident in a reduction of Treasury bill holdings by 2.2 percentage points. Thus, during 2003 to 2006, 
total loans and holding of government securities accounted for just over half (51.0 percent) of the 
total assets. This figure reflected an improvement from 45.7 percent recorded between 1998 and 
2002.  
The remaining 49.0 percent of assets was divided as follows. Foreign currency deposits held 
abroad remained the largest component at 17.5 percent of total assets during the same period. 
However, this amount decreased from an average of 30.0 percent recorded between 1998 and 2002. 
The reduction in the proportion of foreign assets came against a backdrop of rapid appreciation of the 
domestic currency, which downgraded the Kwacha equivalent of these assets.
12
 Another major asset 
                                                          
 
11
 The public sector banks comprised the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZNBC) wholly owned by the state but has 
been privatised and transfer of ownership was concluded in April 2007, a Chinese state bank and a joint venture between 
the governments of Zambia and India.  
12
 It is instructive to note that in dollar terms, foreign currency deposits grew by 30.6 % from 1998/2002 to 2002/2006 
periods. Therefore, the observed reduction in domestic currency equivalent was as a result of currency appreciation.  
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item was the reserves held at the central bank. These accounted for 12.4 percent between 1998 and 
2002 but grew by 2.6 percentage points to 14.9 percent, as a share of total assets. Interbank activity 
was a tiny fraction at 2.4 percent, a reduction from 4.0 percent recorded during 1998 and 2002. 
Similar amounts were recorded for fixed assets and other assets, respectively. In a nutshell, the 
analysis shows that the banks‟ earnings assets were in excess of two thirds of total assets. Banks‟ 
reserves at the central bank do not attract interest payment.  
 
2.4.2 Branching activity  
Table 2-2 below summarises the evolution of the structure of the banking market, vis-à-vis 
branching activity and level of concentration for assets, loans and deposits. The table shows that 
since the end of the banking crisis in 1998, the total number of banks changed very little. In 1998, 
there were 13 banks operating a total of 150 branches across the country. Of the 13 banks, seven 
were foreign owned (two of which were public foreign owned), five local private banks and one 
public domestic bank. The public domestic bank had the largest branch network of 42 branches 
spread throughout the country, including the rural areas. Foreign owned banks operated a total of 67 
branches, nearly half of which were operated by Barclays bank, the largest bank in Zambia.  
 
 Table 2-2: Structure of the Zambian commercial banking sector, post crisis period            
   
1998 
   
2002 
   
2006 
 
 
Foreign Local Public 
 
Foreign Local Public 
 
Foreign Local Public 
 Number of banks  7 5 1 
 
8 5 1 
 
8 4 1 
 Number of Branches  67 41 42 
 
69 41 43 
 
60 58 43 
 Total assets (K'bn)  900.39 139.07 373.47 
 
3,199.76 443.70 979.16 
 
7,260.49 1,575.26 1,676.72 
 percent of industry assets  63.73 9.84 26.43 
 
67.73 9.39 20.73 
 
68.01 14.76 15.71 
 Loans (K'bn)  288.94 28.65 142.18 
 
825.85 83.29 65.61 
 
2,739.78 609.33 517.53 
 percent of industry loans  62.84 6.23 30.92 
 
84.73 8.54 6.73 
 
70.86 15.76 13.38 
Securities (K‟bn) 109.75 18.58 26.07 
 
528.27 135.37 383.81 
 
1,354.23 274.54 521.50 
percent of total industry holdings 71.08 12.03 16.88 
 
50.43 12.92 36.64 
 
62.98 12.77 24.25 
 Deposits (K'bn)  675.49 77.65 240.71 
 
2,139.14 188.21 771.70 
 
5,293.52 1,133.81 1,337.66 
 percent of industry deposits  67.97 7.81 24.22 
 
69.03 6.07 24.90 
 
68.17 14.60 17.23 
 Source: Bank of Zambia and own calculations           
 
The number of operating banks increased slightly to 14 in 2002, owing to the licensing of a new 
foreign bank, the African Banking Corporation (ABC) in 2000, bringing the total number of foreign 
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banks to eight. Other categories of banks remained unchanged until 2004, when a merger between 
New Capital Bank and Cavmont Merchant Bank was authorised, forming Cavmont Capital Bank 
(CCB) at the beginning of 2004. This is reflected in the reduced number of operating banks to 13 in 
2006. Together, these 13 banks operated a total of 161 branches in 2006, against 150 in 1998, 
representing growth in branching activity of 7.3 percent. The increase in branching activity arose 
from a countrywide expansion in the number of branches by Finance bank, one of the most 
successful local private banks. Specifically, it acquired some branches originally operated by 
Barclays bank, and opened a few new ones. The closure of some branches by Barclays bank led to a 
15.0 percent reduction in the total number of branches operated by foreign owned banks.
13
  
 
2.4.3 Market growth and concentration  
Table 2.2 also shows the growth in banking activity as well as the breakdown in the degree of 
concentration. From Table 2.2, aggregate industry assets grew substantially over the period, 
amounting to K10.7 trillion (US$2.9 billion) at the end of 2006. A third of this amount was held by 
foreign owned banks, depicting an 8.2 percent increase over the 1998 share. In value, the total 
amount of assets held by foreign banks more than doubled to K7.3 trillion (approximately US$2.0 
billion). The remainder was shared by local private banks and the public bank, which collectively 
accounted for 30.5 percent of industry assets, representing K3.3 billion (approximately US$0.9 
billion) in value.  
The dominance of foreign owned banks as measured by the value of assets predates the crisis 
and is a reflection of an entrenched position in all segments of the banking market. For the credit 
market, loans held by foreign banks amounted to K2.7 trillion (US$0.7 billion) in 2006, a growth of 
231 percent over 2002 position in nominal terms. The surge in advances came against a backdrop of 
renewed lending by most foreign banks, following an improvement in the macroeconomic 
environment since 2002. Again, during the same period, domestic banks and the state-owned bank 
lagged behind, recording total loans worth K1.1 trillion (US$0.3 billion) between them. As a 
                                                          
 
13
 Barclays bank closed almost half of its branches due to dwindling level of profitability of these branch offices in view 
of the changing market conditions induced by falling Treasury bill fortunes and rapid appreciation of the domestic 
currency, both of which caused a diminution of earnings. However, it would seem that Barclays bank management 
seriously miscalculated the ecnomic fundamentals because within a year of closing these branches, there was a  in policy 
shift, which saw an even more aggressive branching activity and recruitment of staff to man the new offices.   
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proportion of total industry loans, private domestic banks accounted for 15.8 percent and the public 
sector bank took up 13.4 percent. Measured against the 2002 level, both categories of banks recorded 
an improvement, even though the dominance of foreign banks remained evident despite shrinkage in 
their share of loans.  
On the liability side, purchased funds accounted for the largest share, taking up 80.5 percent of 
total liabilities. Accordingly, the following analysis pertains to the deposit side of the market. Here 
again we observe a dominating position by foreign banks throughout the review period. The stock of 
deposits held by foreign banks stood at K5.3 trillion (US$1.4 billion) in 2006, two thirds of the 
industry total deposits for the period. This amount also depicted a growth rate of 147.5 percent in 
nominal value over the 2002 position. Controlling for inflation effects, the growth rate in deposits for 
foreign banks was only 32.1 percent; that for domestic private banks was substantially higher at 
221.5 percent while the value of real deposits held by the public bank shrunk by 7.5 percent 
(increased by 73.3 percent in nominal terms).  
The above indicators depict the relative dominant position of foreign banks in the Zambian 
banking industry, a concern raised by the authorities as being inimical to overall competition in the 
sector. Table 2.3 shows more clearly the level of concentration in the banking sector in relation to the 
three-bank concentration ratio  3CR for assets, deposits and loans, respectively.  
 
Table 2-3: Concentration in the Zambian commercial banking sector 
Three bank concentration ratios, CR3 (percent):1998-2006 
    Assets 
 
Deposits 
 
Loans 
1998 
 
64.3 
 
67.7 
 
71.2 
1999 
 
66.2 
 
69.3 
 
77.1 
2000 
 
59.4 
 
61.9 
 
71.5 
2001 
 
60.3 
 
62.9 
 
74.0 
2002 
 
59.2 
 
62.4 
 
62.7 
2003 
 
55.8 
 
58.5 
 
60.6 
2004 
 
58.1 
 
61.5 
 
61.6 
2005 
 
55.8 
 
56.7 
 
60.1 
2006   50.4 
 
53.1 
 
59.7 
Average   58.4 
 
61.6 
 
66.5 
Source: BoZ data and author‟s own calculations 
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It can be seen from Table 2.3 that the three largest banks accounted for 58 percent of assets, 67 
percent of loans and 62 percent of deposits. Of the three banks included in the calculation of the 
ratio, two are foreign owned banks and the third is a public bank, which accounted for more than a 
fifth in each of the industry assets, deposits and loans. Figure 2.1 depicts the Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index  HHI which also shows a similar pattern.14  
 
Figure 2.1: Banking concentration - Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
 
 
 
       
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Source: BoZ data and author's own calculations    
 
From the chart we observe that the level of concentration was high for the loans market since 
the HHI exceeds the threshold of 1800 which regulators use to measure intensity of competition, 
indicating clear dominance of a few banks in this segment of the market. Yet again, foreign banks 
account for the largest proportion of the estimated HHI. The HHI for deposits and total assets shows 
a moderate level of concentration because it falls between 1000 and 1800. Both 3CR  and the HHI
show that despite a slight downward trend, the banking sector is still relatively more concentrated, 
depicting some evidence of market power. However, given the pitfalls of these structural measures in 
evaluating competitive conduct (World Bank, 2006; Hausman & Sidak, 2007), these conclusions 
                                                          
 
14
 The HHI  is calculated as 2
1
N
i
i
HHI s


 
where 
2
is  is the square of a bank‟s market share.  
 
1013
1226
1439
1652
1865
2078
2291
2504
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Assets Deposits Loans
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
21 
 
may be flawed even though the HHI  is more preferred to the CR3  as a measure of market structure 
because of its sensitivity to the number of firms and relative firm distribution (Amato, 1995).  
 
2.4.4 Bank capitalisation and solvency  
Since the end of the banking crisis, solvency concerns have lessened as commemrcial banks 
have generally recorded satisfactory capital performance (see Figure 2.2).  
 
 Figure 2.2: Aggregate capital adequacy position  
 
 
 
      
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       Source: BoZ data and author's own computations   
 
Figure 2.2 shows that the aggregate capital adequacy ratio (Cap Ratio) defined as total 
regulatory capital-to-risk weighted assets (RWA) has been increasing, but was at its lowest level in 
1999. Coming from a crisis, this year represents troubling times for small local banks. However, 
quick action by the regulatory authorities averted further deterioration in capital through the 
enactment of the Bank of Zambia Act of 1996 and the amendment in 2000 of the Banking and 
Finacial Services Act (BFSA) of 1994.
15
 Against this background, Zambian banks continued to 
exhibit an increasing level of compliance with the capital adequacy requirements, negating major 
concerns of solvency risk. 
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In 2006, Tier I capital as a proportion of risk-weighted assets averaged 20.7 percent, well above 
the 8 percent recommended under the Basle II Accord. It was also in excess of the regulator‟s own 
threshold of 10 percent. A similar picture is observed for total regulatory capital to risk-weighted 
assets, which amounted to 22.4 percent over the sample period. Thus the relative stability in the 
banking sector since the turbulent early years of reform has been ascribed to the improvement in 
regulatory and supervision capacity of the central bank. The existing pieces of legislation are now 
seen to provide sufficient scope for the central bank to preemptively deal with any problem banks.  
In relative terms, foreign owned banks boasted of better capitalisation than domestic banks, 
although both categories of banks remained compliant with the minimum requirements. The ratio of 
Tier I capital-to-risk weighted assets for foreign owned banks stood at an average of 23 percent 
between 1998 and 2006 against 17 percent for domestic private banks for the sample period. 
Evaluated against total regulatory capital, foreign banks had a capital-risk weighted assets ratio of 24 
percent compared with 19 percent for local banks.  
From the above, it is no surprise that the Zambian banking system has been described as 
adequately capitalised and in a better shape than before the crisis (IMF and World Bank, 2002; 
Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2004). The IMF/World Bank FSAP report actually gave 
Zambian banks a bill of approval, stating that despite other potential risks in the sector, these risks 
did not threaten banks‟ solvency given high capitalisation ratios.  
 
2.4.5 Sources of bank revenue   
Figure 2.3 below shows the evolution of three main sources of income, as a proportion of total 
operating income. Zambian banks earn their revenue from three main sources: interest on advances; 
interest on investment in securities and non-interest income (earned from fees, commissions and 
gains on foreign exchange transactions).  For the industry as a whole, the main source of revenue 
was interest income, averaging above 60 percent of total revenue. Over the years, interest income on 
loans (including net interest income from interbank placements) has been the largest component of 
total interest revenue, exceeding that of treasury securities. However, the share of loans interest 
income has been thinning over the years due to the obliterating effect of non-performing loans and 
accompanying provisioning. Nonetheless, between 2001 and 2004 the reduction in loans interest 
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revenue was offset by an increase in interest earned from investments in Government securities 
which bolstered the banks‟ revenue position.  
 Figure 2.3: Major sources of banks‟ income (percent share of total income)  
 
 
 
     
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      Source: Author's own calculations based on BoZ data  
 
In 2002, income from securities exceeded revenue from loan advances, thereby narrowing the 
gap between these two revenue sources. This trend continued until 2004 when the government 
implemented a domestic debt consolidation programme, culminating in significant reduction in 
borrowing requirements which underpinned the disinflation process. This programme led to a sharp 
decline in yield rates on securities, causing a concomitant decline in interest income on these 
investments. As a result, the proportion of revenue earned from securities shrunk and with this, a 
rebound in the share of loans interest revenue. 
In light of the above, it can be seen that interest income from securities as share of total income 
amounted to only 11.6 percent in 1998, but increased threefold to 34.5 percent in 2002, before it 
tumbled in 2004 to 31.1 percent, coinciding with the fall in yield rates. As the fall in yield rates 
steepened in 2006, the share of securities income in total revenue shrunk to its 2000 level of 19 
percent. The reduction in government borrowing requirement stemmed from an improvement in the 
macroeconomic profile, which also served as a catalyst for increased private sector lending by the 
banks, beginning in 2004. Indeed, de Luna Martinez (2006) reports that Barclays bank, the largest 
lender in the industry only resumed making loans to the private sector after a drastic fall in Treasury 
bill yield rates. Although the share of loans interest earnings in total interest income declined 
progressively from a peak of 32.9 percent in 1998 to 27 percent in 2002 it rebounded in 2004 to 27.6 
percent and increased even further to 30.1 percent in 2006 though it remained below the 1998 level. 
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However, the increase in the rate of non-performing loans from 2003/4 significantly dampened the 
uptake in loans income. Consequently, loans interest revenue grew less than the fall in returns on 
securities, implying a higher decrease in total interest income through to 2006. This is also 
highlighted in Figure 2.3 above.  
The steady increase in income from securities also acted as disincentive for exploiting other 
sources of income, outside traditional intermediation activities. In particular, since the banking crisis 
which saw a curb on speculative foreign exchange transactions, non-interest revenue declined, 
mirroring an expansion in traditional sources of revenue. Therefore, income on fees, commissions 
and gains from foreign exchange transactions exhibited volatility till 2001, just before the 
government instituted measures to put a further clamp on dollarisation activities. Subsequently, non-
interest income flattened somewhat, falling below the 40 percent mark as proportion of total income. 
The IMF/World Bank (2002) also made similar observations in the FSAP that foreign exchange 
gains suffered a knock in 2001 due to the relative stability of the Kwacha during that year.  
Although the share of non-interest income became a less important source of revenue between 
2001 and 2003, it has since recouped the sparkle of the early years, driven largely by diminishing 
income from securities. Thus, between 2004 and 2006, non-interest income accounted for an average 
of 37.4 percent against 34.6 percent recorded from 2001 to 2003. From 1998 to 2000, the proportion 
of non-interest income to total operating revenue amounted to 38.3 percent. The resurgence in non-
interest income was mainly attributed to fees and commissions, which offset the reduction in gains 
from foreign exchange trading as the domestic currency appreciated steeply from the third quarter of 
2005. Between 1998 and 2004 fee income as a proportion of non-interest income amounted to 36 
percent while gains from foreign exchange transactions accounted for 52 percent. The appreciation in 
the domestic currency saw a shift in the relative importance of these revenue sources. Accordingly, 
between 2005 and 2006, banks posted 47 percent in fees and commissions and 45 percent in gains 
from foreign exchange trading.  
 
2.4.6 Cost structure and profitability of commercial banks   
Strong earnings and profitability reflect a bank‟s capacity to build an adequate capital base 
necessary to absorb losses, finance its expansion and meet its obligations to shareholders. The widely 
used indicator of profitability is the return on assets (ROA) which is often supplemented by the 
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return on equity (ROE). The net interest margin (NIM) is another common measure of bank 
profitability. Figure 2.4 below shows the evolution of banks‟ aggregate costs and profitability 
indicators over the sample period. Zambian banks boast of high profits, underpinned by the three 
main income streams discussed above.  
 
Figure 2.4: Aggregate profitability and cost-earnings ratio   
 
 
 
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     Source: Bank of Zambia, and author's own estimates  
 
The pattern of profits as measured by the return on assets (ROA) mirrored the evolution in net 
interest margin (NIM) defined as net interest revenue divided by earnings assets. Volatility 
characterised the movements in both ROA and NIM, especially between 2002 and 2006. The ROA 
ranged from a low of 3.0 percent in 2004 to a high of 6.0 percent recorded in 2006. Similarly for 
NIM, it fell to a low of 3.0 percent in 2003 and reached a peak of 6.7 percent in 2005, the highest 
since 1998. However, both indicators reflected movements in the banks‟ cost structure depicted by 
the cost-earnings ratio (CER) that is, ratio of operating costs to net income.  
Between 1998 and 2000, the level of profitability was strong, allowing banks to record an 
annual average of 5.9 percent return on assets. This was also consistent with the increase in net 
interest margin (NIM) across the industry. However, both ROA and NIM dipped in 2001, as banks 
lost significant amount of revenue due to exchange losses. The decrease in ROA was greater than 
that of NIM, mainly because interest earnings remained high relative to interest expenses.  
Several factors explain the level of profitability. Most importantly, they reflect a sustained 
upward trend in yield rates for government securities more than a reduction in operating costs. 
Therefore, without a major shift in revenue sources, banks remain vulnerable to sharp declines in 
government borrowing requirements and the accompanying shrinkage in yield rates on Treasury 
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securities. This was especially evident during 2005-2006 when yield rates on Treasury securities 
plummeted to record lows, falling below 10 percent since 1998. Accordingly, both ROA and NIM 
declined.  
Another explanation for the wide interest margins may be macroeconomic instability as given 
by the high and variable rate of inflation. Over the sample period, inflation averaged 20.5 percent 
mainly because of government‟s appetite for deficit financing during the 1990s and early 2000s. 
Between 1998 and 2002, the rate of inflation averaged 24.8 percent but fell drastically to around 16 
percent between 2003 and 2006, thanks to stringent fiscal operations complemented by a strong anti-
inflationary monetary policy pursued by the Bank of Zambia. These factors eventually culminated in 
the drastic fall in the inflation rate to 8.2 percent at the end of 2006. This was the first time the rate of 
inflation had hit single digit in three decades. 
Until 2007, commercial banks had suffered high and unremunerated reserve requirements. In 
2003, the reserve ratio on liquid assets was reduced to 14 percent from 17.5 percent to induce 
lending to the private sector. However, banks responded rather sluggishly, prompting the central 
bank to lower the ratio further to 8.0 percent in 2007. Nonetheless, long years of high reserve 
requirements served as a disincentive for meaningful reduction in lending rates, which remained 
persistently higher than deposit rates, leading to a wide interest rate spread and net interest margin. 
At a disaggregated level, Table 2.4 below shows profitability by bank ownership structure. Foreign 
owned banks recorded higher profits than domestic private and public sector banks.  
 
 Table 2-4: Bank profitability measures, by ownership category 
 
Return on assets, ROA (percent) 
 
Net interest margin, NIM (percent) 
 
Foreign Local Public All 
 
Foreign Local Public All 
1998 4.80 0.85 2.75 3.89 
 
5.47 2.29 0.39 3.86 
1999 7.92 0.47 0.17 5.61 
 
4.53 1.01 1.81 2.97 
2000 9.99 3.12 4.32 8.16 
 
6.72 4.17 1.66 5.74 
2001 7.48 5.93 -7.16 4.70 
 
5.65 4.81 1.82 5.35 
2002 7.15 7.60 6.43 7.05 
 
4.64 5.68 5.29 5.35 
2003 5.65 6.27 0.93 4.76 
 
2.85 5.80 0.09 3.70 
2004 3.14 4.94 1.31 3.02 
 
5.10 7.54 5.01 6.00 
2005 6.52 6.99 3.15 6.00 
 
5.25 7.71 9.15 6.70 
2006 3.98 5.27 1.33 3.68 
 
4.75 4.84 7.18 5.60 
Average 6.29 4.61 1.47 5.21 
 
5.00 4.87 3.60 5.03 
Source: Calculated from BoZ data 
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At an average of 6.3 percent, foreign owned banks‟ level of profits was 37 percent higher than 
that for domestic private banks and was 4.3 times greater than that posted by the public sector banks. 
A striking feature of the banks‟ profitability is that foreign owned banks lost their first position to 
domestic private banks between 2002 and 2006, thanks to the latter group‟s rationalisation of 
operational costs.
16
 During this period, domestic banks performed better in profitability terms. 
From 2002-2006, the return on assets and net interest margin for domestic banks averaged 6.2 
percent and 6.3 percent, respectively. For foreign banks, profitability ratios were 5.3 percent for 
ROA and 4.5 percent for the NIM over the same period. In the preceding three years (1998-2001), 
domestic private banks recorded ROA of 2.6 percent on average and NIM averaging 3.1 percent 
against 7.5 percent and 5.6 percent, respectively for their foreign owned counterparts. The 
improvement in profit performance showed that domestic private banks had recouped the loss in 
profitability since the banking crisis which dampened their earning opportunities as a result of flight 
to quality.  
The performance of the state owned bank was dogged by a sharp increase in losses, which saw 
negative profits in 2001. However, in 2002 profits rebounded strongly but this momentum was short-
lived as profits dissipated, reeling below 2 percent on average between 2003 and 2006. Therefore, 
the recovery of 2002 was insufficient to wipe out the earlier losses mainly due to a reduction in fee 
income and a stable currency which substantially eroded foreign exchange gains. This underscores 
the bank‟s vulnerability to foreign exchange trading to cushion its income against falling interest 
earnings.   
From the data above, except during 2002-2006, the state owned bank had the lowest level of 
NIM. Prior to this period, the public sector bank lagged behind all bank categories in NIM, posting 
only 1.4 percent between 1998 and 2001. However, a clean up in the balance sheet boosted the 
quality of assets and with this, a revamp in earnings and profitability. Accordingly, between 2002 
and 2006, the public sector bank recorded NIM of 5.4 percent, even higher than that for foreign 
owned banks.  
                                                          
 
16  
The expense ratio (i.e., ratio of non-interest expense to net operating revenue) amounted to 59.0 percent for domestic 
private banks excluding the state owned bank during 2002-2006 while that for foreign banks was 70.0 percent over the 
same period. However, from 1998-2001, domestic private banks‟ expense ratio was 0.22 percentage points higher than 
foreign owned banks. Clearly therefore, domestic banks instituted cost saving measures in the latter part of the study 
period, which resulted into better profit performance. 
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The wide margins observed from the preceding discussion are a reflection of the oligopolistic 
nature and conduct in the Zambian banking market. With non-interest expenses exceeding three 
quarters of total operating costs, this suggests that Zambian banks have scope to capture efficiency 
gains by reducing operating costs, especially those related to employee compensation and benefits.  
 
2.4.7 Measures of financial development and intermediation in the Zambian banking sector   
The Zambian banking industry is also underdeveloped and exhibits low intermediation (see 
Table 2.5 below. Relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), total banking assets amounted to 25.3 
percent between 1998 and 2001 while during 2002-2006, this figure increased marginally to 26.8 
percent. Equally, reforms notwithstanding, the ratio of private sector credit to GDP amounted to only 
7.6 percent between 2002 and 2006, a marginal increase from 7.1 percent recorded during the 1998-
2001 period.  
 
 Table 2-5:Indicators of financial development and intermediation (Percent of GDP) 
    ASSETS PUBLIC CREDIT PRIVATE CREDIT 
1998 
 
23.44 2.54 6.52 
1999 
 
24.63 3.10 6.98 
2000 
 
26.10 3.54 8.20 
2001 
 
26.90 5.92 6.87 
2002 
 
29.05 5.64 5.89 
2003 
 
26.79 8.76 6.57 
2004 
 
27.13 6.93 7.92 
2005 
 
23.84 7.31 7.23 
2006   27.22 6.05 10.16 
1998-2001 
 
25.27 3.77 7.14 
2002-2006 
 
26.81 6.94 7.55 
1998-2006   26.12 5.53 7.37 
Source: IMF (IFS online edition); BoZ (Macroeconomic indicators) and own calculations 
 
The banks‟ private credit as a share of GDP is one of the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa and was 
marginally higher than credit to the public sector. Between 2002 and 2006, the annual average ratio 
of private credit to GDP was 7.6 percent, a slight improvement over the preceding period from 1998-
2001. Over the corresponding period, the ratio of credit to government averaged 6.9 percent per 
annum, an expansion of 84.1 percent relative to the period from 1998 to 2001. The bulk of bank 
credit to government was accumulated during 2002-2004 before fiscal consolidation took effect. 
Subsequently, as noted above, debt accumulation receded culminating in low growth of fresh 
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issuance of Treasury securities. Nonetheless, the relatively high proportion of credit to the public 
sector reflected preference for the low risky securities over more risky private sector lending. This 
also reflects the underdeveloped nature of the Zambian financial system.  
 
2.4.8 Implications of observations in chapter two   
Unlike in developed countries and emerging markets, the Zambian banking industry has not 
experienced any form of consolidation, whether market driven or government induced. Rather, the 
observed levels of industry concentration stem mainly from the dominance of foreign owned banks, 
which pre-dates independence. Although their dominance has been reduced somewhat, this is too 
small to erode their market share.  
The literature shows that foreign bank presence in the domestic banking sector is good for 
competition and efficiency (Claessens & Laeven, 2004; Gelos & Roldos, 2004; Jayaratne & Stratan, 
1998). These benefits are amplified by the process of financial liberalisation. However, in the case of 
Zambia, de Luna Martinez (2006) argues otherwise, suggesting that despite policies of open doors, 
competition and efficiency are low and there is no product innovation among foreign banks. The 
banking industry is also characterised by high operating costs, wide margins and profitability ratios. 
The level of financial intermediation is also at low levels.  
This is in stark contrast with the theoretical prediction of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis that 
financial liberalisation fosters financial intermediation by encouraging savings mobilisation and 
thereby promoting financial development. In the Zambian banking industry, savings are constrained 
by negative real deposit interest rates while credit to the private sector is hampered by the high cost 
of lending and other structural impediments, including prohibitive loan pre-qualification 
requirements and the banks‟ appetite for relatively less risk government debt instruments. The 
relatively high proportion of foreign currency assets in total assets has perpetuated the financial 
disintermediation because banks enjoy better returns on foreign currency deneominated assets than 
on domestic private sector lending.   
Whether the observed high level of concentration is evidence of efficient operations as 
propagated by the efficient-structure hypothesis (Demsetz, 1973; Peltzman, 1977) or a general 
tendency towards non-competitive behaviour is unclear. The exact form of competitive conduct and 
degree of efficiency can only be determined by interacting measures of market structure and bank 
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behaviour. Without such an assessment, we cannot predict with any degree of certainty about the 
implications of this concentration and related high profitability ratios.  
To the banks‟ credit, the level of solvency and liquidity are sufficiently high indicating low 
probability of systemic risks in the industry. This derives mainly from stringent regulatory 
requirements instituted after the banking crisis of the mid-1990s to enhance solvency of commercial 
banks. Whether this regulatory regime has benefitted Zambian commercial banks in terms of 
competition and efficiency performance is a matter we take up in empirical sections of this 
dissertation.    
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e   
 
An Overview of the Microeconomic Theories of Banking 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Until the early 1970s, the theory of the banking firm focussed on one form of bank behaviour or 
another without addressing the banking firm as a whole in terms of its functions, conduct, 
performance and response to regulatory and other policy changes (Baltensperger, 1980). In 
particular, the theory of portfolio selection pioneered by Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958) 
dominated the literature. Portfolio selection models emphasised the role of banks as investors 
without analysing their behavioural aspects as firms. This perception changed in the early 1970s with 
the emergence of microeconomic models of banking with roots in the industrial organisation (IO) 
literature. In particular, the seminal work of Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) later referred to as the 
Klein-Monti model provided insights into the behaviour of commercial banks under different market 
structures.  
This part of the thesis gives an overview of some of the authoritative studies which have shaped 
the analysis of banking behaviour over the years. This review is not exhaustive but aims at 
highlighting theories relevant to the study of competition and efficiency in the banking industry in 
order to properly contextualise the discussion of these issues in this study. Whilst acknowledging the 
contribution of early theories of banking vis-à-vis portfolio selection and related models, a particular 
point of emphasis is placed on those models founded on microeconomic theory. Studies by Pyle 
(1971), Santomero (1984), Bhattacharya and Thankor  (1993) give a comprehensive review of early 
portfolio selection models. For a review of both portfolio selection and microeconomic models of 
banking, see Baltensperger (1980) and Swank (1996). Freixas and Rochet (1997) is a particularly 
influential source of banking theories and models founded in the IO literature.  
A starting point for the review is recognition of the banks‟ basis for existence and the role they 
perform (Allen & Santomero, 2001). This issue has been touched on in the introductory chapter of 
the thesis. However, to reiterate, the basis for banks‟ existence is to ameliorate risks associated with 
market imperfections. Specifically, because of information asymmetry and associated problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection in credit markets, banks become an important avenue of 
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overcoming such asymmetries through their intermediation role. It is this very special function which 
distinguishes banks from other firms and has been the central theme of theoretical as well as 
empirical research on banking. 
 
3.2 Theories of banking  
Theories of banking are directly linked to the banks‟ basic functions in an environment 
characterised by imperfections. Baltensperger (1980) and Swank (1996) classify these theories as 
falling within two broad categories. The first category is the incomplete models of banking (e.g., 
portfolio selection and/or risk management theories, models of bank runs, credit rationing models 
and bank regulation models). The second category is called complete theories of banking, principally 
based on the industrial organisation literature. It is important to emphasise that the multiplicity of 
different theories of the banking firm is attributed to the inability of any one model to address all 
aspects of banking. Below is a brief discussion of some of the models of banking.  
 
3.3 Partial theories of banking behaviour 
3.3.1 Portfolio models of banking 
Portfolio selection bank models use risk management as the basis for analysing banking 
behaviour. Pioneered by Markowitz (1952) and Tobin (1958) the main thrust of portfolio selection 
theory is that banks select a portfolio of securities rather than individual assets (and liabilities) based 
on risk-return characteristics and treat these markets as perfectly competitive. According to 
Markowitz (1952) asset diversification defines the optimal investment decision for a financial firm, 
implying that banks behave as rational investors and decide upon the optimal portfolio mix to 
maximise expected profits.  
In the Tobin (1958) framework, liquidity preference of households and firms forms the basis of 
the analysis. The framework includes the risk free asset and analyses the role of debt contraction in 
portfolio choice. Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Sharpe (1963) built on this theory, completely 
revolutionising the field of corporate finance. The Miller and Modigliani (1961) model demonstrates 
that the value of a firm is not affected by the method of financing investment (that is, equity or debt). 
Instead, it depends on the outcome of that investment defined by the return the firm receives. On the 
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other hand, Sharpe (1963) explored an approach known as market (or single factor) model by 
reasoning that the return on each security is linearly related to a single index, such as the stock 
market index. 
 
3.3.1 Models of bank runs 
Bank runs are a common feature of financial crises and have played a significant role in 
monetary history (Kindleberger, 1978). Bank runs have a tendency to be contagious with devastating 
economic outcomes, including contraction in output. For the United States, studies have shown that 
the economic damage inflicted on the economy during the Great Depression was mainly induced by 
bank runs (Bernanke, 1983). The financial meltdown of 2008 stirred up renewed debate on the effect 
of insability in the banking system and its effect on global and national economies.  
In their influential paper, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) developed a framework for analysing 
bank runs, liquidity and optimal insurance scheme. They argue that due to withdrawal risk, banks can 
be forced to liquidate their assets at a loss to meet sudden liquidity requirements by depositors. To 
prevent a run on the banking system, the optimal solution is government regulation in form of a 
deposit insurance. Allen and Gale (2000) provide further evidence and show that banks hold 
interregional claims (similar to interbank assets) as insurance against liquidity preference shocks. 
When there is no aggregate uncertainty in the market the first best allocation of risk sharing can be 
achieved, but this arrangement is financially fragile. Therefore, it is easier to see that contagion can 
easily spread throughout the financial system when a shock hits one region and is transmitted to 
other banks. The possibility of contagion depends strongly on the completeness of the structure of 
interregional claims (Allen and Gale, 2000:1). Freixas and Rochet (1997) provide a good overview 
of models of bank runs and the role of regulation.  
 
3.3.2 Bank regulation models 
Related to models of bank runs is another class of theories of banking, namely bank regulation 
models. The basis of bank regulation stems from their susceptibility to failures. Therefore, regulatory 
authorities institute mechanisms to curtail factors that may jeopardise the proper functioning of the 
financial system. Since banks hold a substantial amount of depositors‟ funds, a small disruption to 
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their functioning could destroy household savings and at the same time restrict firm‟s access to 
credit.  
Essentially, regulation is a response to market failures and imperfections in banking. Freixas 
and Santomero (2002) argue that one cannot discuss banking, its existence, its regulation or the 
effect of such regulation in a world without financial imperfections. Therefore, financial regulation 
instils discipline by compelling banks to behave in a prudent manner. Different bank regulation 
models have been proposed in the literature. A dominant view emphasises the safety of depositors‟ 
funds and soundness of the banking system (Santos, 2000). Theoretically, this model prescribes the 
minimum capital or equity requirements aimed at inducing optimal governance of banks. Hence, 
capital standards are used to define the threshold for the transfer of control from shareholders to the 
regulator. The safety and soundness regulation model also prescribes the minimum level of assets 
held in one sector or firm, highlighting the importance of assets diversification and reduction of 
funding risk.  
The other model of bank regulation stipulates the entry requirements and activity lines of 
banking business. Increasing or decreasing the cost of entry into the banking sector could affect the 
profitability of firms already competing in the industry. It could also determine the degree of 
competition and level of efficiency in the banking sector. When bank regulation restricts the banks‟ 
scope of permitted activities under a given charter, this has important implications on bank conduct 
and the evolution of market structure. Entry regulatory policy may produce unintended outcomes. 
Therefore, it must be well designed and made compatible with competitiveness of the industry 
(Crampton, 2003). 
 
3.3.3 Credit rationing models   
The prevalence of information asymmetry and associated problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection in credit markets has been the central area of research for many economists. The problems 
of moral hazard and adverse are especially acute in the banking industry and interact with other 
banking characteristics to determine bank performance.  
Hodgman (1960) was one of the first to develop a credit rationing theory consistent with profit-
maximizing behaviour. This framework has remained at the centre of the literature of credit-rationing 
models. The basic notion is that the bank‟s risk of loss (risk of default) is positively related to loan 
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exposure. Hodgman (1960) envisages a bank‟s expected return as consisting of two parts with 
probabilities attached to them. The minimum return is realised when there is default and, in the 
absence of default, the full return is obtained and it is given by the loan rate less the cost of raising 
deposits on the money market. At low levels of loan amounts, the probability of default is negligible, 
but rises with an increase in the amount of loans. As the loan size increases after a certain point, the 
probability of default rises so that the profit on the loan starts to decrease. This results in a backward 
bending loan offer curve.  
The widely cited model of credit rationing, due to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), is similar in 
reasoning to Hodgman‟s (1960) characterisation. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that because of 
moral hazard, a high loan interest rate induces borrowers who succeed in obtaining loans to engage 
in risky projects with a high probability of failure but promising a high return if successful. 
Similarly, because of adverse selection, low quality investors with a high risk of default seek to 
obtain loans even at a higher interest rate. Therefore, an increase in the loan rate above some critical 
level chases away good borrowers who are unable to repay the loan at a higher rate. To exclude less 
creditworthy customers, banks set the loan rate below the market clearing threshold and rations 
credit at this rate, driving away some loan applicants. In equilibrium, credit rationing is an optimal 
response to moral hazard and adverse selection. For an overview of credit rationing models see 
Freixas and Rochet (1997) and Santomero (1984).  
Incomplete models discussed above do not provide an integrated view of banking behaviour, 
including an endogenous determination of the total scale of operation of the banking firm 
(Baltensperger, 1980). These models also exclude from the analysis the importance of real resource 
costs banks incur when performing their functions. For example, in screening their customers, banks 
expend an enormous amount of resources, related to labour, capital and other material costs (Swank, 
1996; Hanak, 1992; Baltensperger, 1980). Many other bank functions also have implications on 
conduct and performance and the structure of the banking sector. For this reason, a partial view of 
the banking firm is inconsistent with the analysis of banking behaviour. Hence, Murphy (1972) 
admits that “my own work dealt with most aspects of banking….but in each case a partial view of a 
particular problem was taken, a procedure about which I felt somewhat uneasy” (p.614). 
In view of the partial approach taken by incomplete models of banking, Swank (1996), Hanak 
(1992) and Baltenesperger (1980), among others, offer alternative explanations for modelling the 
banking firm. They argue that complete models with foundation in industrial organisation economics 
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better describe the nature and performance of banks. Complete theories of bank behaviour are a 
subject of the subsequent discussions.  
 
3.4 Complete theories of banking 
The production of bank output requires use of some inputs, which entails incurring both 
financial and real resource costs. Intuitively, banks intermediate between borrowers and lenders and 
therefore incur transactions and monitoring costs. Banks also incur screening costs due to 
information acquisition on the quality of borrowers and their collateral. Therefore, a model of 
banking must incorporate the real resource costs incurred by banks in the intermediation process. 
These real resource costs include expenses on labour, equipment and services rendered to the bank 
customers, including those incurred on settlement of payments. One would therefore think of a 
service-based theory of banking. Complete theories of banking have been dominated by models 
founded in industrial organisation literature. Some of these models are discussed below.  
 
3.4.1 Industrial organisation models of banking17 
Models of banking that use the theory of industrial organisation as their foundation have for a 
long time received wide application in the banking literature. These models deal with growth, size, 
market structure, conduct and performance (efficiency) in the banking industry. Previous models of 
the banking firm ignored the extent of rivalry in banking markets and the number of banks and 
relative size were taken as exogenously determined (VanHoose, 1988). Therefore, because individual 
banks interact strategically with other banks in a manner that influences their behaviour, complete 
models of banking have emerged to fill the void left by incomplete models. This reasoning derives 
from the fact that although special in nature, banks possess behavioural characteristics similar to 
those of non-financial firms. Therefore, a theory of the firm suited to banking can be applied to 
analyse their behaviour. In view of this, IO models have formed the basis for analysing the bank 
production process in the context of the real resource cost theory of the banking firm.  
 
                                                          
 
17
 This section borrows significantly from Freixas and Rochet (1997).   
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
o
n 
37 
 
3.4.2 Banking behaviour under perfect competition  
The workhorse of complete models and indeed many of the IO approaches to banking is the 
Klein-Monti model (Klein, 1971; Monti, 1972). In a perfect competition framework, the model 
assumes that the banking system is composed of a large number of banks each of which is an 
atomistic individual unable to influence market price and/or output. Therefore, banks are profit 
maximising agents taking price as given while minimising costs. The model is set out as follows. 
There are N small homogenous banks, with an identical cost function denoted by  C = C D,L
depicting the production costs of deposits  D  and loans  L , respectively. As price takers in the 
market, banks take the loan rate  Lr , deposit rate  Dr and the money market rate  r  as given.  
The individual bank faces a downward sloping demand for loans  LL r and an upward sloping 
supply of deposits  DD r . Inverting these curves yields  LrL  and  DrD implying that the rate of 
interest on loans is a function of loan demand and the deposit interest rate is a function of supply of 
deposits, respectively. The cash reserves, R  are given by the equation below 
 
 R = 1- D - L        (3.1) 
where,  denotes fraction of deposits held in cash (unremunerated) reserves at the central bank.
18
 
The bank also participates in the interbank market and can lend or borrow at the interest rate struck 
by interbank liquidity conditions. The bank‟s profit maximisation objective is therefore given by   
 
       L Dπ L,D = r - r L+ r 1- - r D -C L,D   .    (3.2) 
 
The banks‟ profit  π , is a sum of intermediation margins on loans and deposits, net of production 
costs. The first order conditions are given by Equation (3.3):  
 
                                                          
 
18
 In some countries, central banks pay interest on cash reserves. Furthermore, some developed countries have done away 
with required reserves altogether. In Zambia, cash reserves do not attract interest payment.   
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  
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    (3.3) 
where  Lr - r is the margin between the loan rate and interbank rate,   Dr 1- - r  is the margin 
between the deposit and interbank rate, '
LC  is marginal cost of producing loans and 
'
DC  is marginal 
cost of servicing deposits. Intuitively, Equation (3.3) states that a competitive bank will adjust its 
volume of loans and deposits at the point where interest rate margins equal marginal costs. This 
means that an increase in the deposit rate will cause a reduction in the bank‟s demand for deposits. 
Conversely, a high loan rate leads to a fall in the supply of bank loans. Rearranging Equation (3.3) 
and solving for Lr yields the following result: 
 
   ' 'L D L Dr = r+r +C L,D +C L,D      (3.4). 
 
 
Upon further rearranging we obtain the interest spread given by Equation (3.5) below 
 
 
   ' 'L D L Dr - r = r+C L,D +C L,D      (3.5). 
 
The result given by Equation (3.5) is a fundamental finding. It states that the intermediation margin 
 L Dr - r is driven by the reserve ratio and the sum of marginal costs of servicing loans and deposits 
by the bank. The central message implied by the perfect competition model of banking is that the 
intensity of competition among banks should induce a reduction in the price of bank products and 
services while quantity should increase. Consequently, this would dampen monopoly profits enjoyed 
by individual banks (Besanko & Thakor, 1992; Guzman, 2000).  
One of the applications of the perfect competition model of banking is a study by Alencar and 
Nakane (2004). Using Brazil as an example, the authors analyse banking behaviour in a model with 
agency costs and costly verification technology. The model evaluates two cases – a competitive 
scenario and a case where banks have market power. Numerical simulation results show that greater 
competition in the loan market enhances the response of the real economy to an interest rate shock. 
The authors also submit that higher competition and/or a more efficient verification technology 
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reduces the reaction of both the default rate and interest rate spread to an interest rate shock. Finally, 
they argue that the influence of the verification technology in the economy‟s dynamic response is 
greater when banks operate under perfect competition. This result gives credence to the hypothesis 
that monetary transmission is strong under highly competitive banking market conditions.  
 
3.4.3 Klein-Monti original monopoly model of banking 
The theory of perfect competition in banking is one polar of market structure in the industrial 
organisation literature. Given the assumptions of price taking behaviour, this model is very 
restrictive and unrealistic for practical purposes. Furthermore, because the banking sector is 
characterised by different forms of barriers to entry, the imperfect competition model would 
probably be the more appropriate model of analysis. Before presenting the oligopoly model of 
banking, we need to discuss the original formulation of another extreme case of banking, namely the 
monopoly model of bank behaviour.  
The framework is simple in structure yet it has served as benchmark for analysis of bank 
behaviour. The model assumes a single bank operating in the industry, choosing among three assets: 
cash reserves, loans and Treasury bills. The model also distinguishes among three types of liabilities, 
namely demand deposits, time deposits and equity capital which is set exogenously. This model 
establishes that a profit maximizing monopoly bank operating in a well-developed financial market 
will equalise the marginal cost of deposits and the marginal return on loans to an exogenous market 
rate such as the Treasury bill or the interbank rate. Reasoning analogously as in the perfect 
competition framework the monopolist bank maximises
19
 
 
          1L Dπ L,D = r L L r D L - r D D -C L,D      (3.6) 
 
Assuming that the profit function is concave and twice differentiable, the following first order 
conditions obtain 
                                                          
 
19
 The difference between the perfect competition and monopolist banking case is that the latter takes into account the 
infuence of the stock of loans on the loan rate  Lr L and similarly for deposits,  Dr D .   
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 
   ' 0'L L
L,D
r L r r -C L,D
L

   

L     (3.7a) 
 
 
     ' 0'D D D
L,D
r D D r 1- - r C L,D
D



    

   (3.7b) 
 
From the above equations we have the prediction of the Klein-Monti monopolistic model of banking 
which states that the optimal amount of loans  L is determined solely by Equation (3.7a) and the 
optimal stock of deposits  D  is determined by Equation (3.7b). Similarly, the optimal solutions for 
loan and deposit rates are given by Lr
  and Dr
 , respectively. Therefore, the bank‟s lending decision 
 LL r is independent of the deposits supply function  DD r . 
Let the loan demand elasticity be defined as 
 
 
'
0
L L
L
L
r L r
e
L r
    and the deposit supply 
elasticity as
 
 
'
0
D D
D
D
r D r
e
D r
  . Substituting these terms in (3.7a) and (3.7b) and using the 
equilibrium solutions of Lr
  and Dr
 , we get: 
 
 
' 1L L
L L L
r r C
r e r

 
 
       (3.8a) 
 
 
 
'1 1D D
D D D
r r C
r e r
 
 
  
     (3.8b) 
 
The left hand side of expressions (3.8a) and (3.8b) depict the Lerner Indices for loans and deposits, 
respectively and  state that a monopolistic bank sets its volume of loans and deposits such that the 
Lerner Indices equal inverse elasticities.
20
 These Lerner Indices are adapted to the banking sector to 
                                                          
 
20
 The Lerner Index  LI is given by  P - MC P where P is price of bank output and MC is marginal cost of 
production. 
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depict market power exercised in the loans and deposits markets. The greater the banks‟ market 
power in these markets, the smaller the respective elasticity and the higher the Lerner Index.  
Although the monopolist model of banking yields some useful properties, it has received a lot 
of criticisms, centred mainly on the independent dichotomy of loans and deposits determination. For 
example, Swank (1996) argues that this dichotomy is a direct consequence of simplifications 
inherent in the model, rather than a result of price setting behaviour. Not surprisingly therefore, 
extensions to the model suggest that assets and liabilities and interest rates are all interdependent.  
For instance, Dermine (1984; 1986) and Goodman and Santomero (1986) examined the 
implications of different premium structures of deposit insurance on the model. The results indicate 
that incorporating liquidity and solvency factors invalidate the assumption of the independence 
dichotomy. The assumption of risk neutrality has also been questioned. Given the uncertainty in 
financial markets, risk is a fundamental problem in banking. Therefore, an explicit treatment of risk 
in the model exposes the key role of market imperfections and yields results ignored by the Klein-
Monti model (Pringle, 1974). 
 
3.4.4 The imperfect (oligopolistic) competition model of banking 
The disillusionment with failures of perfect competition and monopolistic models to provide 
practical explanations of banking behaviour has naturally yielded to different models of banking. For 
all practical intents, imperfect competition more reasonably approximates actual banking behaviour. 
There is a voluminous literature in support of this view.
21
 As conjectured by proponents of the theory 
of oligopolistic markets, banks typically operate in a monopolistically competitive environment, 
making this class of imperfect competition models more appealing. Therefore, models of imperfect 
competition in the banking sector offer robust improvements to the analysis of bank behaviour 
(Freixas & Rochet, 1997; Toolsema, 2003). 
A more accurate description of reality is to assume that the banking sector is characterised by a 
finite number of banks, N operating in an imperfect Cournot competition framework. For simplicity, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
21 
In Chapters four and six below, we give a detailed review of the literature for competition and market power in the 
banking sector and outline the main conclusions contained in the studies reviewed. Empirical evidence is then provided 
based on the Zambian banking sector.
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the basic assumptions of the traditional Klein-Monti model remain unchanged. However, all banks 
now face the same linear cost function denoted by 
 
 , 1,......,n L DC L D L D n N        (3.9) 
 
Furthermore, each bank takes the amount of loans and deposits chosen by other banks as given and 
maximises its profit by choosing its own amount of loans and deposits. Therefore, the profit 
maximisation condition for each bank is   
 
   1 ,L n m n D n m n n n
m n m n
r L L r L r r D D D C L D 
 
        
              
        
   (3.10) 
 
Solving the objective function, Freixas and Rochet (1997) show that a Cournot equilibrium is an N 
firm of vectors of the stock of loans and deposits  
1,2,..,
,*n n n N
L D

, so that for every n ,  ,n nL D 
maximises the profit for each individual bank. The solutions yield a unique equilibrium where each 
bank sets its equilibrium stock of loans, 
*
n
L
L
n
 and volume of deposits, *n
D
D
n
 . The first order 
conditions with respect to the equilibrium stock of loans, *nL  and optimal level of deposits, 
*
nD  are 
given by the following set of equations:  
 
   ' 0
*
n
L L
n
L
r L r L r
L N

 

    

L      (3.11a) 
 
     ' 0n D D D
n
D
r D r 1 r D
D N



        

    (3.11b) 
Rewriting the first order conditions in elasticity form yields the equivalent Lerner Indices as follows: 
 
 
 
1L L
L L L
r r
r Ne r

 
 
       (3.12a) 
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 
 
1 1D D
D D D
r r
r Ne r
 
 
  
     (3.12b) 
 
The equilibrium solutions of the oligopoly model differ from those obtained in a monopolistic 
banking model only in the measurement of elasticities. For the oligopoly framework presented 
above, the elasticities are multiplied by a factor of N , the total number of banks in the industry. 
Intuitively therefore, the Klein-Monti model of monopolistic banking may be reinterpreted as a 
special case of imperfect competition when 1N  . When N  , we have the other end of perfect 
competition. Intermediate N values of banks denote monopolistic competition. Accordingly, the 
Lerner Index  LI closer to zero denotes intensifying competition while the converse obtains when 
competition among banks is weak. If a firm leaves the industry, output should fall and price rise, so 
that the price-cost margin (Lerner Index) increases. Thus, for N = 1 , the Lerner Index tends to 
approach unity because price is always above marginal cost. Under perfect competition LI = 0  since 
price is equal to marginal cost. Monopolistic competition can therefore be being conceived as a 
middle range of the Lerner Index  0 < LI <1 . The intermediate case of the Lerner Index measures 
the average deviation of banks‟ behaviour from the bipolar cases of monopoly and perfect 
competition. According to Coccorese (2009), it expresses the true degree of market power exercised 
by banks. 
These conjectures can then be used to evaluate the responsiveness of the changes in the money 
market rate on the loan and deposit rates as the number of firms is altered in the banking industry. 
For instance, when the intensity of competition increases as the market tends to a perfect competitive 
case, a change in the money market rate induces a smaller response in the loan rate while the 
response of the deposit rate is greater under similar conditions. This can be seen by partially 
differentiating the solutions of the equilibrium loan rate Lr
 and deposit rate, Dr

.The equilibrium loan 
rate is given by  
 
 
*
L L*
L *
L L
Ne r
r =
Ne r -1
     (3.13) 
The equilibrium deposit rate is denoted by  
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The response of the 
Lr
 to changes in r is obtained by the following equation 
 
 
1
1
1
L
L
r
r
Ne r






     (3.15) 
 
From Equation (3.15), the response of the loan rate to changes in the money market rate is 
determined by the intensity of competition. Hence when N  , Lr
 becomes less sensitive to 
changes in r . The response of the deposit rate can be derived analogously (see Freixas and Rochet, 
1997). Another prediction of the imperfect (oligopoly) competition model presented above is that the 
interest spread between the loan rate and the deposit rate narrows down as N increases due to rising 
competitive pressures. The observed pattern in the Zambian banking industry is at variance with the 
theoretical prediction, mainly due to structural and macroeconomic factors, including embellished 
inflation expectations and high default rates.  
Although the Cournot model discussed here addresses the shortcomings inherent in the standard 
Klein-Monti monopoly model, there have been some extensions of this framework by introducing 
aspects ignored in the formulation of the imperfect competition model. For example, Prisman, et al. 
(1986) developed a stochastic model consistent with oligopolistic competition by introducing 
uncertainty and liquidity requirements using a two-stage bank decision framework. They assume that 
an individual bank is a price taker in the bond market and price setter in the loan market and certain 
deposit markets.  
The model yields very interesting results. Both liquidity constraints and uncertainty push the 
bank to borrow from the central bank. However, since the central bank charges a penalty rate in 
order to encourage interbank activity, the equilibrium is such that the optimal loan and deposit rates 
are a function of the refinancing penalty rate at the central bank. More importantly, the model shows 
that under conditions of uncertainty there is interdependence between asset/liability management 
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such that the elasticity of deposit supply lowers the loan rate by making the banks more aggressive in 
the loan market. 
3.4.5 Real resource cost models of banking 
Real resource cost models are in the spirit of Swank (1996), Hanak (1992), Santomero (1984), 
Baltensperger (1980) and Sealey and Lindley (1977). The models emphasise a bank‟s production 
technology taking into account all production costs (financial and non-financial) to reflect the 
constraints banks face in performing their primary function of intermediation. Swank (1996) submits 
that a complete neglect of real resource costs in a theory of banking is inadvisable. This is because 
operating costs account for a sizable amount of total banking costs with obvious implications on the 
level of production.  
The intuition is that production of earning assets (loans for example) and deposit mobilisation 
attract costs that may constrain the bank from performing these functions. Such costs may exhibit a 
U-shaped average cost curve and rising marginal costs over a range of output. However, as Pesek 
(1970) has observed, previous models on the determination of the equilibrium quantity of money 
paid less attention to the role played by real resource costs in theoretical analysis of banking. 
Therefore, a model of the banking firm must adequately reflect the price and cost elements in the 
analysis of bank behaviour.  
These theories are based on a specific production technology for a financial firm embodying 
two stages in the bank‟s optimisation objective. The first stage is cost minimisation, which reflects 
the special features of the production technology itself. In the first stage, analysts invoke duality 
theory and derive factor input demands using the Shepherd‟s Lemma. The second stage of profit 
maximisation results from the bank‟s choice of a profit maximising level of output, prices and 
distribution services, subject to the cost minimisation level of inputs, the demand functions for its 
output and the balance sheet constraint.  
Real resource cost theories of the banking firm have formed the bedrock for a large body of 
modern empirical work in banking competition, market power and efficiency. Therefore, the 
different variants of the Klein-Monti models discussed above are examples of real resource cost 
theories of banking.  
The application of real resource cost and other related imperfect competition models has largely 
been confined to industrial countries while their use in bank studies of nonindustrial countries has 
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been constrained by lack of detailed bank level data. The availability of highly disaggregated data in 
recent years has made it imperative to test the applicability of these banking models in developing 
countries. In particular, the focus of the analysis has been in relating variations in bank revenues and 
costs to constraints imposed by structural and institutional factors in modelling bank conduct. The 
present study is one of the new efforts aimed at validating the evidence from developed countries by 
subjecting these theoretical models to banking systems of less developed economies characterised by 
a host of institutional bottlenecks and macroeconomic impediments. In this regard, the study opens 
up new research opportunities in this genre of models. 
        
3.5 Definition of inputs and outputs for a banking firm  
The issue of what constitutes inputs and outputs for a banking firm is highly controversial in the 
literature. Two approaches have dominated the literature on the measurement of inputs and outputs. 
The first, called the production approach, stipulates that banks and indeed all financial firms are not 
different from non-financial firms and therefore, both inputs and outputs must be measured in 
physical units. Thus, banks use labour, capital and other material resources (inputs) to produce the 
number of demand deposit accounts and quantity of loans transactions processed as outputs. In the 
production approach, only operating expenses arising from use of personnel, computers, etc., are 
taken into account and nothing else matters. Sherman and Gold (1985) motivate most of the research 
in the production approach. However, Sealey and Lindley (1977) and Berger, et al., (1994) argue that 
the use of production approach stems from a lack of proper distinction between technical and 
economic production and this difference is critical for commercial banks and all financial 
intermediaries. To this end, an alternative view to the measurement of bank inputs and outputs has 
been advanced. This view is based on the premise that banks engage in the transformation process 
involving the borrowing of funds from surplus spending units and lending those funds to deficit 
spending units. This process is known as financial intermediation. This special function is an 
important distinguishing feature of banks from non-financial firms (Gurley & Shaw, 1955). The 
transformation process creates a product more highly valued than the original input elements. 
Therefore, the concept of production in the economic sense takes into account the banks‟ objective of 
maximising profits by creating value to output measured at market prices.  
For commercial banks, services made to creditors are more associated with the acquisition of 
economic inputs (labour, capital, materials and loanable funds) since these services require banks to 
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incur real resource costs without yielding any direct revenue. On the other hand, as intermediaries, 
banks use labour, capital, materials and borrowed funds to produce earning assets which generate 
revenue for the bank (Sealey & Lindley, 1977). Accordingly, banks incur costs related to usage of 
labour, capital and materials involved in producing different services to depositors. They also make 
interest payments to depositors for their funds. These expenses constitute the banks‟ input costs.  
The intermediation approach has more appeal to a developing country such as Zambia where 
banks continue to perform the basic function of financial intermediation. Accordingly, and in line 
with previous research, this study uses the intermediation approach on the following strengths. 
Firstly, bank deposits and other borrowed funds constitute the main sources of funds for Zambian 
commercial banks, accounting for more than  70.0 percent of total liabilities. Therefore, deposits 
accurately reflect banks‟ inputs rather than outputs, especially that there is a limited range of services 
banks pay to deposit holders. Secondly, the intermediation approach incorporates all expenses 
(interest expenses and non-interest expenses) and is therefore consistent with real resource cost 
models. The added advantage of the intermediation approach is that data on monetary values of 
assets and deposits are more readily available than the deposit and loan accounts, the key data 
required for the production approach.  
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C h a p t e r  F o u r   
Cost Efficiency and Scale Economies in Zambian Banking 
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
Research on banking efficiency in less developed countries (LDCs) has received little attention 
despite rapid growth in this literature in other parts of the world. This is rather unfortunate given the 
dominance of the banking sector in the financial system of many of these LDCs. Bank efficiency 
performance is a prerequisite for economic growth and this impact is strong and clear-cut, since 
inefficiency is tantamount to wastefulness which leads to lower profits or higher bank tariffs or both 
(Bikker & Bos, 2005). From the perspective of a practising banker, the interest in bank efficiency is 
made more relevant by the changes in the banking industry, spurred by technological advances and 
other economic developments. Therefore, banks and regulators should use efficiency evaluation and 
benchmarking as methods to identify the best practices in order to improve the performance and 
productivity of commercial banks.  
Banks play an invaluable role in ameliorating the effects of information asymmetry by 
transforming risk, size and maturity of financial instruments. In doing so, they convert short-term 
liabilities into long-term productive assets. Indeed, economies with a sophisticated and efficiently 
performing financial system are more capable of evaluating assets whose real value would otherwise 
be difficult to determine in the absence of properly functioning financial institutions (Thakor, 1996). 
For this and other reasons, regulatory authorities and bank managers alike must aspire to achieve 
operating efficiency which is essential for vibrant economic performance and improvement in social 
welfare. Cost efficiency is also beneficial to consumers because it translates into lower prices and 
provision of high quality bank services.  
In light of the above, a number of transition and developing economies embarked upon 
financial liberalisation policies, seen as a panacea for stimulating efficiency performance after many 
years of interventionist policies. Without doubt, the reform measures injected fresh air in the 
functioning of the banking sector. In Zambia specifically, institutional and regulatory reforms 
significantly shaped the financial landscape and impacted greatly on banks‟ profitability, cost 
structure and efficiency. However, the reforms also posed great challenges for general bank conduct 
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resulting in little progress being made in the area of efficiency. High cash reserve ratios and other 
regulatory requirements have also been blamed for the low level of efficiency. These weaknesses 
have been compounded by the presence of widespread distortions elsewhere in the economy such as 
poor quality of collateral and balance sheet weaknesses for bank borrowers, which have been 
reflected in high proportion of nonperforming loans to total loans, estimated at 13.6 percent between 
1998 and 2006. To circumvent credit losses arising form toxic assets, banks have responded by 
holding large amounts of government securities and accumulating off-shore deposits in foreign 
currency. This has reduced the amount of credit available to the domestic economy, exacerbating 
financial disintermediation.  
In Zambia, the authorities have long bemoaned the low level of bank efficiency as an 
impediment to financial development. In 2002, the IMF and the World Bank conducted an 
assessment of the financial system and observed that Zambian banks were cost inefficient as shown 
by wide interest rate spreads. However, as alluded to earlier, interest margins are only indicative and 
do not provide a comprehensive assessment of bank efficiency performance. Thus, to our knowledge, 
there has been no empirical study conducted to investigate the pattern of bank cost efficiency in 
order to justify the concerns raised above. Against the background of unsatisfactory performance of 
the Zambian banks on efficiency grounds, the task in the present chapter is to assess empirically, the 
level of bank cost efficiency and its determinants. The study is both timely and relevant in light of 
the recommendations articulated in the FSAP and the more recent FinMark Trust studies. 
 
4.2 Research questions and hypotheses 
The banking crisis of the 1990s changed the way the Bank of Zambia conducted its regulatory 
policy. After the failure of many banks, the central bank improved its supervisory capacity and 
implemented a new banking legislation to prevent future crises. In this streak, bank restructuring 
took centre stage and was aimed at strengthening banks‟ capital power. Capital and other regulatory 
requirements are important in shaping banks‟ behaviour because of imperfections characteristic of 
financial markets. Regulations take different forms, but the important ones are capital and cash 
reserve requirements which are imposed to protect banks from insolvency. The authorities may also 
impose other restrictions on banking activities, such as limits on branching and foreign exchange 
trading. Thus, it would be postulated that due to the presence of market imperfections, regulatory 
requirements attenuate the information problem by limiting risk taking in the banking industry.  
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However, in complying with these regulatory requirements, banks incur additional costs which 
may affect their performance. It turns out that these forms of regulatory requirements may affect the 
level of efficiency because they act as fixed inputs in the production process. To illustrate, tighter 
capital regulatory requirements meant to safeguard the banking industry may produce some 
unintended adverse consequences on bank behaviour, including inefficient allocation and use of 
resources. Therefore, in determining bank cost behaviour, it is important to incorporate regulatory 
factors (Elliehausen, 1998).
22
 Research by Fare, et al. (2004) found that risk-based capital standards 
had a significant impact on profit efficiency. Hughes and Mester (1993) also argue that an increase in 
reserve requirements raises the opportunity cost of funds and acts as a tax on the price of deposits, 
thereby impairing banks‟ decision making. Estrada and Osorio (2004) offer one option to correct for 
the effect of regulatory intensity by explicitly allowing financial capital costs to determine the level 
of efficiency. This approach is aimed at directly capturing regulatory burden borne by the banks and 
helps understand the dynamics of hidden costs which may be difficult to observe in practice.  
Another important consideration relates to the macroeconomic environment under which banks 
operate. Significant changes in the business cycle and general economic performance and the policy 
environment all have implications for bank efficiency performance. For instance, in Zambia, 
persistent government fiscal deficits, high inflation and rapid currency depreciation created 
uncertainty in the economy. Collectively, these factors may have affected resource allocation in the 
banking sector. 
In view of the foregoing, this chapter seeks to answer the following research questions. What 
has been the pattern of cost efficiency of Zambian banks since the end of the crisis? Do loan quality 
and other bank-specific factors intensify or attenuate bank inefficiency? Furthermore, is regulatory 
burden a major source of cost inefficiency in the Zambian banking industry? Are cost efficiency and 
bank ownership structure related, and if so, which bank categories are more efficient than others? 
These are important policy questions which would shed light on the nature and dynamics of 
efficiency performance of Zambian banks since the banking crisis of the 1990s.  
                                                          
 
22 
Some studies have estimated direct and compliance costs of regulation see for instance, Franks, et al. (1997) and 
Elliehausen (1998) for a survey. These estimates show that costs of regulation range between 9 % – 13 % of non-interest 
expenses. Studies also show that there are economies of scale associated with regulatory costs; large banks incur lower 
per unit regulatory costs than smaller banks. Our analysis reveals that the income statement from Zambian banks does 
not report costs associated with regulatory requirements. Therefore, it is very difficult to estimate the extent of regulatory 
costs and apply them to banking efficiency. To circumvent this handicap in our empirical framework below, we use 
reasonable proxies to capture regulatory intensity. 
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In the remainder of this chapter, we outline in detail the approach used to answer these 
questions.  Section 4.3 provides a theoretical foundation of economic efficiency and its application to 
the banking sector. In Section 4.4 a review of relevant literature on bank efficiency is presented and 
discussed. The analytical framework and methodological approach taken to analyse cost efficiency 
of Zambian commercial banks is a subject of Section 4.5. Empirical results are presented and 
discussed in Section 4.6 while Section 4.7 provides a summary of research findings on cost 
efficiency performance.  
  
4.3 Theoretical foundation of economic efficiency  
The concept of economic (productive) efficiency is rooted in neoclassical microeconomic 
theory, which focuses on resource allocation and utilisation. It advocates for non-wastage of 
resources by emphasising cost reduction while producing the maximum possible level of output for a 
given technology and available inputs. The main driving force behind economic efficiency is value 
creation. In the process of transforming inputs into some output value, a change that increases value 
is an efficient change and one that decreases value is an inefficient change. For purposes of policy 
intervention efficiency has often been used to evaluate the effectiveness of policy alternatives.  
Economic efficiency is better explained by profit maximisation (or analogously, cost 
minimisation) but is often associated with perfectly competitive markets than with monopoly 
because the latter leads to deadweight loss. For firms operating in a competitive industry, efficiency 
gains accrue when firms earn only normal profits in the long-run and respond to changes in 
consumer preferences by increasing output. Whether this output in sold at the same, higher or lower 
price depends in large measure on the position of the cost curves in the long-run.  
Economic efficiency also encompasses allocative efficiency, which occurs when a firm‟s inputs 
are allocated in such a way as to maximise its benefits (profits, revenue and output) depending on the 
firm‟s objective function. In a perfectly competitive market, allocative efficient outcomes occur 
when price is equal to marginal cost. Allocative efficiency also addresses the issue of the right mix of 
inputs and quality of output produced.  
Finally, X-efficiency, introduced by Leibenstein (1966) refers to efficiency in production by 
linking inputs to outputs. It is an economic expression for the effectiveness with which an 
organisation uses its given set of inputs to produce outputs. Specifically, it refers to the internal 
organisation of firms and its response to external factors. Under such circumstances, both 
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motivational factors (e.g., moral and bureaucratic inertia and human errors) and competitive 
pressures may affect X-efficiency. In many of his writings, Leibenstein repeatedly argued that X-
efficiency was superior to allocative efficiency, implying that the latter effect was trivial.   
Evidently, the concept of efficiency is broad and has been assigned different interpretations. 
The concept of X-efficiency is especially controversial. Since Leibenstein first proposed the term, 
analysts have sought to evaluate its meaning and in the process, different interpretations have 
emerged. For instance, Peel (1974) contends that cost reduction can be observed in a movement from 
monopoly to perfect competition, not due to X-efficiency but because managers are forced to give up 
goals inconsistent with cost minimisation as the environment becomes more competitive. Equally, 
Stigler (1976) cautions that failure to recognise higher than minimum cost levels are mainly due to 
rationally calculated utility maximising strategies (including leisure and expense preference) by 
workers rather than by X-inefficiency.  
The above efficiency definitions refer to static efficiency. The alternative definition derives 
from dynamic efficiency (Jameson, 1972). Dynamic efficiency takes into account change in 
technology as a main source of productivity, so that over time, the production frontier shifts due to 
technological advancements. Therefore, according to Abel, et al., (1989),   dynamic efficiency could 
be associated with long-run economic growth arising from productivity change due to capital 
accumulation.  
Scale economies and economies of scope provide another perspective for analysing firm 
efficiency performance. Economies of scale occur when more units of a good or service can be 
produced on a larger scale, yet with less input costs. Therefore, economies of scale are associated 
with size of the firm, implying that larger firms enjoy economies of scale due to larger production 
technology. For a long time, economic growth has been explained by the theory of economies of 
scale. Marshall (1961) distinguished between internal and external economies of scale, attributing the 
former to lower costs which lead to higher production and the latter as emanating from external 
forces such as improvements in the transportation network. External economies of scale may thus 
benefit all firms in the industry by lowering costs and stimulating firm growth. 
In contrast, economies of scope relate to a reduction in costs resulting from joint production. 
Thus, a firm which decreases its average costs because of changes in production of different products 
(related or unrelated) is said to be enjoying economies of scope. Economies of scope also provide 
firms with means to generate operational efficiencies, especially when these are driven by 
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diversification. In the case of banking, for instance, it may be economical for a bank to diversify into 
different areas of financial services such as investment banking, commercial banking, leasing and 
factoring, and life insurance rather than pursue traditional commercial banking alone. Such a strategy 
may be driven by synergies of knowledge of commercial banking and investment banking of 
particular corporate customers. For larger banks, diversification may be an important business 
strategy aimed at reducing portfolio risk and hence gain efficiency. 
Although scale economies may be important, bigger may not necessarily be better in the sense 
that when firms expand in size, the chain of command also becomes cumbersome. Therefore 
decisions made by  top managers may take longer and information distorted by the time it reaches 
the bottom ladder of the firm. When this happens, the firm may not be realising cost reductions as 
predicted by theory. Accordingly, diseconomies of scale may set in. Thus, smaller firms may be 
more efficient than larger firms in this regard.  
A similar interpretation may be offered for economies of scope. While economies of scope 
often provide an incentive to expand product lines, the creation of new products is often less efficient 
than expected, resulting in diseconomies of scope. This is because the introduction of new product 
brands may entail additional managerial expertise or personnel, higher raw material costs, a 
reduction in competitive focus, and the need for additional facilities, which collectively could result 
in high per-unit costs. Therefore, economies of scope may not be obvious. For the banking example 
above, managers may find it challenging to manage insurance business while also trying to provide 
commercial banking services to a wide range of customers. For this reason, the envisaged synergies 
may actually lead to huge cost increases.   
Different factors may explain cost inefficiency in a firm. Some of the factors may be inherent in 
the internal organisational structure of the firm and therefore controllable. These factors may be a 
function of administrative mismanagement and lack of managerial expertise, inexperience of workers 
and poor skills levels, non-optimal diversification of assets, misallocation of inputs, among others. 
These factors may impair the firm‟s capacity to optimally respond to changing incentives and 
constraints. External factors, also called environment factors, may also affect the banks‟ inefficiency. 
These include regulatory constraints, macroeconomic shocks, real business cycles, strikes and labour 
disputes and structure of the market in which the firm is operating. Taken together, these factors may 
account for substantial variations in firms‟ performance levels. Internal factors are firm specific and 
therefore within the control of the firm, environmental factors are outside the control of the firm but 
could have a profound impact on the bank‟s inability to operate optimally. Therefore, in assessing 
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the efficiency of firms, care must be exercised in differentiating between internal and external 
factors.  
 
4.4 Review of the literature 
The concept of economic efficiency was first mooted in Farrell‟s (1957) seminal work in which 
he showed that overall efficiency can be decomposed into “price (allocative) efficiency” and 
“technical efficiency”. Farrell‟s (1957) definition of technical efficiency led to the evolution of 
different frontier methods for estimating efficiencies of firms. The Farrell framework gives different 
ways in which a productive unit can be inefficient. A decision making unit can be inefficient either 
by obtaining less than the maximum output available from a pre-determined level of inputs 
(technically inefficient) or by not using the right input mix given their prices and marginal 
productivities (allocatively inefficient). Although frontier approaches possess some similarities, there 
are significant methodological differences among them. Therefore, the approaches used for 
estimating economic efficiency can be categorised broadly as being either parametric (stochastic) or 
non-parametric (linear programming), depending on the specification and estimation of the 
efficiency frontier and assumptions made about the distribution of the error component.  
The stochastic frontier approach (SFA) was simultaneously but independently developed by 
Aigner, et al. (1977), Meesen and van den Broeck (1977) and Battese and Corra (1977) to estimate 
production efficiency for cross-sectional data. Subsequently, Ferrier and Lovell (1990) applied the 
methodology to banks. The SFA involves parameterising the econometric relationship between the 
level of inputs and the technically efficient level of output by choosing a particular functional form 
for the production/cost function. The hypothesised functional form allows for a composite error term 
which incorporates the efficiency term as well as the effects of exogenous shocks (random error) 
beyond the control of the analysed units. The SFA also takes into account any possible measurement 
errors.  
The main criticism of the stochastic frontier approaches stems from the apriori specification of 
the function form. Critics argue that when the specification of the efficiency function and the 
stochastic term are assumed a priori, any misspecification of the estimated econometric model could 
contaminate the efficiency scores.   
Another variant of frontier estimation techniques is founded in the so-called non-parametric 
approaches based on data envelopment analysis (DEA) or linear programming techniques following 
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the seminal work of Charnes, et al. (1978). The approach by Charnes, et al. (1978) uses Farrell‟s 
(1957) concept of efficiency under constant returns to scale (CRS). Later reformulation of the DEA 
model by Banker, et al. (1984) showed that overall efficiency can be divided into „pure technical‟ 
and „scale‟ efficiency and suggested that firms may in fact be characterised by variable returns to 
scale (VRS). The DEA also decomposes overall efficiency into technical and allocative efficiency.  
Data envelopment analysis does not explicitly make any assumptions regarding the functional 
form of the frontier but empirically builds a best-practice function from observed inputs and outputs 
(Favero & Papi, 1995).  However, a major criticism levelled against the DEA methodology is that it 
assumes absence of measurement error and statistical noise. Accordingly, errors are taken as 
measures of inefficiency. As  Herrero & Pascoe (2002) have observed, the estimated efficiency 
scores from a DEA model may be biased if the production process is largely characterised by 
stochastic elements. In contrast, since the stochastic frontier model takes into account random shocks 
outside the decision maker's control in the measurement of efficiency, it presumably represents an 
improvement over the DEA. Nonetheless, both approaches have received wide application in the 
banking system.  
 
4.4.1 Empirical Literature 
This section reviews and discusses some of the related empirical literature on measurement of 
bank efficiency. The estimation of bank efficiency has developed along the lines of the two distinct 
frontier models-DEA and SFA and variants thereof. Traditionally, technical efficiency in banking 
was measured using the production function by estimating scale and scope efficiencies. However, 
according to Kwan and Eisenbeis (1996) technical efficiency is only a component of overall 
economic efficiency. Therefore, scale and scope efficiency measures are of little economic 
significance for financial institutions. Berger, et al. (1993) and Berger and Humphrey (1991) have 
argued that in fact scale and scope inefficiencies are less important than X-inefficiency in the 
banking industry. Similarly, Bauer, et al. (1998) argue that for policy purposes, economic efficiency 
is a much broader concept than technical efficiency in the sense that the former encompasses the 
latter and involves an optimal choice of inputs and/or outputs based on the reactions to market prices.  
The empirical literature on the measurement of bank efficiency has been dominated by research 
from industrial countries, particularly the United States and Europe (Berger & Humphrey, 1991; Aly, 
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Grabowski, Pasurka, & Rangan, 1990; Rangan, Grabowski, Aly, & Pasurka, 1988; Sherman & Gold, 
1985). In recent years, there have been a growing number of studies for emerging markets and 
countries in transition. For developing countries, the literature is sparse and largely concentrated in 
East and South Asian countries. Berger and Humphrey (1997) provide a survey of some of the early 
works in developed countries for bank efficiency while Berger (2007) provides the analysis of 
efficiency estimates from an international perspective.  
A particularly influential study of efficiency in banking in industrial countries is Berger and 
Humphrey‟s (1991) study. Berger and Humphrey (1991) argued that X-inefficiencies were in the 
order of 25 percent or more of overall cost inefficiencies and were more important than scale and 
scope economies, which accounted for only 5 percent or less. An earlier study by Rangan, et al. 
(1988) had found that US banks were about 30 percent inefficient largely due to pure technical 
inefficiency. Estimates for scale inefficiencies were shown to be very small with almost all banks 
operating under a constant returns to scale technology. However, Altunbas, et al. (2000)  showed that 
in Japan, scale inefficiencies dominated X-inefficiencies. More recently, Valverde, et al. (2007) 
show that correcting for banks‟ external business environment and productivity indicators at industry 
level significantly reduces cost inefficiencies. Therefore, based on this new research, inefficiencies 
from scale operations and X-inefficiencies appear to be of equal weight. Evidently, one would think 
of industry productivity growth as emanating from firm level scale expansion and therefore, this 
would translate into lower than expected inefficiencies for individual banks.  
The liberalisation of financial markets has had a profound impact on the bank efficiency 
literature in industrial countries as well as LDCs. For studies in industrial countries there is some 
evidence suggesting that deregulation fosters bank efficiency. For example, Sturma and Williams 
(2004) found that bank efficiency increased in post-deregulation  period in Australia mainly due to 
competition resulting from diversity in bank types. Foreign banks in Australia were also more 
efficient than domestic banks but this did not translate into superior profits. Carbo´, et al. (2003) 
argue that improved post-deregulation economic conditions accounted for most of the improvement 
in costs and profits of Spanish banks. Their conclusion is that deregulation of financial markets is 
better than mergers. This evidence contrasts findings by Kaparakis, et al. (1994) who argued that the 
removal of restrictions on branching activities and the concomitant consolidation due to deregulation 
of US banking sector caused banks to operate in an inefficient manner during the transition phase. 
Other scholars have also found that globalisation of financial markets manifested in increased 
foreign bank penetration has tended to dwarf banking efficiency although this result must be 
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interpreted in conjunction with the quality of institutions in host countries (Lensink, Meesters, & 
Naaborg, 2008).  
Given the accelerated pace of economic reforms and globalisation of financial markets since the 
late 1980s, there has been a growing body of research assessing efficiency in banking and 
productivity performance in developing countries and emerging markets. This interest has been 
necessitated by availability of data in these countries and the need to evaluate the potency of 
financial reforms.  
Emerging markets and former communist countries have provided a new „laboratory‟ for 
testing bank efficiency. For the majority of studies in emerging markets, the evidence is consistent 
with prior expectations that liberalisation stimulates efficiency, particularly of private banks. This 
gives further impetus for continued reforms and restructuring of public banks (Christopoulos & 
Tsionas, 2001; Zajc, 2006; Fries & Taci, 2005; Rao, 2005; Staikouras, Mamatzakis, & 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki, 2008; Weill, 2003; Yildirim & Philippatos, 2007). Similar findings have 
been reported for the Turkish banking sector. For example, Zaim (1995) and Isşık & Akçaoğlu 
(2006) showed that in Turkey, financial liberalisation fostered efficiency of commercial banks with a 
large number of them operating at an optimal scale. This indicated that financial reforms created 
incentives for banks to unlock their potential by implementing measures aimed at reducing costs in 
order to enhance efficiency performance. In contrast, Denizer, et al. (2007) and Yildirim (2002) 
observed that there was a slow recovery of efficiency by the Turkish banks mainly due to the 
unstable macroeconomic and financial environment  which accompanied the reforms. This tended to 
complicate the cost performance of financial institutions.   
Another notable focus of research on bank efficiency has been received from China and other 
Asian countries. Chen, et al. (2005) applied the DEA to analyse the efficiency of Chinese banks for 
the pre-and post-liberalisation period. They concluded that the level of efficiency increased markedly 
after the financial deregulation of 1995 with large state-owned banks and smaller banks benefitting 
more from the reforms than the medium sized banks. Further results by Fu and Heffernan (2007) 
based on the SFA show that Chinese banks gained efficiency ground in the first phase of the banking 
reforms, suggesting that deepening of liberalisation policies strengthen banks‟ cost X-efficiency. A 
possible explanation for this may be that due to relaxation of entry barriers and other banking activity 
restrictions, competition intensified, causing many banks to adopt measures to improve productivity 
and efficiency. Lin (2005), Lim and Randhawa (2005) and Leightner and Lovell (1998) all make 
similar conclusions that productivity and efficiency improved after the reforms with the private 
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banks the major beneficiaries from the reform process. However, in analysing efficiency of Korean 
banks, Hao, et al. (2001) concluded that the financial liberalisation measures of 1991 did not spur 
improved cost efficiency in the banking sector. Instead, better performance was driven by asset 
growth and low expense ratios.  
In the Indian sub-continent, results show that overall efficiency was found to be higher for 
public sector banks than for foreign and domestic private banks (Ataullah & Le, 2006; Sensarma, 
2006; Ataullah, Cockerel, & Le, 2004; Shanmugan & Das, 2004). However, the results of di Patti 
and Hardy (2005) for Pakistan show that efficiency gains were high for all banks during the early 
years of privatisation but subsequently, the level of efficiency for privatised banks decreased. New 
private domestic banks were the shining example of better performance while foreign banks lagged 
behind. For Sri Lanka, Seelanatha (2007) found regressive efficiency performance of different forms 
for the banks during the first half of the study period. By the end of the second half, banks had 
marginally recouped efficiency losses. The author attributes the declining trend in efficiency scores 
in the earlier period to the short-term policy effects and argues that in the long-run, banks in Sri 
Lanka should record improvement in efficiency as reforms get entrenched and the macroeconomic 
environment becomes more stable.  
From the review above, the general observation is that in developed countries and emerging 
economies, reforms were accompanied by an improvement in bank efficiency. The analysis also 
shows that more efficiency gains could accrue from further development in the financial sector. 
However, some studies reported of dampened efficiency performance. Berger and Humphrey (1997) 
submit that deregulation may not always improve efficiency and productivity due to other 
intervening incentives especially in the early years of reform. These factors stem from short-term 
effects related to the instability in the macroeconomic environment.  
 
4.4.2 Empirical literature: sub-Saharan Africa 
The literature on the studies of bank efficiency in sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries has 
lagged those of other developing countries. Only recently has there been a noticeable increase in the 
number of studies analysing the efficiency performance of commercial banks. The slow pace in 
growth of the bank efficiency literature for SSA is partly due to lack of bank-level data during the 
control regimes. Bank efficiency studies for SSA include Ikhide (2000; 2008) and Adongo, et al. 
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(2005a; 2005b) for Namibia; Hauner and Peiris (2008) and Beck and Hesse (2009) for Uganda and 
Čihák and Podpiera (2005) for Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.  
In the efficiency analysis of Namibian banks, Ikhide (2000; 2008) and Adongo, et al. (2005a; 
2005b) reached contrasting conclusions. The studies by Ikhide (2000; 2008) measure economies of 
scale and scope with the suggestion that banks in Namibia were characterised by inefficiency. On the 
other hand, using an alternative profit X-efficiency approach, Adongo, et al. (2005a; 2005b) argue 
that Namibian banks compared relatively well with international evidence. The variations in 
conclusions may be due to differences in the approaches used to measure banking efficiency.  
For east African countries, Čihák and Podpiera (2005) and Hauner and Peiris (2008) reach 
similar conclusions and observe that the increase in bank competition due to breaking up of entry 
barriers and entry into the sector of foreign banks was associated with a rise in efficiency. Of the two 
studies, Hauner and Peiris (2008) deduced changes in efficiency using competition analysis while 
Čihák and Podpiera (2005) applied descriptive analysis based on several bank performance 
indicators, including interest margins. Recent evidence by Beck & Hesse (2009) shows that the high 
spreads characteristic of Ugandan banks is suggestive of inefficiency performance in the banking 
industry. It is important to point out that the accounting ratios and narrow measures of efficiency 
such as spreads are only indicative of actual bank performance and may not provide reliable 
estimates of banking efficiency (World Bank, 2006).    
More recently there have been studies conducted for a group of African countries. For example, 
Chen (2009) estimated a frontier function for SSA middle-income countries and evaluates the 
determinants of efficiency. The study shows that bank inefficiency was in the order of 20-30 percent. 
Foreign banks were found to be more efficient than public and domestic private banks. Chen (2009) 
also argues that besides macroeconomic stability, bank competition and financial development, 
institutional factors also explain the differences in bank efficiency for the sample countries.   
Kablan (2007) and Kirkpatrick, et al. (2008) also provide evidence of banking efficiency for 
countries in the West African Monetary Union (WAEMEU) and SSA, respectively. Kablan (2007) 
observed that cost efficiency was generally higher in the majority of WAEMU states except for 
Burkina Faso and Cote D‟Ivoire while Kirkipatrick, et al. (2008) found lower profit X-inefficiency 
than cost X-inefficiency for SSA countries. Both studies observed that inefficiency was sensitive to 
the quality of loans and bank soundness. Interestingly, Kirkipatrick, et al. (2008) also found a 
negative effect of financial liberalisation but submit that foreign bank penetration helped improve 
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cost X-efficiency. Although many countries were already implementing financial reforms during this 
period, it is important to note that the banking industry in a majority of these countries also 
experienced significant macroeconomic instability. It is not surprising therefore that cost-efficiency 
was susceptible to risk and solvency factors and the turbulent economic environment.  
Figueira, et al. (2006) interrogated the effect of ownership structure on efficiency of African 
banks, using a much larger sample. Using both the parametric SFA and non-parametric DEA, they 
show that private domestic banks did not appear to outperform public banks. However, foreign 
owned banks posted higher efficiency than any of the two bank groups, namely domestic private and 
public banks. Efficiency indicators also showed wide variations across different bank categories.   
 
4.4.3 Key findings from the empirical literature 
The review of literature highlights growing importance of studies in developing countries, 
spurred by availability of bank level data and the need to assess the efficacy of banking sector 
reforms. In general, the studies show that banks could still improve the level of efficiency by cutting 
excess costs. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence to suggest that banking efficiency improves with 
the breadth and depth of liberalisation and deregulation policies. The reported reverse effect in a few 
studies is due to the short-term effects of liberalisation such as credit rationing, high spreads and 
weakening loan quality. These problems tend to be exacerbated under an unstable macroeconomic 
environment which is often associated with early years of reforms.  
Indeed, Denizer, et al. (2007) have observed that a number of developing countries experienced 
instability in the macroeconomic environment characterised by high inflation, slower economic 
growth and other economic ills, including banking crises. These factors tend to produce a distorted 
incentive structure for banks, making resource allocation and utilisation to achieve greater efficiency 
a much harder task.  
The determinants of banking efficiency are all encompassing. They include bank-specific, 
market structure, macroeconomic and institutional factors. The type of ownership structure is also an 
important source of bank efficiency. However, across a range of studies, there is less conclusive 
evidence on whether foreign banks are more efficient than their public and domestic counterparts. In 
general, foreign banks perform better when institutions are of good quality in host countries.
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4.5 Methodological Framework  
4.5.1 Choice of appropriate frontier model 
There is no consensus on the preferred frontier method to apply in benchmarking efficiency 
performance. Berger and Humphrey (1997) reported that there are approximately an equal number of 
studies using non-parametric methods and applications of parametric methods in analysing efficiency 
of financial institutions. Yet, other studies have estimated efficiency using both approaches (Beccalli, 
Casu, & Girardone, 2006; Resti, 1997; Weill, 2004). According to Resti (1997) there is no significant 
difference between the two frontier approaches. When differences occur, they can be explained by 
revisiting the intrinsic features of the models. On the other hand, Eisenbeis, et al. (1999) argue that 
efficiency scores derived from the DEA are two to three times larger than those estimated by the 
SFA. However, the patterns of scores across banks are similar and there is a relatively high 
correlation between the efficiency scores derived from the two methods.  
Against the above background, there is no loss of generality in using either methodology to 
analyse efficiency in banking. Consequently, we estimate bank efficiency using the stochastic 
frontier approach. The SFA allows for simultaneous estimation of the cost function and the 
determinants of cost efficiency in the context of Battese and Coelli (1995). The DEA does not 
support this estimation procedure. A further advantage of the SFA over the DEA is that with panel 
data, it is easier to handle problems assosiated with statistical noise in the sense that additional 
information from multiple time periods is incorporated into the estimation process. The SFA has also 
received wide application in efficiency studies for SSA. Therefore, we are able to compare our 
results with previous research based on similar methodology. However, the usual caveats about 
potential problems arising from misspecification of the cost function remain.  
4.5.2 Formulating a stochastic frontier cost function 
In order to remain relevant with economic theory, we postulate that overall cost efficiency is a 
precondition for bank performance and for regulatory policy analysis. In accordance with Bauer, et 
al. (1998), we conjecture that Zambian banks minimise costs subject to a specific technology. Due to 
institutional and regulatory factors, commercial banks also face policy and institutional constraints 
which impose additional costs on production optimisation decisions, thus affecting efficiency 
performance. Therefore, these constraints form part of the decision variables for individual banks. 
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Accordingly, following standard literature, see for instance, Bikker and Bos (2005) our hypothesised 
cost function is specified as:  
 
   min . .TC s t T w, y w.x x, y,      (4.1) 
 
where  TC w, y  is the cost function, TC  is total economic costs incurred by the bank, y  is a vector 
of bank output/services, w is a vector of input prices, x  is a vector of factors of production, 
 T x, y, is the transformation function and  denotes a vector of bank specific and other factors 
which shift the bank‟s cost function. 
Equation (4.1) can be used to solve for cost minimisation conditional input demand functions 
by invoking the Envelop theorem and applying the Shepherd‟s Lemma. Forming the Lagrangian 
function of Equation (4.1) and differentiating it with respect to input prices, we can solve for the 
equilibrium input demand functions as given by: 
 
  ,j j j qx x w ,y , j = 1,2,...,J; q = 1,2,...,Q; s = 1,2,...,Ss    (4.2) 
 
where qy  is thq measure of bank output, jw  is the thj  input price for the individual bank and s  
denotes ths cost shifters. An asterisk denotes optimal input demands. Note that Equation (4.2) states 
that equilibrium conditional input demand is a function of the level of input prices, output and other 
factors which affect the bank‟s production process. Substituting (4.2) into (4.1) yields a firm‟s 
minimum cost function expressed as 
 
   j j j q s j q sTC = w x w ,y , TC w ,y ,      (4.3) 
 
The intuition behind Equation (4.3) is that banks minimise costs by choosing an optimal number of 
inputs at given prices, a predetermined level of output sold at market prices and bank-specific and 
exogenous factors which affect its level of production in a given period.  
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4.5.3 The econometric specification and modelling strategy 
The cost function given by Equation (4.3) embodies a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between costs on one hand and inputs, outputs and exogenous factors on the other, and it possesses 
all the properties of a cost function. In estimating the equation, care must be taken in selecting time 
periods that are marked by (relative) stability. For the Zambian case under consideration, this 
requirement is satisfied since the study relates to the period after the banking crisis, in which banks 
have continued to exhibit relative stability.  
Derivation of the minimum cost function depicted above is a useful starting point in 
formulating the cost efficient frontier along the lines of Aigner, et al. (1977) and Meesen and van den 
Broeck (1977). Battese and Coelli (1995) posit that a similar approach can be extended to the 
analysis of efficiency in the panel data setup. Thus, consistent with Battese and Coelli (1995), 
Equation (4.3) is reformulated yielding the stochastic frontier cost function expressed in general 
logarithmic form as:  
 
    ln ln ,it qit jit sit itTC = f y ,w ,   ; it it itν u    (4.4) 
 
where it is the composite error term for the thi bank  i = 1,2,.......,N . Equation (4.4) is a stochastic 
frontier cost equation where  TC , y , w and  are as defined before,  is a vector of parameters to 
be estimated. According to Aigner, et al. (1977), itν is a random uncontrollable error term assumed to 
be standard normal, independently and identically distributed with zero mean and constant variance, 
i.e.,  2itν ~ N 0,σ . Furthermore, 0itu  is a one sided controllable component of the disturbance 
term, capturing cost inefficiency, that is, deviation of actual cost from the minimum possible level of 
costs given the hypothesised frontier. Put differently, it reflects the inability of bank i at observation 
t to attain the minimum cost level defined by the „best practice‟ frontier. The distributional 
asusmption of  itu is explained below.  
In line with Battese and Coelli (1995) the panel data inefficiency conditional model is given by 
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0it n,it n,it it
n
u θ + θ z +ε=      (4.5).
 
 
Equation (4.5) specifies the cost inefficiency of each bank where itz are bank specific and other 
exogenous variables that determine cost inefficiency and the s represent the associated coefficients 
depicting the statistical relationship between cost inefficiency and its possible determinants. Finally,
itε is a collection of the effects of other unobserved systematic differences across banks that may not 
have been fully incorporated into the model and is defined by the truncation of the normal 
distribution with zero mean and constant variance, that is,  it εε ~ N 0,σ .
23
  Equation (4.5) allows us 
to estimate time-varying inefficiency scores which can then be related to factors that drive efficiency 
performance.   
There are no a priori reasons to prefer a specific distribution of the inefficiency term  itu . Here 
we assume that itu is assumed to be truncated-normal, first introduced by Stevenson (1980). With a 
truncated-normal distributed disturbance, the one-sided error term is taken to be the variable obtained 
by truncating at zero the distribution of a variable with a possibly non-zero mean (Fu & Heffernan, 
2007). The truncated-normal distribution also provides more flexible representations of the pattern of 
efficiency in the data. Therefore, following Jondrow, et al. (1982), the firm specific inefficiency 
term, itu is decomposed using the conditional mean distribution approach for a truncated normal 
distribution as shown below: 
 
 
 
 2
|
1
it itE u
   

  
 

 
  
   
    (4.6) 
 
where  |it itE u   is an unbiased though inconsistent estimator of itu ,  u u      measures 
the relative importance of itu and it  to the composite error term, it  and must lie between 0 and 1 
                                                          
 
23
 According to Battese and Coelli (1995) nitz and sit may be the same variables in that factors that affect banks‟ costs 
may also influence its cost efficiency performance.  
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(Battese & Corra, 1977). As 0   the effect of the noise error term, it dominates the stochastic 
cost inefficiency error term itu in determining the variation of the global residual it . Conversely, 
when  1   the cost inefficiency effects are stronger in driving the composite error term, it , 
implying that the stochastic frontier is the correct model specification. The terms  and are 
respectively, the standard normal cumulative density function and standard normal density function 
evaluated at    where    it u    
   . Once cost inefficiency estimates in Equation (4.6) 
are obtained, the time variant bank specific cost inefficiency index  CI is calculated by24  
 
  |*it itCI E exp u          (4.7) 
 
To estimate the cost function depicted by Equation (4.4) we adopt a transcendental logarithmic 
(translog) cost formulation first proposed by Christensen, et al. (1973). This specification enables us 
to estimate cost inefficiency and examine the relationship between cost inefficiency and factors that 
affect it. Therefore, following Battese and Coelli (1995) we estimate the translog frontier cost 
function and the inefficiency model in a single-step using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) 
procedure. The alternative is a two-step procedure espoused in other studies.
25, 26
 It should be noted 
that the translog function is a more general specification and incorporates the more restrictive Cobb-
Douglas function. It is therefore suitable for frontier estimation. Accordingly, Equation (4.8) 
represents the empirical translog cost function: 
 
                                                          
 
24
 The converse is cost efficiency given by the inverse of CI. In the empirical section below, we discuss the evolution of 
cost efficiency, depicted as   |*it itCE E exp -u     .  
25
 We argue that it is inappropriate to use the two-step regression procedure because it contradicts the assumption of 
identically distributed inefficiency effects in the stochastic frontier model and because of possible misspecification of the 
cost frontier; this could introduce some bias, see Battese and Coelli (1995). Therefore, one can avoid this problem by 
simultaneously estimating the frontier function and the inefficiency model.  
26 
In studies that employ the two-step procedure, see for instance Kirkpatrick, et al (2008) among others, the translog cost 
function is estimated jointly with input share equations. However, the Battese-Coelli framework adopted in this analysis 
abstracts from this estimation approach but allows the researcher to simultanously estimate the translog cost function and 
the cost inefficiency model, relating cost and inefficiency effects possible explanatory factors.  Therefore, it is a more 
robust way of obtaining estimates of cost efficiency.  
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where itTC  denotes total operating costs (overheard and interest costs), , ,Lit Kit Fitw w w are, 
respectively, unit labour cost, unit cost of capital and unit cost of funds; itY is total bank output
27
, N
is the number of banks in the sample, T is the number of quarterly observations per bank and it varies 
across institutions, ln is the natural logarithm operator and it is as defined above. A time trend, t  
and its quadratic term, 
2t  are included to capture the dynamic changes in costs.  
A well behaved cost function must reflect homogeneity of degree one in input prices, implying 
that for a fixed level of output, total costs must increase proportionally when all factor prices are 
increased in the same proportion. For this purpose, homogeneity of degree one in input prices is 
imposed by normalising total costs and input prices by the input price of funds,
Fitw  before log 
transformations are undertaken.
28
 A similar approach has been used by Weill (2007) and is standard 
in the literature. Therefore, the following symmetry and parameter restrictions are imposed on the 
translog cost function:  
                                                          
 
27
 Although commercial banks are treated as  multioutput  producing firms, we adopt a single output measure in this 
study, proxied by total assets, on the basis that the flow of banking services is proportional to its stock of assets. 
Furthermore, using total assets to depict banks‟ output ensures that on-balance sheet outputs and off-balance asset items 
are all captured to avoid understating bank production. This is consistent with overall bank behaviour. Moreover, 
Zambian banks do not report disaggregated costs for individual assets.  
28
 See Cebenoyan (1988) and Zardkoohi, et al. (1986) and references cited therein for details on appropriate forms of 
normalisations.  
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 (4.9) 
 
We have also included BRANCH , RISK and INTERMED as control variables in the translog 
cost function. The variable BRANCH is defined as the number of branches operated by commercial 
banks. It controls for the scale of operation and network density on costs.
29
  Therefore, by including 
BRANCH in the cost function we postulate that the banks‟ production technology differs in a 
significant way due to variations in size and other unmeasured factors associated with maintaining 
the bank branches. We expect BRANCH to carry a positive sign indicating that branch expansion 
raises operating costs. The variable RISK is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. 
Nonperforming loans (NPLs) are treated as banks‟ undesirable outputs or costs which decrease the 
banks‟ performance. Therefore, RISK is included to capture the impact of poor output quality on 
bank costs. We expect a positive sign on the coefficient of RISK .  
Finally, INTERMED , the loan-to-deposit ratio (intermediation ratio), is included to measure 
the effect of loan and deposit fund utilisation of banks. The flow of deposits into the banking sector 
determines to a large extent the amount of loans a bank can make in a given period. Furthermore, 
banks that rely more on deposits to finance assets face a higher funding risk than those that hold a 
relatively higher proportion of equity capital. Conversely, banks with greater market power would 
produce high deposits and loans, and thus possess a higher loan-to-deposit ratio and therefore lower 
production costs. In view of this, the sign on the parameter on INTERMED  may be indeterminate, 
depending on which of the two effects dominates.  
 
                                                          
 
29
 In some studies, the log of assets is used to capture bank size. However, this may introduce problems of 
multicollinearity when output is measured by total assets.  
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4.5.4 Determinants of cost inefficiency  
As argued above, the single-step procedure involves simultaneous estimation of the translog cost 
function with the inefficiency model. The equivalent of Equation (4.5) above, the specification 
relating cost inefficiency to its determinants, is given by Equation (4.10):  
 
     
     
0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7
ln ln ln
ln ln ln
it it it it
it t t it
u RISK CONTASS CAPRATIO
OPPCOST INFLATION TBR OWNERSHIP
   
    
   
    
 (4.10) 
 
where, u is the non-negative cost inefficiency for each bank. Equation (4.10) completes the 
estimation process of the analysis of bank efficiency and it is estimated simultaneously with the 
stochastic frontier cost function (Equation 4.8) in a single step by MLE. An important aspect of the 
single step estimation is the ability to relate bank-specific and other factors to inefficiency effects. 
Battese and Coelli (1995) also posit that when maximum likelihood estimation is involved, a test 
must be conducted to verify if inefficiency effects exist in the model. Rejecting the null hypothesis 
would imply that the stochastic frontier cost function incorporating inefficiency effects is the 
appropriate specification of the model. Accordingly, both the frontier and inefficiency model could 
have all or some variables in common as drivers of costs may equally influence banks‟ inefficiency 
performance. Therefore we hypothesise the following factors as the ones that affect cost inefficiency 
of Zambian banks.  
The variable RISK  captures the effect of default risk on banks‟ inefficiency. We expect bank 
credit risk to positively affect cost inefficiency of Zambian banks. The variable CONTASS  captures 
the effect of holdings of government securities vis-à-vis traditional intermediation activities of the 
banking sector. Thus, this variable measures the degree of disintermediation on bank efficiency. 
According to Hauner (2008), credit to government undermines bank performance in developing 
countries. Therefore, a positive coefficient is expected for CONTASS  indicating that a higher 
proportion of Treasury securities relative to loans is a source of cost inefficiency. 
Changes in the regulatory environment meant to safeguard the banking system may produce 
some unintended adverse effects on efficiency outcomes since they are products of a convolution of 
forces. To test this conjecture, two measures of regulatory intensity are used. The variable 
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OPPCOST captures the impact of the opportunity cost of maintaining cash reserves on banks‟ cost 
inefficiency. There is a general understanding that reserve requirements act as an implicit tax on 
bank performance. Therefore, we expect the coefficient on OPPCOST to be positive implying that 
complying with cash reserve requirements exacerbates the banks‟ cost inefficiency performance.  
Another variable, CAPRATIO  also measures the banks‟ efficiency responses to regulatory capital 
intensity. The coefficient of this variable is expected to be negative, indicating that well capitalised 
banks are also less inefficient because, as Altunbas, et al. (2000) have argued, banks with low 
inefficiency will have more profits and will be able to retain high proportion of earnings necessary 
for boosting the capital base.  
Conventional economic wisdom suggests that foreign bank presence and private ownership of 
banks have positive influences on bank efficiency performance than do publicly owned banks. For 
example, Bhaumik and Dimova (2004) argue that even when faced with a level playing field in terms 
of regulatory policy, public managers experience less intense performance pressures than their 
private peers. However, the authors argue further that when competition is intense, ownership 
structure matters less in performance analysis. On the other hand, when analysing banking efficiency 
based on public choice theory, Sarkar, et al. (1998) argued that the existence of performance 
pressures compel private bank managers to adopt better strategies that reduce costs, raise 
productivity and increase cost efficiency. To investigate the effect of ownership structure on 
efficiency performance, a dummy variable, OWNERSHIP  has been included.  
Cost efficiency may also be influenced by the macroeconomic environment and monetary 
policy stance. These factors are captured by the rate of consumer price inflation  INFLATION  and 
the Treasury bill rate  TBR . Both these variables are expected to carry positve signs. Details on the 
sample size and description of all variables used in the estimation of the frontier cost function and 
the inefficiency model are discussed later.  
 
4.5.5 Economies of scale and technological change in banking 
In the preceding sections, focus has been devoted to analysing the efficiency of Zambian banks 
and factors that explain cost inefficiency. This section extends the analysis to presence or lack of 
economies of scale and technological change in the Zambian commercial banking industry. 
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Knowledge of scale economies is important for regulatory purposes. Regulatory authorities use 
estimates of economies of scale to determine the appropriate regulatory policy in respect of mergers 
and acquisitions and in predicting future industry structure. Recall that cost inefficiency in Zambian 
commercial banks depicts overutilization (mismanagement) of input resources in the production 
process. However, it is not clear whether there is some level of output at which banks are said to be 
enjoying global economies of scale or indeed if cost inefficiency could be ascribed to existence of 
diseconomies of scale.  
Following Mester (1996), estimates of overall economies of scale are obtained by 
differentiating the translog cost function with respect to output and are evaluated at the mean output 
and input prices. This yields equation (4.11):  
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(4.11). 
 
Economies of scale  ES , as denoted by (4.11) measure the relative change in the bank‟s total costs 
for a given proportional change in the measured level of output. If ES is greater than, less than or 
equal to one banks are said to be experiencing economies of scale, diseconomies of scale or constant 
scale economies, respectively.  
Another important concept in banking production is technological progress (TP ) which 
estimates a relative change in operating costs due to passage of time. This might occur when the 
banks‟ investment in some technologically improving production techniques in turn allows them to 
capture efficiency gains from a reduction in production costs. Technological change is therefore an 
encompassing concept that includes financial innovations, changes in competition intensity and the 
regulatory environment and dynamics in credit allocation process. Accordingly, technological 
change may impact on the banks‟ provision of financial services and the instruments used to provide 
these services. For example, technological change could be underpinned by the spread of automated 
teller machines (ATMs) and adoption of better risk-management techniques.  
Equation (4.12) below provides an approximation of technological progress in Zambian 
banking assuming technological change directly affects the banks‟ cost function. Put differently, we 
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conjecture that banks have been subjected to the same form of technological shocks over the sample 
period.  
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(4.12) 
 
The novelty of this specification is that it does not require knowledge of the timing of the sources of 
technological changes, given that it is hard to pinpoint when banks adopt those technologies and at 
what point effects on the cost structure take hold. Since we are using a cost function, technological 
progress occurs when 0TP   meaning that costs decrease with technological advancement and when 
0TP  technological change is regressive depicting increasing production costs as banks adopt new 
technological means of production. From (4.12), pure technological change, that is, the decline in 
costs keeping constant input proportions, is given by the first two elements in the square brackets on 
the right hand side. The third term denotes non-neutral technical change associated with the effect of 
input factor prices. Finally, the last term measures scale augmented technological progress, related to 
the effect of quantity of bank outputs on costs.  
 
4.5.6 Data and variable description  
In order to analyse bank cost inefficiency, we employ a uniquely assembled quarterly bank 
level data set. All 15 Zambian banks continuously operating during the period January 1998 to 
December 2006 form the population of this study. This period is especially special in the Zambian 
banking industry because it follows changes to the supervisory and regulatory environment and 
enactment of banking legislation in response to the banking crisis of the mid-1990s. This period was 
also characterised by episodes of relative macroeconomic stability and rebound in economic growth 
especially after 2002. It is expected that these economic dynamics would have altered the banks‟ 
behaviour in a significant manner and should be reflected in efficiency performance.  
All the data used in the analysis were gleaned from the commercial banks‟ monthly 
consolidated balance sheets and income statements submitted to the Bank of Zambia. Therefore, the 
information provides all inputs for the necessary calculations. Supplementary data from the 
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fortnightly statistics and data maintained by the Financial Markets Department of the Bank of 
Zambia under the AREMOS data project were also used as sources. Details on the definitions and 
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 4.1 below.  
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Table 4-1: Variables used in estimating cost efficiency and determinants of inefficiency 
Variable Symbol Variable Name Description and measurement Mean Median Std Dev. 
TC  Total costs Interest expenses plus operating costs  52,200.450 54,027.880 20,222.870 
Y  Bank output Stock of total assets  329,127.700 137,957.000 402,073.500 
Lw  Unit price of labour Total personnel expenses expressed as a proportion of total assets  0.005 0.004 0.004 
Fw  Unit price of funds 
Total interest expenses on deposits and other borrowed funds divided by total deposits and 
borrowed funds 
0.014 0.006 0.122 
Kw  Unit price of physical capital 
Sum of all other expenses (on building, equipment, furniture, etc.) divided by stock of fixed 
and other assets 
0.110 0.054 0.410 
BRANCH  Branches Total number of bank branches operated by an individual bank per given period 11 7 13 
RISK  Portfolio credit risk Nonperforming loans expressed as a proportion of total loans 0.092 0.074 0.107 
INTERMED  Intermediation  ratio  Proportion of total loans to total deposits (Loan-to-deposit ratio) 12.239 0.408 35.477 
CONTASS  Asset concentration ratio Proportion of total government securities to total loans (proxy for disintermediation) 2.748 0.836 8.405 
INFLATION  Inflation rate Changes in consumer price index (CPI), percent per annum, expressed on a quarterly basis 20.871 20.600 5.846 
TBR  Treasury bill rate Yield rate on 91-day Treasury bill paper (percent per annum) expressed on a quarterly basis 27.301 32.400 12.507 
OPPCOST  Opportunity cost of cash statutory reserves Interest foregone on cash reserve requirements expressed as a proportion of interest expenses  695.853 213.556 1065.366 
CAPRATIO  Regulatory capital adequacy ratio 
Banks‟ total capital (Tier I and Tier II capital) expressed as a proportion of risk-weighted 
assets 
0.427 0.300 0.448 
OWNERSHIP  Ownership dummy  
Dummy variable for bank ownership structure (1 for foreign and domestic private banks, zero 
for public banks) 
   
Note: Total costs and bank output (assets) are measured in millions of current Zambian Kwacha (K‟million).     
To calculated interest foregone, the risk free 91-day Treasury bill rate is applied to total cash reserves on the assumption that under a regime of zero reserve requirements, banks would invest their funds in less risk 
assets for a guaranteed income stream. Of course, banks can also invest any freed resources in other assets, including foreign exchange deposits abroad and loans. However, these assets are subject to intertemporal 
uncertainty during the period of investment. Securities are less prone to uncertainty. 
Source: Bank of Zambia (BoZ) 
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4.6 Empirical results and discussion 
The ensuing discussion reports results obtained from the translog stochastic frontier cost 
function and the accompanying inefficiency model. First we present econometric tests on the 
suitability of the frontier and inefficiency effects model specification. Secondly, we discuss 
empirical results of the translog frontier cost function and estimates of the inefficiency model. A 
discussion on the properties of scale economies and technological change follows afterwards. 
 
4.6.1 Estimation results of the translog stochastic frontier cost function  
The estimation of the stochastic frontier cost function was performed using maximum 
likelihood function incorporated into Stata 10.0 following the parameterisation by Battese and 
Coelli (1995). As noted earlier, the Battese-Coelli approach provides parameter estimates for the 
cost function as well as for determinants of cost inefficiency assuming a more general truncated-
normal distribution of the error component. The truncated-normal distribution of the inefficiency 
term nests the half-normal distribution as a special case (Fujii, 2001).  
Thus, as a robustness check, a more restrictive half-normal distribution of the inefficiency 
effects and a specification assuming heteroscedasticity (Bottasso & Sembenelli, 2004; Hadri, 
1999) were estimated but results were unreliable due to model instability. Estimations based on 
the two specifications failed to converge even at a higher number (>5000) of iterations. The 
failure of the heteroscedasticity model may be attributed to a flat log likelihood which is caused 
by insufficient degrees of freedom. On the other hand, convergence in the Battese and Coelli 
(1995) specification was achieved after only 33 iterations.  
Table 4.2 below gives the empirical results of the maximum likelihood parameter estimates 
obtained from the normalised translog frontier cost function. Overall the translog cost function is 
well behaved and passes a battery of diagnostic tests. The null hypothesis that a restrictive Cobb-
Douglas cost function would have been the appropriate specification is rejected at 1 percent. The 
test statistic is asymptotically distributed as a 
2 variable with degrees of freedom given by the 
number of imposed restrictions. Therefore, the test exonerates the generalised translog cost 
function as the appropriate specification.  
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  Table 4-2: Empirical results of the stochastic frontier translog cost function 
  Coefficient  Parameter 
 
t-statistic 
  
p-value 
Intercept  0   4.448 
 
7.573 
  
0.000*** 
ln(wL)  1   0.953  
7.619 
  
0.000*** 
ln(wK)  3   0.182  
1.397 
  
0.162 
ln(tass)  y   0.310 
 
2.679 
  
0.007*** 
1/2 (ln(tass))
2
  yy   0.050 
 
4.211 
  
0.000*** 
1/2 (ln(wL)
2
  1   0.068 
 
2.350 
  
0.019** 
1/2 (ln(wK))
2
  3   0.110 
 
3.425 
  
0.001*** 
ln(wL)ln(wK)  13   -0.081  
-2.893 
  
0.004*** 
ln(wL)ln(tass)  1y   -0.008  
0.623 
  
0533 
ln(wK)ln(tass)  3y   -0.007  
0.475 
  
0.634 
t   t   0.022  
2.411 
  
0.016** 
2t   tt   -0.001  
-3.245 
  
0.000*** 
t ln(tass)  ty   -0.0001  
0.088 
  
0.930 
t ln(wL)  tL  
 0.001 
 
-0.722 
  
0.470 
t ln(wK)  tK  
 -0.003 
 
-2.827 
  
0.005*** 
Control Variables  
 
 
      
ln(BRANCH)  1   0.120 
 
11.011 
  
0.000*** 
ln(RISK)  2   -0.015 
 
1.740 
  
0.082* 
ln(INTERMED)  3   -0.032 
 
-2.759 
  
0.006*** 
Diagnostics  
 
 
      
Log likelihood function  
 
 308.812 
     
Wald chi square (p-value)  
 
 0.000*** 
     
2
u    
 0.099 
     
2
    
 0.006 
     
2   
 
 0.106 
     
   
 
 0.940 
     
LR test of one-sided error  
 
 143.742*** 
  
    
LR test of Cobb-Douglas functional form  103.710***                          
    Observations  
 
 380 
     
Significance level:  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: Author‟s own calculations based on BoZ data 
 
More importantly, the test for the one-sided inefficiency error as the dominant structure cannot 
be rejected at 1 percent. The likelihood ratio  LR statistic was calculated as 143.742 against the 
critical value of 42.27.
30
 This test result is further reinforced by the fact that 0.94  was found to be 
statistically significant at 1 percent level, indicating that the inefficiency term dominates the random 
                                                          
 
30
 Appropriate critical values for the LR test of the one-sided error component which follows a mixed chi square 
distribution are provided in Table I of Kodde and Palm (1986).  
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error term in the overall error variance, 
2 . This result also means that we cannot use ordinary least 
squares (OLS) to estimate cost inefficiency since it disregards the bank-specific inefficiency 
component. Thus, deviations from the best-practice frontier are largely driven by bank-specific 
inefficiency effects.  
Sample parameter estimates are plausible, consistent with apriori expectations. We observe a 
positive and significant coefficient on the normalised unit price of labour. The estimated coefficient 
shows that a unit increase in the normalised labour factor price directly translates into 0.95 percent 
increase in total costs. This means there is a near correspondence between labour costs and overall 
bank expenses. Conversely, the estimated coefficient for the normalised unit price of capital was 
found to be statistically insignificant, despite carrying a positive sign. Since equipment and buildings 
are of a fixed nature, costs related to these assets tend to be of less significance over time. 
Worthington (1998) also found an insignificant coefficient for the normalised price of physical 
capital for the Australian building societies. A similar result was reported by Ansari (2007) for the 
Pakistan banking sector. Fu and Heffernan (2007) found a negative and significant parameter 
estimate on the unit price of physical capital for the Chinese banking sector.    
Estimates for the translog frontier model also depict an important effect of bank output on 
costs. The point estimates for the output measure and its quadratic term are statistically significant at 
1 percent. This shows that bank costs increase with the scale of production. The results of the time 
trend show that banks‟ costs increase with time in a contemporaneous fashion, but with passage of 
time, costs decrease, allowing banks to obtain efficiency gains through „learning by doing‟ effects. 
Thus, a positive parameter estimate for the time variable is observed but the quadratic term carries a 
negative sign which may be indicative of narrowing cost inefficiencies.  
Control variables in the frontier cost specification are employed to isolate the effect of some of 
the important bank-specific factors on banks‟ costs. From the estimated results we observe a positive 
coefficient on the log of branch network density. This finding underpins that obtained for the output 
measure (total assets), indicating that adequately controlling for differences in the scale of operation 
produces robust results. For this variable, a percent increase in branches raises operating costs by 
0.12 percent implying that maintaining a large branch network has some cost implications. 
According to Giokas (2008), banks strive to provide services of better quality within reach of their 
customers by expanding branch network. However, this also leads to an increase in operating costs 
of bank branches. Similarly, Grigorian and Manole (2006) argue that in highly inflationary economic 
conditions, banks tend to increase the number of branches but this raises overhead costs thereby 
weakening efficient performance. These views reinforce the argument by Berger, et al. (1997) that 
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although over branching raises revenues from providing extra customer convenience, this comes at a 
cost which is reflected in disproportionately high X-inefficiencies.  
The above arguments also apply to the Zambian banking sector. For a long time, Zambian 
banks have operated under an environment characterised by high rates of inflation. Furthermore, 
over the sample period, the number of branches increased, as banks reached out to customers to gain 
a competitive edge over peers. However, costs also increased, confirming the positive effect of 
branch network density on costs. In order to cut fixed costs related to branching activity, banks 
should adopt better technologies such as increased use of automated teller machines (ATMs) and 
telephone and internet banking and rely less on brick and mortar. Although the initial capital outlay 
of setting up such technological infrastructure is high, these costs tend to diminish over time thereby 
enabling banks to realise significant cost savings. According to Boitumelo and Valadkhani (2008), 
adoption of self-service technologies can lead to a substantial reduction in the service delivery costs. 
The converse is observed for the intermediation ratio and risk factor effects. These two impact 
bank costs negatively. For the liquidity ratio, this effect is significant at 1 percent level but accounts 
for only 0.03 percent of the reduction in bank costs. Nonetheless, it indicates that banks with a higher 
proportion of loans-to-deposits are more able to contain funding costs resulting in moderate cost 
savings. The impact of nonperforming loans is less robust with a coefficient of 0.02 percent and only 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
4.6.2 Determinants of cost inefficiency  
Table 4.3 below summarises results of the multivariate conditional mean (CM) inefficiency 
model (Equation 4.10), jointly estimated with the stochastic frontier cost function (Equation 4.8). 
In this model, the estimated inefficiency effects were regressed on a set of variables which affect 
cost inefficiency. The variables capture the impact of regulation, risk, macroeconomic policy 
environment and ownership structure on banks‟ cost inefficiency. From Table 4.3 the null 
hypothesis that 00 1 2 3 4 5 6 7                  was rejected at 1 percent as shown 
by the LR test of one-sided error component (see above for appropriate critical values). This 
implies that Zambian banks can be modelled as being driven by inefficiency effects.  
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Table 4-3: Parameter estimates of the conditional mean (CM) inefficiency model 
  
Coefficient 
 
Parameter 
  
t-ratio 
 
p-value 
Intercept  0   
9.729 
  
4.457 
 
0.000***  
ln  RISK   1   0.443   2.151  0.031** 
ln  CONTASS   2   0.488   2.926  0.003***  
ln  CAPRATIO   3   -0.662   -2.760  0.006***  
ln  OPPCOST   4   -0.331   -2.920  0.004***  
ln  INFLATION   5   0.874   1.963  0.050** 
ln  TBR   6   -0.397   -2.089  0.037**   
OWNERSHIP   7   0.666   2.180  0.029**   
Diagnostics 
       
2
u   0.071       
2
   0.006       
2   0.077      
  
 
0.923 
     
LR test of one-sided error 
 
143.742*** 
     
Observations 
 
380 
     Significance level:  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Source: Author's own calculations based on BoZ data 
 
Empirical results also show that both measures of regulatory pressure, namely capital ratio
 CAPRATIO and opportunity cost of cash reserves  OPPCOST carry negative signs and are 
significantly different from zero at 1 percent. For the capital ratio, the estimated coefficient is 
consistent with bank behaviour and shows that adequately capitalised banks have higher cost 
efficiency and may be subject to less regulatory pressure than poorly capitalised banks. For a unit 
increase in regulatory capital ratio, banks recorded two thirds of a percent reduction in cost 
inefficiency. This corroborates previous research findings, which have established that regulatory 
capital should be inversely related to inefficiency on grounds that banks with low inefficiency 
will have higher profits. Hence, they are able to use these profits to bolster their capital buffer 
which serves as an indicator of good reputation (Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux, & Seth, 2000; Berger 
& De Young, 1997; Carvallo & Kasman, 2005; Fries & Taci, 2005). Therefore, a high capital 
ratio is associated with better efficiency performance because banks can borrow at low interest 
rates since they are perceived as less risky.  
Turning to the measure of the opportunity cost of reserves, the results show that compliance 
with cash reserve requirements did not impair the banks‟ ability to perform efficiently. The 
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coefficient on OPPCOST was estimated at 0.33. Since Zambian banks hold large amounts of 
excess reserves, this helps them to remain regularly compliant with statutory reserve 
requirements. Therefore, this result means that there is no opportunity cost explicitly associated 
with non-remuneration of reserve deposits. Rather, more compliant banks with a high proportion 
of statutory reserves also recorded better cost efficiency.   
The ratio of nonperforming loans-to-gross loans  RISK ,the variable capturing output 
quality is positive and significant at 5 percent level. This means that one percent deterioration in 
the banks‟ loan quality results in loss of efficiency performance in the order of 0.44 percent. 
Similar findings have been reported in previous studies. For example, Carvallo and Kasman 
(2005) found that high risk undermined banks‟ ability to improve cost efficiency performance of 
Latin American and Caribbean banks.  
The statistically significant positive coefficient for CONTASS  (ratio of securities to total 
loans) is also expected since higher Treasury bill holdings (credit to government) relative to loans 
augments banks‟ cost inefficiency. This could be attributed to the cushioning effect Treasury 
securities have on banks‟ operations, which serves as a disincentive to devise ways of curbing 
managerial and other organisational inadequacies and lapses. Hauner (2008) attributed low 
efficiency performance of banks in developing countries to provision of credit to government. In 
a majority of developing countries, credit to government is in form of securities holdings.  
The measure of macroeconomic uncertainty and policy stance  INFLATION  is 
unambiguously positive, indicating that high inflation prevents banks from operating close to the 
efficient frontier. Clearly, a volatile macroeconomic environment is counterproductive to banks‟ 
efficiency improvement. In particular, the magnitude of the estimate on the log of inflation 
validates calls for macroeconomic stability as a pre-requisite for an efficiently functioning 
banking system. Recent studies by Chen (2009) for sub-Saharan African middle income 
countries and Weiss (2007) also showed that inflation is detrimental to banks‟ cost efficiency 
performance. Moreover, Yildirim (2002), Denizer, et al. (2007) and Zaim (1995) all argued that 
uncertainty in the macroeconomic setting slowed down the recovery of Turkish banks‟ efficiency 
performance. This effect tends to be strong when banks are emerging from a crisis.  
Finally, foreign bank presence in the Zambian banking system does not seem to have 
improved cost efficiency in the industry. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable
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OWNERSHIP  indicates that relative to other forms of bank ownership, foreign banks were two 
thirds of a percent less efficient. The finding is consistent with de Luna Martinez‟s (2006) 
observation that foreign banks have not performed as well as the open policy dictates. It also 
corroborates findings by Sensarma (2006) that foreign banks operating in India were the worst 
performers in efficiency terms between 1986 and 2000 compared with state owned and private 
domestic banks. Lensink, et al. (2008) also found that foreign bank presence negatively affects 
efficiency, although this effect is less pronounced in countries with good governance institutions. 
In Zambia, banks operate in a very challenging and informationally opaque environment. The 
absence of specialised courts to enforce credit contracts further complicates the banks‟ ability to 
recover debt from defaulters. Potentially, these factors affected efficiency performance of foreign 
banks more than they did for other bank categories, especially public owned bank which enjoyed 
considerable state support in various forms.
31
   
However, the result is in contradiction with both theoretical postulations and empirical 
observations which stipulates that foreign banks infuse efficiency in the host banking sector and 
serve as a benchmark for improved performance by the public and domestic private banks. The 
result is also inconsistent with the public choice theory discussed earlier in the context of Sarkar, 
et al. (1998).  
 
4.6.3 Characteristics of average bank-specific efficiency scores  
Table 4.4 below presents a ranking of average bank-specific cost efficiency scores 
estimated from the translog frontier cost function.
32
  For reasons of confidentiality, banks have 
been coded alphabetically (column 1). The corresponding average efficiency score is given in 
                                                          
 
31
 It must be noted that in general we would expect lower efficiency performance of public sector banks given their 
profligacy.   
32
 In the Battese-Coelli specification framework, inefficiency scores range between 1 (depicting the most efficient 
bank) and infinity (depicting the least efficient bank). For comparative purposes we rank banks according to cost 
efficiency scores, obtained by inverting the Battese-Coelli inefficiency estimates. Cost efficiency ranges between 
zero and unity. The most efficient bank has a score of one while zero denotes least efficiency score. Depatures from 
efficiency performance (best practice frontier) are calculated as the difference between 1 and the estimated 
efficiency score. Appendix II presents efficiency scores per bank per quarterly observation obtained from estimating 
Equation (4.8). 
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column 2 and column 5 gives position of the bank‟s efficiency score relative to others. Therefore, 
a bank ranked first means that it is more efficient than a bank ranked second, and so on.  
 Cost efficiency estimates show that for the banking sector as a whole, banks operated 
below the frontier, with mean cost efficiency of 92.0 percent, depicting cost inefficiency of 8.0 
percent. This means that if all banks were utilising the best practice production technology they 
could have improved their efficiency performance by saving up to 8.0 percent in total costs. For 
individual banks, the cost efficiency scores indicate that relative to the common best practice 
frontier, the most efficient bank (Bank D) had a cost efficiency score of 96.2 percent, that is, 4.9 
percent more efficient than the average bank in the sample. To move to the efficient frontier, 
Bank D could have cut its costs by 3.8 percent; this reflects its level of cost inefficiency. 
Conversely, the least cost efficient Bank M had a cost efficiency score of 69.2 percent depicting 
input wastage of about 30.8 percent. Thus, bank M could have improved its cost performance by 
shedding off excess costs that prevented it from moving closer to the efficient frontier.  
 
Table 4-4: Mean cost efficiency ranking of Zambian banks 
Bank Code Mean Efficiency Minimum Maximum Efficiency Rank Ownership 
A 0.931 0.688 0.977 10 Foreign 
B 0.960 0.904 0.982 3 Foreign 
C 0.962 0.921 0.979 2 Foreign 
D 0.962 0.934 0.974 1 Foreign 
E 0.805 0.693 0.934 13 Foreign 
F 0.833 0.538 0.979 12 Foreign 
G 0.923 0.773 0.975 11 Foreign 
H 0.799 0.799 0.799 14 Foreign 
I 0.947 0.759 0.974 6 Public 
J 0.938 0.707 0.983 8 Domestic 
K 0.953 0.822 0.984 5 Domestic 
L 0.933 0.534 0.979 9 Domestic 
M 0.692 0.330 0.962 15 Domestic 
N 0.942 0.898 0.968 7 Domestic 
O 0.956 0.931 0.970 4 Domestic 
All banks 0.917 0.330 0.984 
  
Source: Author‟s own calculations based on BoZ data 
 
The overall picture emerging from the estimated cost efficiency indicators is that although 
Zambian banks are inefficient on average, most of them inched closer to the best practice 
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frontier. This was shown by the average inefficiency gap of 8.0 percent for the whole sample 
period. The improvement in cost efficiency can be detected in Figure 4.1 below, which gives a 
graphical trend analysis of efficiency performance over the study period. Table 4.5 provides 
condensed annual summary statistics of efficiency indicators. To reiterate, the study period 
coincides with some positive developments in the economy, beginning particularly with 2002. 
These developments were marked by a rebound in economic growth and reduction in consumer 
inflation. Clearly, these changes strongly influenced the banks‟ cost performance response. 
           
Figure 4.1: Evolution of mean cost efficiency  Table 4-5: Annual summary statistics of cost efficiency 
 
 
 
   
       
      
Year Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
      
1998 0.847 0.181 0.330 0.966 
      
1999 0.913 0.111 0.438 0.976 
      
2000 0.909 0.115 0.506 0.977 
      
2001 0.937 0.062 0.702 0.980 
      
2002 0.920 0.062 0.739 0.980 
      
2003 0.932 0.078 0.538 0.983 
      
2004 0.897 0.092 0.668 0.982 
      
2005 0.931 0.072 0.688 0.980 
      
2006 0.957 0.023 0.893 0.984 
      
1998-2006 0.917 0.099 0.330 0.984 
Source: Author's own computations based on BoZ data 
 
In Figure 4.1, we observe an upward trend in cost efficiency, depicting some reduction in 
inefficiency over the sample period. The picture given by Table 4.5 for aggregate annual 
statistics of cost efficiency is somewhat blurred, mainly because of the variability in efficiency 
scores. Nonetheless, it reflects in broad terms the reduction in the degree of inefficiency among 
the sample banks. Based on the sample estimates, the mean efficiency index increased by about 
13.0 percent between 1998 and 2006, an indication of narrowing cost inefficiency during the 
study period.  
Although there were variations in individual banks‟ cost efficiency, the improvement in 
performance for all sample banks was remarkable and indicates that since the end of the crisis, 
the majority of banks have broadly moved closer to the best practice frontier although this shift is 
light. For star performers, survival strategies aimed at cost reduction and improved management 
practices partly explain the shift in cost efficiency. Therefore, from a policy perspective, the 
results show that liberalisation policies may have entered a new phase, injecting new lease of life 
0.763
0.806
0.849
0.892
0.935
0.978
1
9
9
8
q
1
1
9
9
8
q
3
1
9
9
9
q
1
1
9
9
9
q
3
2
0
0
0
q
1
2
0
0
0
q
3
2
0
0
1
q
1
2
0
0
1
q
3
2
0
0
2
q
1
2
0
0
2
q
3
2
0
0
3
q
1
2
0
0
3
q
3
2
0
0
4
q
1
2
0
0
4
q
3
2
0
0
5
q
1
2
0
0
5
q
3
2
0
0
6
q
1
2
0
0
6
q
3
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
83 
 
in the Zambian banking sector. More importantly, the results represent the banks‟ strong 
response to incentives induced by the reforms towards stimulating managerial flexibility and 
functional reorganisation aimed at stemming costs and inappropriate mix of resource inputs. 
 
4.6.4 Further analysis of cost efficiency and bank ownership structure 
The analysis of results estimated from the inefficiency model suggested that foreign banks 
appeared less efficient than their domestic private and public sector counterparts. Figure 4.2 
below puts this analysis into perspective by depicting cost efficiency by bank ownership 
structure. Theory predicts that foreign owned banks would under normal conditions perform 
better than domestic private and state banks mainly because of their international exposure and 
sound managerial practices.   
The analysis of Figure 4.2 corroborates econometric estimates which show that foreign and 
domestic private banks lagged behind public-owned banks in cost efficiency performance. Rather 
than depict improved cost performance, the relatively low level of inefficiency exhibited by 
public owned banks reflects more the cushioning effect of soft budget constraints in form of 
implicit guarantees and other incentives, including conversion of toxic assets related to state 
enterprises into long-dated government securities in order to shore up the public banks‟ balance 
sheets. For instance, the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZNCB), the largest public bank, 
was losing revenue mainly due to non-performing loans. This required a provision of 
approximately K12.0 billion to keep it solvent.
33
 According to official records filed by the 
Minister of Trade in Parliament (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2007), ZNCB was also 
losing a further K2 billion (US$0.5 million) per month on interest due on deposits and in 
establishment and staff costs, with the large rural branch network contributing to this 
drain. Predictably, these losses were eroding the bank‟ capital base.  
To rectify the situation and bring the bank back to equilibrium in order to facilitate the 
privatisation process, Government cleaned up its balance sheet and issued bonds valued at K250 
billion (US$62.5 million) to cover the liabilities owed by the Zambia National Oil Company 
                                                          
 
33
 This converts into approximately US$3.0 million at the 2006 average exchange rate  
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(ZNOC) and a failed mining company, the Roan Mining Company of Zambia (RAMCOZ).
34
 
Inevitably, these actions strengthened the state bank‟s balance sheet and capital base and helped 
contain the costs related to bad loans, thereby improving its performance. However, these 
guarantees were of a short-term nature. To sustain its performance, long-term measures were 
necessary, including privatisation of the bank.  
 
 
Figure 4.2: Mean cost efficiency by bank ownership type  
 
 
 
      
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
       
 
Source: Author's own estimates based on BoZ data  
 
Foreign banks experienced a downward trend in cost performance, which means 
inefficiency increased. The observed low efficiency levels by foreign banks may be due to less 
regulatory pressure enjoyed by these institutions. This enhances their reputation but also gives 
them greater latitude to maximize private benefits of control, including very generous staff 
compensation packages, resulting in high cost inefficiency performance. However, from 2004, 
cost efficiency of foreign banks recovered, as economic incentives changed following 
improvements in the economy. In contrast, efficiency of domestic private banks rose steadily 
throughout the study period, lifting up in 2002, coinciding with the improvement in broad 
macroeconomic performance. To this end, it can be surmised that domestic banks were quick to 
post gains from macroeconomic stability which characterised the period between 2002 and 2006.  
                                                          
 
34 
Prior to the conversion, 90 percent of loans were non-performing, indicating the severity of the liquidity position. 
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From 2004, the dispersion in cost efficiency between public and domestic private banks 
narrowed somewhat. Domestic private banks closed in on state banks‟ efficiency performance 
and exceeded the latter‟s cost efficiency by about 1.7 percentage points in 2006. However, the 
efficiency gap between foreign owned banks and domestic private banks was widening. Yao, et 
al. (2007) reported of similar efficiency behaviour among Chinese banks. They noted that the 
efficiency gap between Chinese state banks and domestic private banks ranged from 8 to 18 
percent in favour of domestic private banks. The leap in cost efficiency of private banks was 
underpinned by the merger in 2004 between two of the small domestic banks. Before the merger, 
the average cost efficiency for the two banks was 70.0 percent. In the post merger period, cost 
efficiency for the bank formed by the two merged banks was 1.4 times higher than the average 
efficiency for the merged banks during the pre-merger period.  
 
4.6.5 Empirical results of scale economies and technological progress  
The main objective of this chapter centred on the analysis of cost efficiency and its 
determinants. However, efficiency performance may be related to banks‟ exploitation of scale 
economies or due to adoption of certain production technologies that help them reduce costs. 
Therefore, we devote the remainder of this chapter to the analysis of economies of scale and 
technological change in the Zambian banking industry. This discussion serves as a robustness 
check to the preceding analysis on characteristics of cost efficiency. Indices of global scale 
economies and technological change are reported in Table 4.6 below.  
The results in Table 4.6 reveal existence of widespread economies of scale for all banks 
although they also show a downward trend over the estimation period. The estimated mean value 
of scale elasticity for all banks was 1.1, indicating that costs fell by 10 percent relative to the 
increase in the scale of production. Furthermore, the results exhibit a wide variation in the level 
of scale economies between small and large banks. Small banks were 12.6 percent more 
productive than large banks. The small banks subsample comprises mainly domestic private 
banks. Therefore, as earlier observed, the high indicator of scale economies may be partly 
explained by the relatively higher efficiency performance of this bank category.  
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Table 4-6: Economies of scale and technological change in Zambian banking  
 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1998-2006 
Economies of Scale 
Small 1.278 1.250 1.228 1.206 1.185 1.167 1.152 1.132 1.110 1.190 
           
Large 1.119 1.086 1.076 1.054 1.043 1.034 1.045 1.032 1.021 1.057 
           
All banks 1.216 1.187 1.168 1.151 1.134 1.119 1.110 1.094 1.075 1.139 
Technological Progress 
Small -0.014 -0.012 -0.009 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.005 0.007 -0.004 
           
Large -0.010 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 0.001 0.006 0.008 0.009 -0.001 
           
All banks -0.013 -0.012 -0.008 -0.007 -0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.007 0.009 -0.003 
Source: Author's own computations based on BoZ data      
 
Parallel to the results on scale economies, estimates for technological progress indicate that 
for the sample period as whole, banks recorded slight cost gains due to technological progress. 
However, from 2004, the banking sector was characterised by technological regress averaging 
about 0.7 percent. Between 2004 and 2006, banks‟ costs increased but too small to offset scale 
efficiency posted in earlier years. For large banks, the deceleration in costs due to technological 
change was 0.8 percent, 3 basis points higher than that for small banks. This result underpins the 
fact that as technological progress took root, large banks adapted faster to these changes, 
although the existence of new technologies and diversification in services may not have spurred 
significant cost reductions over the sample period. 
 
4.7 Summary of findings 
In this chapter, we have analysed characteristics of cost efficiency for the Zambian banks 
using the stochastic frontier approach. We have also evaluated the importance of bank-specific 
and environmental (including regulatory) factors in explaining cost inefficiency of Zambian 
banks. The results from the analysis show that on average, Zambian banks were inefficient. This 
means that for the banking industry as a whole, mismanagement of resources remains an 
impediment to good performance. However, over the years, we observe some reduction in cost 
inefficiency, with domestic private banks displaying remarkable performance in this respect. In 
particular, this was evidenced in widening of the efficiency gap between domestic private banks 
and foreign owned banks.  
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Inefficiency in banking is influenced by a combination of factors. Most importantly, we 
have established that both internal and external variables affected cost inefficiency of Zambian 
commercial banks over the study period. Macroeconomic uncertainty, especially in the early 
years of the sample period played a greater influence in exacerbating the banks‟ cost inefficiency. 
Regulatory factors did not exacerbate cost inefficiency. It was found that compliance with cash 
reserves actually helped banks to improve cost efficiency. The same applies to regulatory capital. 
Well capitalised banks were also the most cost efficient. Internally, banks‟ credit risk exposure 
and reliance on Treasury securities dampened improvements in cost efficiency.  
Evidence of widespread scale economies is also observed, although there was a declining 
trend over the sample period. As well, technological change characterised the banking sector, but 
cost savings were modest. Nonetheless, the analysis shows that large banks appeared to adapt 
faster to technological change than small banks, even though the difference in performance was 
less pronounced.  
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C h a p t e r  F i v e   
 
Measuring the level of Competition in the Zambian Banking Industry  
 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The study of competition in banking markets spans at least four decades, yet this continues 
to be an attractive subject of empirical enquiry. From public policy perspective, banking 
competition represents a socially optimal target, since it stimulates reduction of intermediation 
costs and leads to delivery of high quality service by banks. Therefore, there are many reasons 
for studying competition in banking. Indeed the advantages of competition for an efficient and 
inclusive financial system are strong in that competitiveness fosters efficient management of 
banks thereby increasing firms‟ access to external financing (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2004). Related to this, competition in the banking sector can spur economic growth 
and lead to an improvement of social conditions.  
A number of studies have shown the relationship between competition and growth. For 
instance, Pagano (1993) has argued that a competitive banking system leads to an improvement 
in economic growth and enhance consumers‟ social welfare. Cetorelli and Gamberra (2001) 
argue further that although concentrated banking systems offer growth opportunities for young 
firms, there is strong evidence of a general depressing effect on growth associated with a 
concentrated banking industry, which impacts all sectors and all firms indiscriminately. 
Claessens and Laeven (2005) reach similar conclusions arguing that the degree of competition is 
an important aspect of financial sector development.  
In Zambia, the low level of access to banking services for all economic agents, but 
particularly households and small and medium sized firms is the subject of recurrent policy 
debate (de Luna Martinez, 2006; Oxford Policy Management, 2007; Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning, 2004). The main conclusion is that access to financial resources has been 
hampered by lack of competition in the Zambian banking sector. Therefore, lack of a competitive 
banking sector may be seen as the main cause of slow growth in the economy because firms have 
limited access to external finance to expand their businesses.  
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The seminal paper by Keeley (1990) stimulated the debate on the relationship between banking 
competition and financial stability. In his article Keeley (1990) argues that banks attach greater 
weight to charter value which then serves as a self-regulatory devise in that it prevents them from 
engaging in risk behaviour. Competition is therefore good for financial stability (Allen & Gale, 
2004). However, the trade-off between competition and stability is a matter of intense debate. For 
instance, Hoggarth, et al. (1998) argue that competition in the banking sector leads to financial 
fragility because it induces banks to take on more risks. Using a dynamic theoretical framework, 
Bolt & Tieman (2004) show that banks faced with stringent capital adequacy requirements tend 
to set stricter acceptance criteria for loans and that stiff competition in the banking industry 
propagates riskier bank behavior thereby threatening stability of the financial sector.  
On the other hand, evidence by Staikouras and Wood (2000) and Marcel, et al. (2001) 
shows that competition in banking does not endanger financial stability.  Specifically, Marcel, et 
al. (2001) argue that where competition endangers instability in the financial sector, stability can 
be enhanced by prudential regulation and improved corporate governance. It may also be 
beneficial for a bank to hold equity capital in excess of regulatory threshold although this comes 
at a higher cost relative to deposits. According to Northcott (2004) the impact of banking 
competition on financial instability is a short-term phenomenon. In the long-term, firms and 
authorities must aspire to foster competition to ensure the future strength of the banking system. 
From a policy perspective, this can be achieved by designing regulatory measures that anticipate 
problems rather than those that react to them.  
Arguing along similar lines, Beck (2008) shows that given the importance of a competitive 
banking sector to growth, regulatory and supervisory authorities should instead focus on devising 
an incentive compatible environment for banks rather than try to fine-tune market structure or the 
degree of competition. Therefore, competition must be placed at the centre of any public policy 
agenda since it has the mechanism to respond to the dynamic changes in economic conditions, 
especially those that affect delivery of financial services. 
 
5.2 Problem statement and research objectives  
A common expectation from financial liberalisation was that competition in the banking 
system would increase, thus allowing for reduced intermediation spreads and improved access to 
financial services by the people. In Zambia, Mwilwa (2007) observes that bank interest spreads 
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have remained high years after the financial liberalisation reforms were implemented. Among the 
causes of high spreads, the author cites both bank-specific and the macroeconomic variables as 
being influential. High spreads may also be a reflection of collusive behaviour as well as 
managerial incompetence and inadequate technology (Gruben & McComb, 2003).  
In Zambia, there is widespread perception that competition in banking is limited. This 
perception stems in part from the observed wide interest spreads and high prices of bank services 
in form of fees and commissions. These factors have tended to push banks‟ earnings nearer to the 
ones defined by oligopolistic market. Indeed, gauging by the high level of concentration in the 
Zambian banking industry, the concern for limited competition is warranted. Using these 
indicators, the IMF and World Bank (2002) also noted that these factors have undermined 
competitive behaviour in the banking sector.  
Unlike the FSAP report by the IMF and World Bank, the FinMark Trust (2006) and study 
attributed lack of financial inclusiveness to less competition in the banking sector. de Luna 
Martinez (2006) uses a similar approach to make a case for low competition among Zambian 
banks. These studies posit that due to inadequate competition among banks, customers are 
subjected to a very high cost of banking services. Accordingly, this has shut out a large section of 
society from accessing financial services. Although there are other factors such as low incomes 
that contribute to poor accessibility to financial services, the cost of intermediation is certainly a 
major impediment.   
Although there is a policy recognition that competition in the Zambian banking is low and 
creates a disincentive to improving efficiency performance of commercial banks, it is somewhat 
surprising that hitherto no empirical study has been conducted to understand the state of 
competition in the industry. The studies referred to above have drawn their conclusions by 
relying on methodologically flawed indicators which do not explain actual bank behaviour. 
Assessing competition using concentration ratios and related structural indicators leads to wrong 
inferences. This is partly because structural measures ignore the relationship between market 
contestability and revenue behaviour at bank level. To this end, a different form of analysis is 
required to capture the actual conduct of banks. Given the relative dominance of the banking 
industry in Zambia‟s financial sector, it is imperative that the market structure under which 
commercial banks operate is empirically assessed.  
Therefore, the key research objective in this chapter is to assess the degree of competition in 
the Zambian commercial banking sector in the post reform period, particularly after the banking 
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crisis of the mid-1990s. This is implemented using the Panzar-Rosse approach (Rosse & Panzar, 
1977; Panzar & Rosse, 1982; Panzar & Rosse, 1987) anchored in the non-structural approaches, 
otherwise known as the New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) models. The main appeal 
of the NEIO approaches, unlike their structural counterparts, is that they are a refinement of 
formal models of imperfectly competitive markets and endogenise market structure by taking 
into account the fact that bank performance may affect market structure.  
Thus, of major importance in this exercise is the need to respond empirically to the 
continuing policy challenges and dilemmas presented by inconsistencies between expectations of 
policy reforms and observed evidence in the performance and conduct of the Zambian banks. 
Accordingly, the study is both timely and relevant to the present situation. The rest of the chapter 
is organised as follows. The next section reviews the relevant literature while section three 
discusses the methodology and data issues. In section four we present and discuss the empirical 
results. Section five gives a summary of the findings for the chapter. 
 
5.3 Competition in banking – review of the literature   
Two main approaches have dominated the study of competition in banking – the structural 
and non-structural approaches. Structural approaches draw significantly from traditional 
industrial organisation (IO) economics. The classic IO characterisation of banking competition 
has it that there is a causal link running from bank market structure to conduct and performance, 
measured by the banks‟ pricing behaviour and profits (Northcott, 2004). The leading 
methodology of structural models is the so-called Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) 
paradigm initially proposed by Bain (1951).  
 
5.3.1 Structure conduct performance   
The main prediction of the SCP paradigm is that a high level of concentration causes banks 
to charge high loan rates and low deposit rates, thereby reducing equilibrium quantities of funds 
available for credit (Besanko & Thakor, 1992). The majority of banking studies utilising the SCP 
analysis have been conducted in industrial countries, especially the United States and Canada. 
Among them, Diebold and Sharpe (1990); Hanan and Berger (1991); Hannan (1991a; 1991b); 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992) all found support of the SCP paradigm in banking. In particular, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
92 
 
they predict that high loan interest rates, low deposit interest rates and occurrence of collusive 
profits are a function of market concentration. For a review of early studies on the SCP paradigm 
as applied to banking, see Gilbert (1984). Bikker and Haaf (2003) and Northcott (2004) give an 
updated review of literature.  
Critics of the SCP paradigm have observed that the theory does not explain the sources of 
differential levels of market concentration such as presence of entry barriers. When these factors 
are controlled for, the evidence of the SCP paradigm disappears (Evanoff & Fortier, 1988). 
Further evidence strongly rejects the validity of the relationship between concentration on one 
hand, and interest rates on the other. For instance, Jackson (1992; 1997) has argued that there is 
no monotonicity between concentration and prices or interest rates. Instead, the evidence is U-
shaped. Hanan (1997) also fails to find evidence of the impact of bank concentration on interest 
rates. In view of these criticisms, the SCP has lost much of its appeal in modern banking 
literature, yielding to alternative methods of analysing bank behaviour.  
 
5.3.2 Efficiency structure hypothesis    
Within the structural class of models, the efficiency structure hypothesis (ESH) due to 
Peltzman (1977) and Demsetz (1973) has challenged the predictions offered by the SCP. 
Proponents of the ESH submit that there is a reverse causality between competition and 
concentration, suggesting that higher profits may be a result of efficient operations of banks. 
Thus, banks may be exploiting greater X-efficiency, which in turn allows them to acquire market 
dominance.  
The test for the ESH has also been extensive but with varying results. Rhoades (1992) 
investigated the degree of competition in the local mortgage loans market for the US. The results 
suggested that local market conditions were important in influencing banks‟ performance. 
Further, results indicate that the level of concentration indices significantly affected prices 
charged in the local mortgage markets, underpinning the relative importance of the SCP over the 
ESH explanation. Berger (1995) used a measure of X-efficiency in an attempt to distinguish 
between the SCP and ESH. The results were not conclusive. However, for emerging markets of 
Europe, Al-Obaidan (2008) found evidence confirming the efficiency hypothesis.  
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Frame and Kamerschen (1997) tested the possibility of superior X-efficiency in explaining 
high profits observed in the US legally protected banking markets. The authors refute that X-
efficiency was the main reason US banks were highly profitable. This evidence was supported by 
Bernstein and Fuentes (2003) in their analysis of interest rate stickiness for the Chilean banking 
sector.  
 
5.3.3 SCP and ESH literature for developing countries    
Studies of bank behaviour in developing countries have always lagged behind research in 
developed countries and emerging markets. For countries in SSA, the paucity of literature is even 
more acute, both for the SCP and the ESH. To contextualise the discussion, we begin by looking 
at the recent evidence for Bangladesh, in which Samad (2008) tests the validity of the two 
competing hypotheses of the structural models. Using pooled analysis, he notes that the 
Bangladesh banking sector can be defined by the ESH. However, he suggests that there is need to 
further explore the effect of the banking structure in order to draw definitive policy conclusions.  
In Africa and SSA in particular, Chirwa (2001; 2003) studied the market structure-
profitability relationship for Malawian banks using cointegration analysis. For both studies, 
Chirwa argued that bank market structure matters for profitability in the Malawian banking 
system. A study by Okealaham (2004) for the banking sector of the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA) countries observed that concentration was an important factor in the banks‟ profitability. 
Nannyonjo (2002) tests the ESH for Ugandan banks and could not reject the hypothesis. 
However, Mugume (2007) refutes claims that the performance of the Ugandan banking sector is 
a function of efficiency hypothesis.  
 
5.3.4 Non-structural approcahes to studies of banking competition    
As can be observed from the review of empirical studies on the competing structural models 
of bank behaviour, the evidence is mixed. This lack of uniformity in results gave rise to further 
search for alternative approaches to better explain bank behaviour. Accordingly, non-structural 
approaches also known as the new empirical industrial organisation (NEIO) models have 
emerged and offer theoretically sound foundation of competition among rival firms (Panzar & 
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Rosse, 1987; Bresnahan, 1989; Bresnahan, 1982; Lau, 1982). These non-structural approaches 
are seen as reconciling the observed ambiguity between theory and firms‟ behaviour by 
appealing to the literature of oligopolistic markets in analysing industry competition (Cetorelli, 
1999).  
For the NIEO models, market concentration is not necessary to explain competition in the 
industry since competition can actually occur even in concentrated markets (Shaffer, 1994). 
Hence, as argued in the contestability literature (Baumol, 1982), the number of banks in the 
industry does not matter for competition. Rather, the driving force is the threat to entry defined 
by presence or absence of barriers, economic or legal.  
 
5.3.5 A selection of studies for industrial countries    
In the NEIO approaches, there are two leading methodologies, namely the Panzar-Rosse 
(PR) methodology and the Bresnahan-Lau (B-L) approach. Although both these models have 
been used to analyse the level of banking competition, a few studies have been conducted using 
the Bresnahan-Lau framework. Conversely, the PR approach has received wide application, both 
in industrial and nonindustrial countries. The main appealing feature of the PR approach is that it 
less data intensive and the knowledge of bank output and prices is not necessary. This has made 
it an attractive tool of investigating the state of competition in many countries. Besides, Bikker 
and Haaf (2003) observe that studies employing the Panzar-Rosse approach yield more consistent 
results than those relying on the structural methods of analysis. 
Some of the early applications of the PR model to the banking sector in industrial countries 
were Nathan and Neave (1989) for Canadian banks, Vesala (1995) for Finnish banks, 
Molyneaux, et al. (1994) for a group of industrialised European countries. These studies all 
concluded that generally the banking industry is characterised by monopolistic competition. 
However, Nathan and Neave (1991) also found evidence of perfect competition in the Canadian 
banking industry for 1982 while Molyneaux, et al. (1994) noted that the Italian banking market 
could best be described by monopoly conduct. 
Another authoritative study is that by Bikker and Haaf (2002) in which the authors apply 
the PR methodology to test the relationship between concentration and degree of competition for 
a number of industrial countries. The results are definitive and show that monopolistic 
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competition was the dominant market structure for the banking sector of the sample countries. 
Another important finding was that the banking sector of the Netherlands was the most 
concentrated yet it was also the most competitive. Overall, Bikker and Haaf (2002) found a weak 
negative relationship between competition and concentration. 
Casu and Girardone (2006) analysed the interplay among concentration, competition and 
efficiency for the single European market. They observed that banks were characterised by 
monopolistic competition and the degree of concentration did not seem to be necessary for 
banking competition. Matthews, et al. (2007) studied the competitive conditions of major UK 
banks and found that banks earned their revenue under conditions of monopolistic competition.  
A distinguishing feature of the B-L approach is that it relies mainly on times series data, 
although panel estimations have been used in recent research. Notable studies in the B-L genre of 
literature include Shaffer (1993) who applied the Bresnahan-Lau model to the Canadian banking 
industry from 1965-1980. The results showed that banking behaviour was consistent with perfect 
competition during this period. Furthermore, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) used a similar 
approach and derived a conjectural variation (CV) parameter to infer competitiveness in the 
Italian banking industry in the context of regulatory reforms. The authors observed that reforms 
induced improvement in the level of competition among regional Italian banks.  
 
5.3.6 Bank competition in LDCs and emerging markets   
As data have become readily available and economic reforms deepened, there has been a 
growing application of the NEIO methodologies in developing countries and emerging market 
economies, given that the link between traditional measures of competition and market structure 
disappear with deregulation of the banking system (Bruno, 2004).  Here too the literature is 
replete with the Panzar-Rosse approach with a few exceptions.  
One exception is Kubo (2006) who investigated the degree of competition for the Thai 
banking sector after the financial crisis based on the Bresnahan (1989) framework along the lines 
of Angelini and Cetorelli (2003). The results showed that banks had become less competitive 
after the crisis. Wong, et al. (2007) also derived a CV for Hong Kong during the period 1991-
2005. The results indicated that despite rising concentration, banks in Hong Kong operated under 
competitive conditions in the loan market without any significant sign of collusive pricing. 
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A majority of studies in LDCs and countries in transition have popularised the use of the 
Panzar-Rosse approach. Many of these studies have been conducted in the context of financial 
liberalisation and other reform policies. For example, Mamatzakis, et al. (2005) employed the 
Panzar-Rosse methodology to a sample of South Eastern European (SEE) countries between 
1998 and 2002. Their findings show that the banking systems in these countries were contestable, 
indicating absence of collusive behaviour.  The level of competition had also improved over the 
years. A study by Gelos and Roldos (2004) for a group of European and Latin American 
emerging countries also found that contestability was high, despite rapid consolidation in the 
banking systems. Their Panzar-Rosse estimates of competition depicted presence of monopolistic 
competition in the banking industry of these countries.   
For Greece, Hondroyiannis, et al. (1999), showed that banks operated in a monopolistically 
competitive market. Furthermore, gradualism in financial sector reforms and adoption of best 
banking practices in the context of the European Union directives were the main ingredients in 
propping up competitive conditions of the Greek banking system. These results were confirmed 
by Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) who argue that the banking markets of Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) countries could not be characterised by the bipolar cases of perfect competition 
or monopoly. Instead, banks earned their revenues under conditions of monopolistic competition. 
Moreover, the intensity of competition was higher in later years of the study period, indicating 
that banks may have been warming up to reforms. However, in an earlier study, Drakos and 
Konstantinou (2005) argued that banks in Greece and Turkey did not show significant 
differences before and after financial liberalisation although the finding for Turkey has been 
challenged. Specifically, Gunalp and Celik (2006) reported of improvements in the degree of 
competition among Turkish banks after liberalisation policies.  
Whilst the research gap in many LDCs has been narrowing, the evidence for SSA countries 
has remained scant. For the few studies conducted, the broad observation corroborates findings 
of previous research elsewhere. Chen (2009) recently computed the competition index for a 
sample of middle-income SSA countries based on the Panzar-Rosse framework. For most the 
countries analysed, the results suggest that monopolistic competition best describes the level of 
competition in the banking sector although the degree of competition varies across countries. In 
another study, Saab and Vacher (2007) found that banking systems in the Economic and 
Monetary Community of Central Africa countries (CEMAC) are not integrated and are 
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characterised by limited competition. This concern is shared by Buchs and Mathisen (2005) who 
noted that despite financial reforms, banks in Ghana continued to operate less competitively. 
However, Mugume (2007) and Hauner and Peiris (2008) found positive effects of reforms on the 
level of competition among Ugandan banks, especially in post-privatisation period. Clarke, et al. 
(2009) have observed that the privatisation of Uganda Commercial Bank has led to the 
improvement in the level of profitability for the acquiring foreign bank. However, the new bank 
still operated as a monopoly in remote areas due to low levels of competition. 
Foreign bank presence in domestic banking markets has been found to shore up 
performance of financial institutions in host countries. The conventional argument for foreign 
bank presence in local banking markets is that they infuse new technologies, promote 
competition and provide managerial expertise. Foreign banks also increase local banks‟ resilience 
to shocks through peer pressure and learning by imitation. Also, the number of foreign banks by 
itself may exert a greater influence on the degree of competition even when their market share is 
large. This means that despite high levels of concentration, foreign banks may spur competition 
in the banking industry (Uiboupin, 2004; Claessens, Demirgüc-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001).  
A counter argument is that foreign banks tend to crowd out smaller domestic private sector 
banks in the deposits and loans markets. Because of their financial clout and reputation, foreign 
banks mobilise deposits from large multinational corporations, thereby crowding out domestic 
banks. In the loans market, large foreign banks also tend to lend to large firms without helping 
nurture the smaller domestic banks. This leads to a reduction of total credit available to small and 
medium-size enterprises (Stiglitz, 1994). In the short-term, foreign banks can also raise overhead 
costs for domestic banks and dampen their profitability as domestic banks seek to adopt new 
technologies and hire skilled personnel in order to compete with foreign banks (Claessens, 
Demirgüc-Kunt, & Huizinga, 2001).  
With the exception of a few examples, see for instance Yuan (2006), and Yildirim and 
Philippatos (2007), many studies have not endeavoured to factor in the discriminatory effect of 
differences in bank sizes and ownership structure on banking competition. When such factors are 
taken into account, the evidence suggests that there are significant differences in the degree of 
competition between foreign and domestic banks and between large and small banks, 
respectively.  In Zambia, large subsidiaries of foreign banks continue to dominate the banking 
industry in most segments of the banking market and even by size of assets (de Luna Martinez, 
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2006). This is because over the years, foreign banks have gained a substantial market share such 
that the entry of new fringe banks (both domestic and foreign) has not helped dampen the 
existing large banks‟ dominance. 
 
5.3.7 Summary of the empirical literature    
From the review of literature on banking concentration and competition we note that 
structural approaches suffer from theoretical deficiencies and therefore less equipped to offer 
plausible conclusions on the relationship between concentration and competition in banking 
markets. Shaffer (1994) cautioned that studies that infer competitiveness of the banking industry 
using structure or conduct are methodologically flawed, rendering their findings unsuitable as a 
basis for public policy. Indeed, as the analysis in the preceding section has demonstrated, banks 
can be competitive even when the market is highly concentrated.  
Thus, the development of NEIO approaches to provide a theoretical basis to market 
behaviour has created further incentives for revisiting competition measures in the banking 
sector. From these approaches we observe that broadly, banks operate under conditions of 
monopolistic competition although a few cases of monopoly and perfect competition have been 
observed. Although it may be desirable to make comparisons across different banking markets, 
we should bear in mind that banks operate in uniquely different local economic conditions, and 
thus may respond differently to the opportunities and constraints presented by these conditions. 
Therefore, this aspect makes comparison in results problematic (Gunji, Miura, & Yuan, 2009). 
Each study must be evaluated on its own merit based on the economic environment in which 
commercial banks operate.  
 
5.4 Methodology and estimation technique  
5.4.1 Analytical framework of the Panzar-Rosse approach    
The review of previous research has shown that the Panzar-Rosse methodology has 
theoretical and practical appeal as a measure of the state of competition in the banking sector. 
Therefore, in line with the literature, we adopt the Panzar-Rosse methodology in assessing the level 
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of competition in the Zambian banking industry. Since this approach is widely used, the choice of 
the PR methodology enables us to compare our results with those obtained from previous studies, 
especially in developing countries.  
The standard structure of the Panzar-Rosse methodology proceeds according to the analytical 
framework presented below and it is based on the structural revenue and cost relationship facing a 
particular firm, i . For details on formal derivation and accompanying assumptions, see Panzar and 
Rosse (1987). Let the revenue function be given by   
 
 R = R y,       (5.1) 
 
where, y is output and  stands for other variables that shift the revenue function. Further, assume the 
cost function of the following expression   
 
 , ,TC C y w      (5.2) 
 
where TC denotes economic costs, w represents input prices, and  exogenous factors that affect 
banks‟ costs of production. These may also include factors internal to the banks‟ own operating 
environment. Profits are given by the difference between revenues and costs, implying that marginal 
revenue equals marginal costs. Therefore, the profit expression is denoted as  
 
   , , ,= R y TC y w        (5.3) 
where is per period level of profit and other variables are as defined earlier. Partially 
differentiating Equation (5.3) with respect to output, and equating the result to zero yields the profit 
maximization condition, that is, marginal revenue equals marginal cost as given by Equation (5.4)  
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       , , , , , ,
0 or
R y TC y w R y TC y w
y y y y y
       
   
    
  (5.4) 
 
where 
 ,R y
y
 

 is marginal revenue (MR) and 
 , ,TC y w
y


 denotes marginal cost (MC).  
Solving Equation (5.4) for y  yields the profit maximising level of output, y

 defined as
 , ,y y w   . Substituting y into the revenue function yields the reduced form equation given by: 
 
   , , , , ,R R y w R w            (5.5) 
 
where R denotes the reduced form revenue function and other variables are as defined before. It 
can be seen from Equation (5.5) that in long-run equilibrium, the firm‟s revenue is a function of factor 
prices and exogenous factors only. For the banking system, exogenous factors may include bank-
specific, regulatory and institutional factors and macroeconomic variables. Clearly, neither the 
structural factors such as concentration ratios nor the number of firms is necessary to define the level 
of competition in the industry. 
In the framework presented above, competition is measured by the extent to which a change in 
factor input prices is reflected in the equilibrium revenue earned by a bank. Panzar and Rosse 
(1987) show that the sum of revenue elasticities with respect to the firm‟s factor input prices indicates 
whether the market is perfectly competitive, monopolistically competitive or monopolistic (collusion). 
The sum of the factor price elasticities is given by the algebraic expression of the H  statistic in 
Equation (5.6) below:  
 
R w
H
w R

 

 .     (5.6) 
 
Intuitively, the H  statistic rests solely on microeconomic theory, which exploits the proposition 
that pricing reactions to changes in input prices determine the market structure in which banks operate. 
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Thus, different market structures can be identified based on the sign of the H  statistic. Panzar and 
Rosse (1987) proved that if 0H   the market is characterised by monopolistic conduct or 
conjectural variations short-term oligopoly. The implication is that an increase in input prices 
increases marginal cost, reducing the equilibrium output and hence revenue. Consequently, the sum 
of the revenue elasticities is negative. Under perfect competition or highly contestable market, an 
increase in factor prices leads to a proportionate increase in marginal cost and in equilibrium, this 
means marginal cost equals marginal revenue. Accordingly, there is no change in the equilibrium 
level of output indicating that the sum of elasticities is equal to one, that is, 1H  . Monopolistic 
competition is defined by intermediate values of the H  statistic  0 1H  . Intuitively, an 
increase in factor input prices raises a bank‟s marginal cost and hence revenue, but less than 
proportionately.  
Table 5.1 below gives summary interpretations of the market structure and equilibrium 
conditions defined by the H  statistic.  
 
In the original formulation based on a single-product monopoly, Panzar and Rosse (1987) further 
showed that both the sign and magnitude of the H  statistic are important. That is, a higher H 
statistic would indicate increasing competitiveness.  
An important prerequisite of the PR methodology is that banks must be in long-run 
equilibrium for the above market structures to hold. For developed countries, the assumption of 
long-run equilibrium may not be difficult to sustain. In transition countries where banking sectors 
Table 5-1: Interpretation of the Panzar-Rosse H  statistic 
Value of H - statistic Market Structure Characterisation 
0H   
Monopoly or conjectural variations short-term oligopoly. In this case each bank 
operates independently as under monopoly profit maximising conditions and the H-
statistic is a decreasing function of the perceived demand elasticity. 
0 1H   
Monopolistic competition characterised by free entry equilibrium excess capacity. 
The H-statistic is an increasing function of the perceived demand elasticity. 
1H   
Perfect competition, or natural monopoly in a perfect contestable market, or sales 
maximising firm subject to break even constraint. It could imply free entry 
equilibrium with full (efficient) capacity utilisation. 
Market equilibrium test 
0E   Equilibrium 
0E   Disequilibrium 
Source: Molyneux, et al. (1994). 
Un
ive
rsi
ty
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
102 
 
are still undergoing transformation, long-run equilibrium may be farfetched (Mktrtchyan, 2005; 
Northcott, 2004). However, given the internal logic of the model, it is best to think of equilibrium 
as a steady state, reflecting adjustment to shocks (Buchs & Mathisen, 2005).  
For the Zambian banking system, the end of the crisis and subsequent restructuring of 
distressed banks culminated in relative stability of the banking industry. Moreover, over time there 
have been no major incentives for banks to continue to price their products and services below 
marginal cost in order to gain market share. These and related factors place the industry in what 
may be characterised as some sort of long-run equilibrium (implied steady state). Accordingly, 
Zambian banks may be seen as readily able to absorb the effect of exogenous shocks. Nevertheless, 
the assumption of long-run equilibrium must be empirically tested rather than imposed arbitrarily. 
This issue is addressed in the empirical section below.   
Gelos and Roldos (2004) also argue that for the PR approach to be applied to banking, two 
other assumptions must be satisfied. First, banks should be modelled as single-product firms, using 
labour, capital and intermediated funds as inputs and secondly, input prices must be delinked from 
higher quality services because the opposite might imply higher revenues. When this is the case, 
the value of the H  statistic may be biased upwards.  
  
5.4.2 Econometric estimation  
For purposes of econometric estimation, the reduced form revenue equation is specified 
below. It is standard practice in the literature to use revenue, measured variously, as the dependent 
variable. The right hand side includes input prices, bank specific variables and macroeconomic or 
regulatory variables to control for market conditions. Thus, in line with previous research, see for 
example, Drakos and Konstantinou (2005); Buchs and Mathisen (2005), Hondroyiannis, et al. 
(1999), among others, the empirical PR model is given by Equation 5.7 below:   
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         
   
   
     
0ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln
ln ln
ln ln ln
it L Lit F Fit K Kit RISK it
OC it CR it
LR it BR it
INFL t TBR t EXR t
REV w w w RISK
OPPCOST CAPRATIO
INTERMED BRANCH
INFLATION TBR EXR
    
 
 
   
    
 
 
   
     (5.7) 
 
where  subscripts i  and t denote bank i at time t and REV  is the ratio of revenue-to-total assets 
(both total and interest revenue as a proportion of assets are used), Lw , Kw and Fw denote 
respectively, unit labour costs (approximate wage rate), unit cost of capital and unit price of funds; 
ln is a natural logarithm operator, OPPCOST is the opportunity cost of reserve requirements, 
INTERMED is the intermediation ratio,CAPRATIO  is the capital-to-risk weighted assets ratio, 
RISK is ratio of nonperforming loans to gross loans, BRANCH is the number of bank branches per 
period, INFLATION is the rate of inflation, TBR is the 91-day Treasury bill rate and EXR  is the 
exchange rate defined as the amount of local currency units per unit of United States dollars, that 
is, ZMK/US$,   is a white noise disturbance term and T is time period measured in quarters. 
Finally, 's are parameters to be estimated. From Equation (5.7), the H  statistic is given by the 
sum of the revenue elasticities with respect to input factor prices, that is, L K FH      . 
All the independent variables have been carefully chosen and included in the revenue 
specification to reflect the banks‟ revenue response to regulatory constraints, internal management 
practices and macroeconomic conditions. For example, reserve requirements have the propensity to 
limit banks‟ independent behaviour and hence curtail competitiveness in the industry.35  This is 
because they create compelling pressures that force banks to move in tandem yet independent 
behaviour is the hallmark of competition (Telser, 2007). Clearly, ignoring such factors may lead to 
misleading inferences about banks‟ actual behaviour.  
 
                                                          
 
35
 Reserve requirements are imposed and adjusted on occasion, mainly as a monetary policy tool than for prudential 
regulatory purposes. As a prudential regulatory requirement, they complement but not supersede equity and capital 
requirements.   
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5.4.3 Sample and data  
All the 15 banks that were operating in Zambia during 1998-2006 form our sample of 
analysis. Newly established banks and merged banks during the study period have been included. 
However, the sample excludes failed banks due to unavailability of data. For the merged banks, the 
data are reported separately for each bank before the merger and subsequently, the merged bank 
enters as a single institution. Therefore, the estimations were conducted on an unbalanced panel.  
Quaterly observations were used in the estimation process to increase degrees of freedom. 
The data were sourced from the banks‟ balance sheet and profit/loss statements as well as returns 
on liquidity ratios submitted to the central bank of Zambia. Macroeconomic data were gleaned 
from the Fortnightly Statistics, also published by the Bank of Zambia. Table 5.2 below gives a 
description of the variables used in the analysis. Note that only the newly introduced variables are 
presented in Table 5.2. Other variables used in the analysis are as defined in Table 4.1 above. 
 
Table 5-2: Variables used in evaluating competition in the Zambian banking industry 
Variable  Variable Name Description and measurement Mean Median Std Dev. Source 
TREVASST
 
Total revenue  
Interest plus non-interest income 
expressed as a proportion of total assets  
 
0.022 
 
0.021 
 
0.010 
 
IS and BS 
       
INTRASST
 
Interest revenue 
Interest income, expressed 
 as a proportion of total assets  
0.013 0.013 0.006 IS and BS 
       
OITASS  Other income 
Non-interest income (fees, commissions, etc),  
expressed as a proportion of total assets  
0.008 0.007 0.007 IS and BS 
       
ROA  Return on assets 
Total revenue before taxes expressed  
as a proportion of total assets 
0.005 0.486 0.007 IS and BS 
       
EXR  
Nominal 
exchange rate  
Local currency units per unit of US dollar 
(ZMK/US$) 
3655.800 3806.965 1016.78 Fort. Stat. 
Note: IS – Income statement, BS – Balance Sheet; Fort. Stat. – Fortnightly Statistics 
Source: Bank of Zambia (BoZ) 
 
5.4.4 Hypotheses and expected signs of coefficients 
In this section we hypothesise about the direction of effect between revenue and its 
explanatory factors. Firstly, in line with previous research, we estimate the revenue equation using 
both total revenue-to-total assets ratio  TREVASST
 
and ratio of interest revenue-to-assets 
 INTRASST , taking the specification involving TREVASST  as the benchmark equation. Using 
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total revenue to assess banks‟ behaviour ensures that a comprehensive measure of competitiveness 
for all banking services (traditional and non-traditional) is captured. This is consistent with the fact 
that for survival, banks have to aggressively contend with each other in all lines of business 
activities. Therefore, estimations based on interest revenue  INTRASST  serve as robustness 
checks to the total revenue  TREVASST specification. Interest revenue comprises interest earned 
on loans, securities and net interbank placements. A regression for non-interest income has also 
estimated to reinforce the results from the two specifications.   
All three input prices are expected to carry positive coefficients. Therefore, 
0; 0 and 0L K F      in all specifications. Since nonperforming loans are undesirable outputs, 
they act as a drain on revenue and bank performance. Accordingly, the variable RISK is expected 
to carry a negative coefficient  that is, 0RISK  . This implies that banks exposed to high credit risk 
would generate less revenue. A priori, the sign on opportunity costs of statutory reserves 
 OPPCOST  is expected to be negative, 0OC  . The intuition is that a large amount of 
unremunerated reserves depict a high opportunity cost of funds. Accordingly, this means high 
interest forgone which in turn reduces the amount of revenue a bank would otherwise earn if such 
reserves were remunerated or invested in earning assets.  
The effect of CAPRATIOon revenue is ambiguous ex-ante, depending on whether high 
capital requirements lead to more or less revenue for the banks. To the extent that this variable has 
distortionary regulatory effects, bank revenue may decline, and therefore 0CR  . On the other 
hand, if such distortions are not binding, say, because banks engage is risk lending and hence earn 
a higher return, this could lead to more revenue. Accordingly, 0CR  . Banks that intermediate 
more funds into loans should earn a higher revenue. Therefore, 0LR  . We also expect that banks 
with more branches earn more revenue, due mainly to closer contact with customers. Accordingly, 
0BR  .  
High inflation is deterimental to banks‟ performance. Therefore, we expect a negative 
coefficient on INFLATION , that is, 0INFL  . In contrast, since banks have historically generated 
a significant amount of revenue from foreign exchange transactions, we hypothesise that 0EXR  . 
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However, to the extent that depreciation in the domestic currency signals macroeconomic 
uncertainty, this variable may have a negative impact on revenue, meaning that EXR  would be 
negative. The 91-day Treasury bill yield rate  TBR  controls for the co-dependence between 
government domestic borrowing requirement and banks‟ performance. This variable is expected to 
carry a positive sign  0TBR  indicating that investment in Treasury securities yields more 
revenue.  
 
5.4.5 Test for long-run equilibrium   
The empirical test for the long-run equilibrium condition is given by Equation (5.8) below. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the return on assets  ROA , while the 
explanatory variables remain the same as those given by Equation (5.7) above. According to 
Shaffer (1983) rates of return are equalised across banks and must not be correlated with input 
prices, that is, 0E  . Therefore, long-run equilibrium is tested using ROAon the premise that it is 
unrelated to input prices. Since ROA  can potentially take on negative values, for convenience it is 
adjusted by a factor of one before taking logarithmic transformation. The specification for long-run 
equilibrium reads as follows: 
 
         
   
   
     
0ln ln ln ln ln
ln ln
ln ln
ln ln ln
it L Lit F Fit K Kit RISK it
OC it CR it
LR it BR it
INFL t TBR t EXR t
ROA w w w RISK
OPPCOST CAPRATIO
INTERMED BRANCH
INFLATION TBR EXR
    
 
 
   
    
 
 
   
     (5.8) 
 
where ROA is the banks‟ profit before tax expressed as percentage of total assets and 
0L K FE        is the test for the long-run equilibrium condition against the alternative that 
0E  . 
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5.5 Empirical results of the Panzar-Rosse approach 
This section presents the empirical results of the Panzar-Rosse approach. Estimations were 
conducted using panel data analysis. The advantage of panel estimation over cross-section analysis 
is that it enables the researcher to combine time series and cross sectional data in order to account 
for unobservable individual bank-specific effects. Therefore it has great flexibility in modelling 
differences in behaviour across individual sample units (Green, 2003). There are two competing 
estimation techniques in panel data analysis - the fixed and random effects models. The choice 
between the two models is informed by the results of the Hausman specification test. In line with 
Hoechle (2007) and Green (2003) all regression equations were estimated with robust standard 
errors in order to correct for groupwise heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional correlation in panels. 
 
5.5.1 Long-run equilibrium in banking  
The validity of the Panzar-Rosse approach rests on the satisfaction of the assumption of long-
run equilibrium. Results of this test are presented in Table 5.3 below. Based on the Wald statistic, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis of long-run equilibrium in Zambian banking even at the 
conservative 10 percent level. The estimated E  statistic was found to be 0.073. The test result 
means that the Panzar-Rosse estimation procedure can be used to adequately evaluate the state of 
competition and related market structure in the Zambian commercial banking sector. In the 
remainder of this chapter we assess the degree of competition measured by the H  statistic. 
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 Table 5-3: Long-Run equilibrium test estimates 
Dependent variable: ln  ROA  
Independent Variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept -1.564 -0.946 0.344 
Input prices 
ln( wL ) -0.057 -0.601 0.549 
ln( wF ) 0.113 2.255 0.025** 
ln(wK) 0.017 0.320 0.749 
E - Statistic 0.073   
    
Bank-specific and regulatory variables 
ln(OPPCOST) -0.147 -2.271 0.024** 
ln(CAPRATIO) 0.102 1.128 0.260 
ln(RISK) -0.041 -1.315 0.189 
ln(INTERMED) -0.022 -0.329 0.742 
ln(BRANCH) 0.373 2.295 0.007*** 
    
Macroeconomic variables    
ln(INFL) -0.326 -2.962 0.003*** 
ln(EXR) 0.644 2.886 0.004*** 
ln(TBR) 0.265 2.295 0.022** 
Diagnostics    
Hausman test (p-value) 0.070*   
u  0.329   
  0.421   
  0.379   
2R  0.033   
No. of Obs. 374   
F-statistic (p-value) 0.000***   
Null hypothesis: 0E  , Fail to reject  0.529p value   
Significance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
Source: Author‟s own estimates based on BoZ  data 
 
5.5.2 Test of competition in banking: results of the total revenue equation 
Table 5-4 below summarises random effects results of the PR regression with TREVASST as 
the dependent variable for the full sample. According to the results, the data fits the model 
reasonably well. Independent variables explain 64 percent of the banks‟ revenue ratio. As an 
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alternative test for model adequacy, the F  statistic is also statistically significant at 1 percent.
  
Table 5-4: Competitiveness in the Zambian commercial banking industry  
Dependent variable: ln  TREVASST  
Independent Variables Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept -1.949 -2.628 0.009*** 
Input prices    
ln(wL) 0.295 6.146 0.000*** 
ln(wF) 0.272 10.417 0.000*** 
 ln(wK) 0.118 3.455 0.001*** 
 
   
Bank-specific and regulatory factors   
ln(OPPCOST) -0.064 -2.405 0.016** 
ln(CAPRATIO)  0.003  0.109 0.913 
ln(RISK) -0.027 -1.694 0.090* 
ln(INTERMED) 0.043 1.192 0.233 
ln(BRANCH) 0.118 2.351 0.019** 
 
   
Macroeconomics variables    
ln(INFLATION) -0.132 -2.783 0.005*** 
ln(EXR) 0.176  2.229 0.026** 
ln(TBR) 0.104  2.429 0.015** 
H  statistic  0.685  
Null: H=0 (p-value) Monopoly  0.000***  
Null: H=1 (p-value) Perfect Competition 0.000***  
Market Structure Monopolistic competition 
Diagnostics    
Hausman test (p-value):  0.954  
u  
 
 0.193  
   0.196  
  
 
 0.492  
2R   0.641  
No. of  Obs.  379  
F-statistic (p-value)  0.000***  
Significance level: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01    
Source: Author‟s own estimates based on BoZ  data 
 
The main attraction of the Panzar-Rosse methodology is the magnitude and significance of 
the H  statistic and the concomitant market structure depicted by this index. From Table 5-4 we 
observe that the estimated valued of the H  statistic of 0.69 obtained from the specification of 
total revenue-total assets ratio is significantly different from both zero and unit at 1 percent level. 
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This means that the null hypotheses of both monopoly and perfect competition are unambiguously 
rejected. Since this value lies between zero and one, the intuition is that over the study period, 
Zambian banks earned their total income under conditions of monopolistic competition. That is, for 
the banking system as a whole, individual banks had the ability to post higher revenue due to the 
exercise of some degree of market power.  
The value of the estimated H  statistic is further buttressed by the significance of all three 
input factor prices and the plausibility of diagnostic statistics. The sample coefficients on all three 
input prices carry the expected positive sign and are significantly different from zero at the 1 
percent level. Intuitively, this implies that factor prices are important for Zambian banks in the 
pricing of bank products and services. This result justifies the use of the intermediation approach in 
modelling bank behaviour by incorporating all cost elements – financial as well as real resource 
costs (Swank, 1996; Baltensperger, 1980).  
The results also suggest that by magnitude, labour and funding unit costs contribute the most 
to the H  statistic. Moreover, most estimates of bank-specific and regulatory variables are 
evidently robust, corroborating prior expectations. The ratio of impaired loans to gross loans 
 RISK  is significant at 10 percent and carries the expected negative sign. This means that credit 
risk does indeed impede banks‟ revenue performance although the impact is modest. Nonetheless, 
this credit risk effect possibly explains the reluctance of Zambian banks to expand their loan 
portfolio during the sample period. Banks with a wide reach in terms of branch density 
 BRANCH also generate more revenue. The significance of the estimated parameter for 
BRANCH means that geographical diversification acts as an advantage for commercial banks in 
terms of revenue generation. Clearly, therefore, even though operating an extensive branch 
network attracts costs, proximity to customers is also beneficial to commercial banks.  
Regulatory intensity related to reserve requirements constrained banks from optimising their 
revenue performance as shown by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
OPPCOST . Capital requirements denoted by CAPRATIOdid not impose a binding constraint on 
the revenue performance of commercial banks. In any case, the result shows that well capitalised 
banks also earned more revenue than their less capitalised counterparts although this effect is 
insignificant. Similarly, the banks‟ loan-deposit ratio  INTERMED was also found to be 
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insignificant. This is consistent with the fact that the financial intermediation function of Zambian 
banks has been very low during study period.   
From the results in Table 5-4, there is reasonable evidence to suggest that macroeconomic 
instability characterised by high inflation affected the banks‟ revenue performance of Zambian 
banks over the study period. The coefficient on INFLATION is negative and significant at 1 
percent, implying that in high inflationary conditions, banks earn less revenue, as traditional 
sources of income get downgraded by inflationary pressures. However, bank revenues responded 
positively and significantly to the 91-day Treasury bill rate and the exchange rate. A unit increase 
in the TBR raised banks‟ total revenue by 0.1 percent and this effect was significant at the 5 
percent level. The above finding underscores the fact that the banks‟ holdings of Treasury bills and 
Government bonds have contributed significantly to the growth in revenue over the years.  
Commercial banks have remained the dominant players in the securities market, accounting 
for over 90 percent of total marketable securities holdings. Therefore, investment in securities has 
always been an important source of bank revenue, accounting for a third of total interest income. 
Furthermore, banks use the 91-day Treasury bill rate as a benchmark in setting their base lending 
rates. Hence, the 91-day Treasury bill rate is picking up all these effects. Similarly for the exchange 
rate, the results indicate that the depreciation in the domestic currency helped banks generate more 
revenue through realised exchange gains on the banks‟ foreign currency denominated assets, which 
in turn boosted the non-interest income component of total revenue.  
Broadly, results of the effect of macroeconomic stance on bank revenue corroborate those 
reported in previous studies for developing countries where credit to government and 
macroeconomic instability influence the revenue performance of commercial banks. For example, 
Mamatzakis, et al. (2005), Hauner & Peiris (2008) and Yuan (2006) show that inflation was 
detrimental to performance of the banking sector but the impact was less significant. On the other 
hand, Buchs & Mathisen (2005) observed that for Ghanaian banks, the rate of inflation adversely 
affected banks‟ revenue generation while the Treasury bill rate acquired a different but robust 
interpretation, impacting bank revenue more positively.  
The results presented above are consistent with those reported by Buchs & Mathisen (2005) 
who showed that both inflation and the Treasury bill rate affected revenue performance of 
Ghanaian banks in an important manner but in the opposite direction. However, studies by 
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Mamatzakis, et al. (2005), Hauner & Peiris (2008) and Yuan (2006) showed that although inflation 
deterred banks from increasing their revenue performance, its impact was less significant.  
 
5.5.3 Economteric results of an interest revenue equation 
This section reports the H  statistic estimated from the specification involving the ratio of 
interest revenue to total assets. Estimating the PR model using the ratio of interest revenue-to-
assets ( INTRASST )
 
allows us to gain further insight into the degree of competition taking into 
account the fact that banks generate the bulk of their income from traditional banking activities. 
Therefore, this estimation addresses itself to the question of whether the degree of competition 
obtained with interest revenue differs substantially from that estimated using total revenue. If it is 
different, this may be attributed to the influence of other income (fees, commissions, etc.). Thus, as 
a further consistency check, we also estimated a regression equation for other income as a 
proportion of assets ( OITASS ). The results of both estimations are reported in Table 5-5 below.  
Panel I in Table 5-5 reports the estimation results for interest revenue. From the results, the 
sum of the input factor elasticities was significantly larger than zero, rejecting the hypothesis of 
monopoly. Specifically, the H  statistic was calculated as 0.648. This figure was also found to be 
significantly less than unit ( p - value= 0.000 ), which rules out the possibility of perfect 
competition in the traditional segment of the Zambian banking system. Fundamentally, these 
findings indicate the oligopolistic nature of the Zambian banking sector. Therefore, the results lend 
further credence to the earlier finding of monopolistic competition in the total revenue 
specification. Relative to the results obtained with the total income equation, the H  statistic 
calculated from an interest revenue equation is generally of similar magnitude.  
A possible explanation for the minor difference in the degree of competition is because banks 
earn more of their total income in form of interest revenue (that is, from loans, securities and 
interbank fund placements). Accordingly, traditional sources of income roughly approximate 
overall activity in the banking sector, especially for a developing country like Zambia where the 
level of financial sophistication is limited. 
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Table 5-5: Competitiveness estimates with interest and non-interest income  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
ln( INTRASST ) 
 
ln(OITASS ) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept -5.131 -8.051 0.000*** 
 
-0.668 -0.517 0.606 
Input prices 
       
ln(wL) 0.252 5.391 0.000***  
0.378 4.206 0.000*** 
ln(wF) 0.291 10.190 0.000***  
0.121 2.605 0.010*** 
 ln(wK) 0.105 2.609 0.009***  
0.161 2.757 0.006*** 
        
Bank-specific and regulatory factors 
     
ln(OPPCOST) -0.101 -3.257 0.001*** 
 
-0.117 -1.730 0.040** 
ln(CAPRATIO) -0.023 -0.728 0.467 
 
0.048 0.140 0.394 
ln(RISK) -0.059 -4.068 0.000*** 
 
0.034 0.810 0.237 
ln(INTERMED) 0.056 1.312 0.190 
 
-0.095 -0.330 0.130 
ln(BRANCH) 0.145 2.239 0.026** 
 
0.006 0.043 0.966 
        
Macroeconomic variables 
ln(INFLATION) -0.194 -3.263 0.001*** 
 
-0.181 -2.002 0.046** 
ln(EXR) 0.477 5.620 0.000*** 
 
-0.009 -0.061 0.952 
ln(TBR) 0.202 4.163 0.000*** 
 
0.120 1.470 0.143 
H-statistic 
 
0.648 
   
0.660 
 
H=0 (p-value) 
 
0.000*** 
   
0.000*** 
 
H=1 (p-value) 
 
0.000*** 
   
0.006*** 
 
Market Structure       Monopolistic Competition 
 
          Monopolistic Competition 
Diagnostics               
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.007*** 
   
0.000*** 
 
u  
 
0.333 
   
0.482 
 
  0.212    0.366  
  
 
0.713 
   
0.634 
 
2R  0.441    0.338  
No. of  Obs.  
380 
   
378 
 
F-statistic (p-value)   0.000*** 
   
0.000***   
Significance level: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent 
ln( INTRASST ) - Log of Total Interest Revenue/Total Assets 
ln(OITASS ) - Log of Other Income (Fees and Commissions, etc)/Total Assets 
Source: Bank of Zambia and author‟s estimations 
Generally, previous studies have produced mixed estimates of the H  statistic derived from 
the two revenue definitions. For example, Perera, et al. (2006) found that in South Asian banking 
systems the degree of competition inferred from the interest revenue regression was greater than 
that estimated from a total revenue specification. On the other hand, Buchs and Mathisen (2005) 
found that for Ghanaian banks, competition estimated from total revenue (H=0.54) was greater 
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than that estimated from an interest revenue regression (H=0.42). Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) 
also report of varying degrees of competition for a number of Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries depending on whether the competitive index is derived from an interest revenue 
regression or a total revenue specification (see Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007:Table II, p.203). 
Chen (2009) presents a more consistent story of competitiveness based on the two revenue 
measures for a sample of middle-income SSA countries.  Except for Cape Verde, all other 
countries considered showed that competition among banks was greater when assessed using 
interest revenue (see Table 5 in Chen, 2009). Hauner and Peiris (2008) reported relatively similar 
estimates for Ugandan banks.   
As in the previous estimation with total income, other coefficients in the interest revenue 
equation are consistent with those for the total revenue regression. The unit factor prices carry 
expected signs with funding costs and unit labour costs dominating the influence in the H 
statistic. The same is true for the three macroeconomic variables, namely inflation, Treasury bill 
rate and exchange rate, respectively. This means that bank interest income is subject to 
macroeconomic shocks and is strongly procyclical. For bank-specific and regulatory variables, the 
estimated coefficients have retained their signs and level of significance, except for the capital ratio 
(CAPRATIO ), which has its sign reversed but remains insignificant. A noteworthy observation is 
the magnitude of the parameter estimate for RISK , which has more than doubled to 0.059 and is 
statistically significant from zero at 1 percent level in the interest revenue equation. This estimate 
shows that focussing on interest income brings out a pronounced influence of credit risk on bank 
revenue.  
 
5.5.4 Are banks more aggressive in traditional income sources than fee income? 
The finding that competitive conditions for total income and interest income are marginally 
different may suggest that fee-income and off-balance sheet activities are an insignificant 
component of the banks‟ business line. We test for this conjecture by estimating a separate 
regression for fee and commission based income, also expressed as a proportion of total assets  
(OITASS ).  
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The Wald-statistic permits us to yet again reject the null hypotheses of monopoly and perfect 
competition at 1 percent. Most importantly, the estimate of the H  statistic of 0.66 suggests that 
this component of banking income is also defined by oligopolistic conduct (see Panel II of Table 
5-5). The estimated competition index suggests that the state of competition from fees and other 
income is no less or more than it is with traditional measures of income. However, the lack of 
significance of most coefficients on control variables indicates that fee income responded less 
robustly to these factors, especially to internal bank-specific factors. These findings are difficult to 
understand given that most banks tend to charge fees and commissions tailored to the structure of 
their internal operations. The insignificance of the exchange rate is also surprising in view of the 
relative importance of foreign exchange gains in other sources of banks‟ income.  
 
5.5.5 Ownership structure, size and degree of competition 
In order to assess whether results from the full sample regression differ by from those defined 
by the behaviour of particular bank categories and size, the estimations were conducted on 
subsamples of domestic versus foreign banks and large versus small banks.
36
 Foreign owned banks 
are all those foreign equity ownership in excess of 50 percent while domestic banks are defined as 
those whose majority shareholders are primarily of Zambian origin. At the end of 2006, there were 
eight foreign-owned banks and five domestic banks, including a state-owned bank. Regardless of 
the ownership structure, all banks are subjected to the same regulatory regime and are expected to 
comply with the regulatory requirements. Thus, it is anticipated that any difference in the level of 
competition between domestic and foreign owned banks would predominantly be due to intrinsic 
and unobservable characteristics defined by the form of ownership, for example, managerial 
ingenuity and expertise in generating revenue. For this reason and taking a cue from previous 
studies, we hypothesise that foreign owned banks would exhibit a higher level of competition than 
domestic banks.  
                                                          
 
36
 The subsamples for domestic and large banks include the Zambia national commercial bank (ZNCB), which until 
April 2007 was wholly owned by the Zambian government. However, as stated earlier, ZNCB often enjoyed soft 
budget support. In a sense, this made the playing field less even. 
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We also investigated whether or not the degree of competition among large banks differs 
from that of small banks, using total assets as a classification criterion for the size of banks. Thus, a 
bank is classified small or large depending on the proportion of its assets relative to the total 
industry assets.
37
 We identified four large banks which accounted for over 80.0 percent of the 
industry‟s total assets. These banks had a mean asset ratio of 16.3 percent. One of these banks was 
state-owned, accounting for about a fifth of the industry assets. The remainder were foreign banks. 
Small banks had a mean asset ratio of only 2.2 percent but exhibited wide dispersion around the 
mean. Altogether there were 11 small banks more than half of which were domestic private banks. 
Small banks accounted for less than 19.0 percent of total industry assets. Obviously, there is some 
arbitrariness in such classification thresholds but this has the merit of keeping a balance of 
differently sized banks in the same asset category.  As with large banks, there was an overlap in the 
small banks subsample, that is, the small banks had a mixture of foreign as well as domestic banks. 
A priori, large banks are expected to manifest stronger competition than their smaller counterparts 
which tend to operate in the fringe markets.  
For purposes of brevity, results of the estimated H  statistic for each of the bank groups and 
asset class are summarised in Table 5.3 below (full regression results are presented in Appendix 
II). In order to compare the results of these panel regressions with findings from previous studies, 
the estimations were conducted only for total and interest income, again expressed as a proportion 
of total assets. 
For the total revenue measure, the results indicate that foreign banks were more competitive 
than domestic banks. For foreign banks, the estimated value of the H  statistic was 0.68 and 
depicted monopolistic competition of the Zambian banking sector, given by the hypothesis test 
results. On the other hand, the competitive index for domestic banks was lower at 0.59. However, 
the statistical test also rejects presence of perfect competition and monopoly at 1 percent in favour 
of oligopolistic behaviour. 
 
 
                                                          
 
37
 This is the same classification used by the Bank of Zambia. 
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The analysis of competitive conduct with an interest revenue equation produced a contrasting 
outcome. Although monopolistic competition still remains the valid market structure, the higher 
value of the H  statistic for domestic banks shows that these banks operate in a more competitive 
environment than foreign banks. This aggressive behaviour serves as a catalyst for competitive 
interest rate setting among the domestic banks, indicating that domestic banks set loan prices 
independent of subsidiaries of foreign banks but tend to get signals from their local counterparts.  
On size and competition, the results in Table 5-6 reaffirm the fact that banks operated in a 
monopolistic competitive environment for both revenue measures and asset class. However, an 
important observation is that for both income measures, small banks had a slightly higher 
competitive edge over large banks. For the small banks subgroup, the H  statistic from the total 
revenue equation was 0.67 against 0.53 for large banks. With respect to the interest revenue 
equation, small banks had a competitive index of 0.69 compared with 0.61 for large banks.  
The observed greater intensity of competition among small banks is inconsistent with prior 
expectations and findings of previous research. For example, Yildirim & Philippatos (2007), 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) and Belaisch (2003) argue that competition among large banks tends to be 
greater than that for small banks because large banks enjoy international exposure while small 
banks operate mainly in thin local markets where they enjoy market power. For the Zambian case, 
Table 5-6: H  statistic estimates by type of bank 
   
 Local 
 
Foreign 
 
Small Large 
Log of Total Revenue/Total Assets ( TREVASST ) H-statistic 0.591 
 
0.684 
 
0.668 0.533 
   
 
      
Hypothesis Tests for Different Market Structures  
      
Monopoly  0H  p-value 0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
   
 
      
Perfect Competition  1H  p-value 0.000* 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 0.002*** 
 
 
      
Log of Interest Revenue/Total Assets ( INTRASST ) H-statistic 0.683 
 
0.577 
 
0.686 0.611 
   
 
      
Hypothesis Tests for Different Market Structures  
      
Monopoly  0H  p-value 0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 0.000*** 
   
 
      
Perfect Competition  1H  p-value 0.004*** 
 
0.000*** 
 
0.000*** 0.011*** 
Significance level: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent 
Source: Bank of Zambia and author‟s estimations  
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higher competitive pressures exhibited by the small banks subgroup underpin the fact that to 
survive, small banks have an established presence in urban centres where competition for 
customers is intense. Thus, because of relatively low reputation, small banks have devised several 
competitive mechanisms which enable them to retain their clients. One way is by offering 
competitive terms on loans and deposits to both large and small customers. On the other hand, a 
majority of large banks boast an extensive branch network.  The alternative way of looking at this 
is that since the large banks subsample also includes the public sector bank, it may be the case that 
its inclusion in the regression analysis affected the results of this bank category.  
The above results notwithstanding, the overall conclusion from the analysis of competition of 
different classes of banks corroborate the findings from the full bank sample estimations. This is to 
say that during the study period, Zambian banks operated in an environment defined by 
monopolistic competition.  
 
5.5.6 Summary of findings and comparison with previous research 
This chapter has addressed an important subject of competition and market structure in the 
commercial banking sector for a low-income country in the context of financial reforms but 
focussing largely on the post-crisis period. Using a not seen before detailed bank-level data set, the 
study draws on previous research anchored in the New Empirical Industrial Organisation literature. 
Specifically, we estimated the degree of competition based on the Panzar-Rosse H  statistic from 
reduced form revenue equations. The regressions were estimated for total income, interest revenue 
and other income, the latter two providing robustness check to the broad revenue measure.   
The key finding from the analysis is that Zambian banks earned their income under conditions 
of monopolistic competition. This is provided by the significant estimates of the H  statistic 
which lie between zero and unit and significantly so for all three sets of revenue measures. 
Furthermore, the results showed a marginal difference between the degree of competition estimated 
from total income and interest revenue. The intuition being that interest revenue may be a close 
approximation of overall banking activity. This confirms the fact that traditional activities continue 
to be an important source of the banks‟ rent in developing countries. The results also justify the 
choice of the intermediation approach in modelling banks‟ conduct.  
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Regression results based on ownership structure and size of banks were broadly in line with 
full sample estimates of market structure. In all subgroup panel regressions, the hypotheses of 
perfect competition and monopoly were rejected at 1 percent significance level. However, the 
magnitude of the H  statistic depicted a mixture of the degree of competitiveness between 
different bank categories. For total revenue, subsidiaries of foreign banks appeared more 
competitive than domestic banks as shown by the value of the estimated H  statistic. However, 
this was not the case when competition was assessed using from an interest revenue specification. 
Foreign banks lagged behind domestic banks in the degree of competitive intensity indicating that 
the former group of banks may have been less aggressive in generating interest revenue. Possibly, 
this may indicate that domestic banks are defined by competitive pricing strategy aimed at 
capturing market share from foreign competitors.  
The main observation from regression results based on the asset size of commercial banks 
was that small banks had a higher competitive index than large banks and this finding is invariant 
to the choice of revenue measure. The implication is that unlike in other countries, Zambian small 
banks exploit their urban presence to continuously compete in order for them to remain profitable. 
An alternative explanation is that by virtue of their size, large banks exert some degree of market 
power despite their wide reach in terms of presence and customer base. From a regulatory policy 
perspective, this evidence shows that authorities should indeed be concerned about the market 
dominance of a handful of large banks because this appears to have implications for competition.  
The results obtained in this chapter are comparable to previous research findings, both for 
developed and developing countries. Specifically for LDCs, the measure of competition compares 
favourably with estimates of the H  statistic provided by Buchs & Mathisen (2005) for Ghanaian 
banks. They are also consistent with the estimates reported by Chen (2009) for middle-income SSA 
countries. Moreover, the degree of competition in the Zambian banking industry does not depart 
from the competitive indices reported for some advanced and emerging economies. For example, 
Drakos and Konstantinou (2005), Gelos and Roldos (2004), Bikker and Haaf (2002) have all 
concluded that banks operate in monopolistic competitive conditions.  
However, estimates for Ugandan banks (Mugume, 2007; Hauner & Peiris, 2008) and South 
Asian banking markets as shown by Perera, et al. (2006) suggest relatively smaller  values of the
H  statistic than the evidence adduced in our study. This implies that Zambian banks exhibit a 
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slightly higher degree of competitiveness than those in Uganda and South Asia. Suffice to say, 
such variations could be attributed to differences in economic conditions under which these banks 
operated. They could also be underpinned by progress made in microeconomic financial sector 
reforms and restructuring and how these impact on banking competition. 
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C h a p t e r  S i x   
 
Market Power and its Determinants in the Zambian Banking Sector 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The microeconomic theory of the banking firm offers different aspects on the conduct of banks 
and their pricing strategies. In particular, the existence of pure profits which stems from the exercise 
of market power depicts banks‟ long-run equilibrium configuration in an imperfect market situation. 
Traditionally, market power has been depicted by the Lerner Index (Lerner, 1934; Tirole, 1992) 
measured as a relative mark-up of price over marginal cost divided by price. Market power is 
especially prevalent in industries dominated by a few large firms, which serve as market leaders 
through collusive conduct. However, the evidence that dominance of large firms manifests itself in 
market leadership has been contested in the literature (Prince & Thurik, 1995). Market power may 
also arise from private firms‟ investment in technology and equipment aimed at improving the 
quality of products and services. In this regard, private ownership could be associated with higher 
price-cost margins, driven by better quality of services (Konings, Cayseele, & Warzynski, 2005).  
There are a number of factors that influence banks‟ exercise of market power. They include 
among others, structural indicators such as concentration ratios, regulatory policy, cost efficiency 
and the macroeconomic environment in which banks operate. For the Zambian banking sector, 
sustained wide interest rate spreads, high levels of market concentration coupled with high profit 
indicators reinforce the view that Zambian banks exercise market power in pricing bank products and 
services.   
Studies have shown that under certain conditions, there is a close link between the H - statistic 
of the Panzar-Rosse methodology and the Lerner Index (Shaffer, 1983; Bikker & Haaf, 2002). The 
reasoning is that when banks are faced with a constant elasticity of demand for banking products and 
assuming there is no mismeasurement of variables, there is a symmetrical relationship between the 
H - statistic and the Lerner Index. Hence, as banks become more competitive (higher H - statistic), 
the narrower the relative price-cost mark-up (Lerner Index).  
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6.2 Study objectives and hypothesis 
There are two main objectives in this chapter of the thesis. The first objective is to provide 
evidence of exercise of market power by Zambian banks and analyse its evolution over the sample 
period. The second objective is to investigate the factors that explain banks‟ market power. This is 
accomplished by relating the estimated bank-specific Lerner indices on market structure, bank-
specific and environmental factors (regulatory and macroeconomic variables). This is of particular 
importance to regulatory authorities that rely on defective measures of market power. To the extent 
that a deregulated environment helped banks retain market power despite policies of open entry into 
the sector, we could witness higher price-cost margins in the Zambian banking industry. Since the 
restructuring programme was aimed at dealing with the weak small banks, this process could have 
reinforced the large (foreign) banks‟ dominant position. In particular, it might have acted as an 
incentive for subsidiaries of foreign banks to maintain a grip on their market share.  
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first of its kind to be conducted for the Zambian 
banking industry. A recent attempt to model bank behaviour by Mwilwa (2007) used an aggregate 
approach to the analysis of interest spreads. However, unlike Mwilwa (2007), our study utilises a 
unique rich bank level panel data set to analyse pricing behaviour in the Zambian commercial 
banking sector. In this regard, the availability of longitudinal data allows us to account for 
unobservable individual bank differences, which, although likely to be important, were not 
considered in Mwilwa‟s (2007) study. Therefore, the main contribution of this study to overall 
literature and to the Zambian banking sector in particular lies in the estimation of the Lerner Index 
using the output price and marginal cost estimated from a cost function. Hence, the study narrows the 
research gap on the measurement of banks‟ market power in developing countries and particularly in 
SSA. For SSA, there is especially dearth of systematic research on the behaviour of banks that is 
comparable and consistent with the research in developed countries and emerging markets. The 
exception is Aboagye, et al. (2008) for the Ghanaian banking sector, a study which we use as a 
benchmark for comparing our findings. These issues are taken up in detail in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
6.3 Overview of the literature on market power 
Perfect competition and monopolistic conduct do not adequately provide practical explanations 
of banking behaviour. This has resulted in alternative models of analysing banks‟ conduct. One such 
perspective relates to the banks‟ exercise of market power defined by the Lerner Index. Coccorese 
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(2009) has argued that the Lerner Index is a true reflection of the banks‟ degree of market power by 
depicting the behavioural departure from monopoly and perfect competition.  
 
6.3.1 Theoretical litetaure of market power 
Models of oligopoly behaviour have become increasingly popular in analysing bank conduct, 
including market power. These imperfect competition models offer robust improvements to the 
traditional measures of banking conduct such as the SCP and they make the analysis more appealing 
(Toolsema, 2004; Freixas & Rochet, 1997). The starting point of these models is that banks operate 
under conditions of imperfect competition defined by oligopolistic behaviour. A theoretical 
framework for analysing bank profit margins has its roots in the seminal works of Klein (1971) and 
Monti (1972) and the models of banking discussed earlier.  
 
6.3.2 Empirical literature on market power in banking 
Previous studies of bank behaviour relied on aggregate indicators of performance. However, in 
recent years, firm level studies have emerged thereby remedying the inadequacies inherent in 
aggregate analysis. The growth in firm-level panel studies has been spurred by the availability of 
individual firm data and the discontent about the failure of structural models to explain bank 
behaviour. By analysing firm level mark-ups, one can readily satisfy the assumptions of possible 
price-taking behaviour among individual firms as opposed to previous studies which violated this 
assumption (Hanan & Liang, 1993). The use of bank-level data also provides an opportunity to 
examine the evolution of market power over time and across firms. An assessment of the efficacy of 
regulatory and other reforms in banking has also informed a larger body of studies on market power.  
In view of the above, Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) analysed the behaviour of Italian regional 
banks using a Lerner Index estimated from a conjectural variations model. The authors found that 
deregulation fostered a reduction in price-cost margins, consistent with theoretical predictions. 
Specifically, the authors showed that initially, competitive conditions were relatively unchanged, but 
improved substantially after the reforms, as evidenced by a reduction in the Lerner Index. However, 
the study failed to find support of the effect of the consolidation process on market power.  
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Fernandez de Guevara, et al. (2005) estimated the Lerner Index but could not find significant 
improvement in competitive conditions within the banking markets of the European Union (EU) 
member countries. To assess the determinants of market power, the authors included among other 
factors, a measure of concentration in the deposits market, which was found to be insignificant. 
However, the authors found that efficiency, default risk and bank size were strong explanatory 
factors of price-cost margins in EU banking markets. More recently, Fernandez de Guevara and 
Maudos (2007) estimated the Lerner index for Spanish banks following the approach of Fernandez 
de Guevara, et al. (2005). Their conclusion was that market power increased in among Spanish 
banks, driven largely by bank size, efficiency and specialisation. However, bank concentration was 
found to be an insignificant variable; the same observation made by Fernandez de Guevara, et al. 
(2005) for the banking sector in the EU.  
In a study of market power in Swedish banking, Sjöberg (2006) estimated a conduct parameter 
based on the Bresnahan (1982; 1989) oligopoly model. The estimated Lerner Index indicates that the 
degree of competition was especially high (lower market power) among the large banks in Sweden 
despite high concentration in the sector. Based on the same framework, Fischer and Hempell (2006) 
showed that the Lerner Index for German banks depicted increasing competitive pressures with 
regional structural and economic variables playing an important role in sustaining the banks‟ 
exercise of market power. Demand factors were also found to have a strong economic effect on 
market power but the level of concentration was insignificant. Pruteanu-Podpiera, et al. (2008) 
analysed the degree of market power among Czech banks. The study did not find a clear cut 
evolution of the Lerner Index in the credit market, despite a high degree of concentration in the 
Czech banking industry.  
Risk measures may affect bank behaviour in an important way. Oliver, et al. (2006) test this 
hypothesis by incorporating a measure of default risk in their analysis of market power in the 
Spanish credit market. Using bank-level data, the authors used a risk adjusted market interest rate to 
capture what they term a true measure of marginal opportunity cost of funds. They then derived a 
Lerner Index defined as a relative mark-up of loan rate over the risk adjusted market rate. Their 
results show that market power differs markedly across different loan products and that adjusting for 
risk premium significantly lowers the estimates of the Lerner Index.  
Although this approach has appeal and produces some interesting estimates of market power for 
the Spanish credit markets, the methodology poses a challenge for developing countries where data 
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on actual values of default risk are virtually non-existent. Consequently, many studies resort to using 
ex-post risk measures such as non-performing loans and loan loss provisions as approximate 
measures of bank credit risk. The degree of bias inherent in using such measures as determinants of 
market power is an empirical issue although there appears to be consensus that credit risk augments 
banks‟ exercise of marker power. 
The literature of bank market power and its determinants in developing countries is sparse and 
mainly confined to emerging and transition economies. For sub-Saharan Africa, (SSA) the evidence 
is especially scanty. The majority of the studies infer market power using interest rate spreads, 
implying that these are good measures of market power. The problem with this approach is that 
market power may be endogenous. For instance, interest rate spreads could be affected by banks‟ 
exercise of market power while high margins may themselves by a consequence of market power, as 
demonstrated by Moore and Craigwell (2002), Chirwa and Mlachila (2004) and Vera, et al. (2007), 
among others. Other studies such as Mwilwa (2007) and Ngugi (2001) have taken an aggregate time 
series approach in analysing the determinants of bank interest spreads without exploiting the benefits 
of individual banks‟ interest rate setting behaviour tenable only through panel estimation.   
As a remedy to the above shortcomings, Fahrer and Rohling (1981) argue it is important to 
apply approaches that take into account the direct behaviour of commercial banks in estimating 
market power. This is the basis of the growth in the NEIO based models for estimating market 
power. The NEIO approaches recognise the need to endogenise market structure in the banking 
industry and test the exercise of market power without relying on structural measures such as 
concentration ratios and number of firms (Delis, Staikouras, & Varlagas, 2008). Indeed competition 
can exist even in a duopoly market while monopolistic conduct is also possible even in markets with 
a large number of players. Ausunbel (1991) has shown that the U.S. credit card market with a large 
number of players was characterised by abnormal returns and asymmetric power reminiscent of 
monopolistic behaviour.   
Only a handful of studies for SSA have used NEIO approaches in measuring market power 
more directly. Specifically related to our study is a recent paper by Aboagye, et al. (2008) for 
Ghanaian banks. The authors applied a methodology employed along the lines of Fernandez de 
Guevara & Maudos (2007) and Fernandez de Guevara, et al. (2005) to a panel of Ghanaian banks. 
Their observation is that Ghanaian banks possess market power stemming from the size, efficiency 
and the macroeconomic environment in which they operate. The other study by Okealaham (2007) 
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took a different approach to the assessment of market power in the banking sector. The author argues 
that banks‟ exercise of market power is not a reflection of market imperfections but a consequence of 
cost economies. This implies that commercial banks enjoying scale economies may exercise greater 
market power thereby dwarfing the effects of structural indicators such as concentration ratios. 
Therefore, the author cautions that consideration must be given to cost economies and profitability in 
banking when drawing conclusions about market power effects.  
Other studies for developing countries include Solis and Maudos (2008), who estimate and 
offer evidence on the social cost of market power using data from the Mexican banking sector. The 
authors found that banks exercised substantial market power in setting loan interest rates with the 
consequence that cost efficiency was significantly undermined. The estimate of the Lerner Index 
derived from interest rates showed that in 2005, social cost of market power was 0.15 percent of 
GDP. However, no evidence of the „quiet life‟ hypothesis was found for the deposits market.  
Tovar, et al. (2007) analysed the interplay between risk, concentration and market power in the 
Colombian banking industry after the regulatory reforms. Their results show that subsequent to the 
reforms, Colombian banks exhibited high systemic risk, which served as a collusive device and the 
cost of this risk was borne by bank customers through high mark-ups. However, the authors found 
that market concentration was not a significant collusive factor; rather, its effect was only robust 
after controlling for systemic risk.  
 
6.4 Methodological framework  
In this section we present a model for analysing bank market power, drawing largely from 
previous studies. A condensed version of the Klein-Monti framework is first presented before 
outlining the empirical structure of the cost function to be estimated.  
 
6.4.1 The analytical structure of the model 
The basis of the empirical estimation is the influential Klein-Monti theoretical oligopolistic 
model of banking first introduced in chapter three and reproduced here as a matter of pedagogy. 
Some of the leading empirical studies in this genre of models include Corvoisier & Gropp (2002); 
Gropp, et al. (2007) and Fernandez de Guevara, et al. (2005). Another variant of imperfect 
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competition models stems from the conjectural variations approach following Iwata (1974), 
Appelbaum (1982), Bresnahan (1982; 1989) and Lau (1982). Applications of this group of models 
have included Shaffer (1993; 2001), Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) and Kubo (2006), among others.  
In the ensuing discussion, we replicate the Klein-Monti model as the framework for the analysis 
of market power. For simplicity, we assume a case of duopoly in line with Dvořák (2005). Let the 
cost function be denoted by  i D i L iTC D,L = γ D +γ L , i = 1,2  where TC , as before, represents total 
operating costs, D and L  denote total deposits and loans while Dγ  and Lγ  are marginal costs of 
producing them, respectively. The loan rate  Lr , deposit rate  Dr , and the money market rate  r , 
are exogenously determined since banks are assumed to compete in quantity. Therefore, each bank 
faces a downward sloping demand curve for loans and an upward supply curve for deposits, given by 
 LL r  and  DD r , respectively. The loan and deposit rates are inverse functions of the demand for 
loans and supply of deposits, as depicted by  LrL  and  DrD , respectively. Finally, the cash statutory 
reserves denoted by R , are given by  R = 1- D - L where  is a fraction of deposits held as cash 
reserves at the central bank. Taking the amount of loans and deposits chosen by other banks as given, 
each bank maximises its profit according to the following specification  
 
         i L 1 2 i D 1 2 i D i L i= r L +L - r L + r 1- - r D +D D - γ D +γ L      
  
(6.1) 
 
where, i is bank i ‟s profits, 1 2L ,L are the amount of loans granted by bank 1 and 2 whereas 1 2D ,D
are the amounts of deposits received by bank 1 and 2, respectively. Other variables are as defined 
above. Equation (6.1) shows that a bank‟s profit can be expressed as the difference between 
intermediation margins and operating expenses. The first order conditions for loans and deposits are 
derived as follows 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
Of
 C
ap
e T
ow
n 
128 
 
   
  * *
*
' * *
L L L
*
'
D D D
π L
= r L +r L - r - γ = 0  
L 2
π D
= r 1- - r D - r D - γ = 0
D 2
       
   
 
 
  


i
i
i
i
  (6.2) 
 
Since L  and D are solutions to the bank‟s objective function, they denote equilibrium amounts of 
loans and deposits for the banking sector. Rewriting the first order condition for loans  in elasticity 
form yields the now familiar Lerner Index  LI  given by equation (6.3) below  
 
 
*
L L
* *
L L L
r - r +γ 1
LI = =
r 2ε r
    (6.3) 
 
where Lε  denotes the elasticity of demand for loans and LI  is the Lerner Index defined above.  The 
only difference between this setup and the case of N - firms presented in chapter three is that for the 
duopoly case, the demand elasticities are scaled by a factor of two.  
 
6.4.2 Empirical model and estimation strategy  
The estimation of the Lerner Index requires knowledge of the price of banking output such as 
realised loan interest rates. However, for the banking industry in general and the Zambian banking 
sector in particular, the data on loan interest rates are not readily available. Since the flow of banking 
services is proportional to its stock of assets, the price of bank output can be depicted by the ratio of 
total revenue (interest and non-interest income) to total assets. Averaging across all banks yields an 
average market price. Using total revenue as a percentage of total assets to construct output price 
ensures that on-balance sheet outputs and off-balance asset items are all captured to avoid 
understating bank production (Carbó Valverde, Humphrey, & Rodriguez, 2003; Jagtiani & 
Khanthavit, 1996). It is therefore consistent with overall bank behaviour.  
The profit and loss statements do not also report marginal costs related to the production of any 
of the individual asset items for Zambian banks. Therefore, an approximate measure of marginal cost 
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has to be estimated. Given that marginal cost is not directly observable, it has to be estimated from 
an observable translog cost function. In industrial countries and other developed emerging markets 
where interbank trading accounts for a large volume of sources of funds for commercial banks, the 
interbank interest rate has been used as proxy for marginal cost of producing loans. However, in less 
developed countries rudimentary financial markets, the main source of banks‟ funds is through 
deposit mobilisation rather than the interbank market. Specifically in Zambia, the amount of funds 
raised through the overnight interbank market represents only 1.8% of total liabilities compared 
while deposits account for 78.2%.
38
 While recognising that banks are multioutput firms, we 
aggregate all bank outputs, namely loans, securities, and other assets into an aggregate measure of 
bank product (total assets) which enables us to construct a single measure of marginal cost for 
overall production activity. If costs were reported for individual bank products and markets, we 
would then calculate output-specific marginal costs as Berg and Kim (1998) did for retail and 
corporate submarkets. With these caveats in mind, we replicate the empirical translog cost function 
of chapter four, yielding Equation (6.4) below: 
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where,  as before itTC  denotes total operating costs, jitw represents factor input prices, itY is total 
output, ,j m denote actual inputs,  is an error term. Other variables are as defined in previous 
                                                          
 
38
 Although the interbank rate may be reflective of funding cost trends in industrial countries, in Zambia it does not 
represent the true marginal cost of bank production. Therefore, this study has opted to use a broad measure of marginal 
cost which takes into account all bank expenses, including cost of interbank funds, operating costs, and more importantly 
the cost of deposits and other borrowed funds. Accordingly, there is no loss of generality by setting aside the interbank 
rate as a measure of marginal costs of bank production.   
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chapters.  In line with the literature and following the  discussion in chapter four, we imposed 
symmetry and homogeneity conditions on the cost function above. Homogeneity condition is 
imposed by dividing total costs, the unit price of labour and the price of capital by the unit price of 
funds.  
The cost function depicted by Equation (6.4) can be estimated directly using ordinary least 
squares. However, there are efficiency gains when the cost function is estimated jointly with input 
cost share equations. The inclusion of the cost share equations in the estimation procedure has an 
advantage of creating more degrees of freedom without adding any unrestricted regression 
coefficients. It also yields more asymptotically efficient parameter estimates than would otherwise be 
if the cost function is estimated on its own. The relationship between the cost function and the input 
share equation is implied by duality theory and can be derived using Shepherd‟s Lemma. Input share 
equations for labour, funds or capital can then be obtained by partially differentiating the cost 
function with respect to Lw , Fw  or Kw . Input share equations for the three inputs are given below:  
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(6.5) 
  
 
such that 1L K FS S S   and j is a random error term for the thj input  , ,j L K F .  
Since the input shares sum to unity, one of the factor share equations is dropped to obtain a 
non-singular covariance matrix. Therefore, only 1J  share equations are estimated jointly with the 
cost function.  The resulting parameter estimates are asymptotically equivalent to those obtained by 
the maximum likelihood approach and are invariant to the factor share equation dropped during 
estimation. The effects of variations across banks are reflected in the stochastic disturbance term, 
j

 
related to each share equation. These disturbances are assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed with mean zero and constant variance, that is,  ~ 0,N   . They are also orthogonal to 
the regressors. Furthermore, allowing disturbances to be correlated across equations enables us to 
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apply Zellner‟s (1962) two-step iterated seemingly unrelated regression estimation (ISURE) 
procedure to the system of equations comprising the cost function and 1J   share equations.  Since 
the cost function is normalised by the input price of funds, we have two share equations for labour 
 LS and capital  KS , respectively.  
Partially differentiating Equation (6.4) with respect to ln itY   yields a measure of marginal cost 
according to Equation (6.6)   
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where itMC is the bank level marginal cost. Consistent with standard literature, see for instance, 
Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), Fernandez de Guevara, et al. (2005) and Aboagye, et al. (2008), the 
bank specific Lerner Index measure of market power is given by 
 
it it
it
it
p - mc
LI =
p
      (6.7) 
 
where, ip  denotes output price for each bank, proxied by the ratio of total revenue to total assets for 
each period. Equation (6.8) below depicts the average Lerner Index for the banking industry 
  
P - MC
LI =
P
t t
t
t
      (6.8) 
where P captures the market price for the whole banking industry, calculated by averaging ip across 
all the banks for each period. The Lerner Index measure of market power may also be viewed as an 
indicator of bank performance because it can be uniquely linked to structural indicators of bank 
behaviour.  
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6.4.3 Evolution of market power and its determinants  
A major advantage of the proposed approach to estimating the Lerner Index is that it gives a 
better understanding of the evolution of competition over time. In this way, we can then evaluate the 
factors that determine the individual banks‟ exercise of market power. These factors could be bank-
specific, structural, regulatory or macroeconomic in nature. In the ensuing discussion, we catalogue 
and motivate the choice of possible determinants of market power in the Zambian commercial 
banking sector. These variables have theoretical basis as well as empirical support both in developed 
and developing countries.  
Firstly, we control for the structure of the market in which banks operate, depicted by the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index  HHI  derived from gross loans.39 The theoretical rationale for 
including a measure of market structure is that an individual bank exerts greater influence over the 
market price relative to marginal cost, thereby increasing the mark-up (Beighley & McCall, 1975; 
Cowling & Waterson, 1976). This impact is greater the more dominant the bank is and how other 
banks respond to this dominance. Therefore, we hypothesise that HHI has a positive effect on the 
Lerner Index. 
The second variable we consider is bank credit risk  RISK , defined earlier as the ratio of 
nonperforming to total loans. Banks‟ exposure to high credit risk could manifest itself in 
deterioration of the credit portfolio. To avoid incurring risk, banks may pre-screen their customers 
and choose to lend o less risky borrowers, even at high interest rates (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981). 
Commercial banks may also increase the proportion of risk free assets such as Treasury securities 
thereby reducing risk-premiums (Tovar, Jaramillo, & Hernandez, 2007). When banks opt to increase 
their risk exposure, the price-cost margins tend to be higher as banks cover up for the potential loss 
in revenue arising from default risk by raising their prices relative to marginal cost. However, when 
the proportion of toxic assets is lower, margins tend to decrease, in which case market power is 
weaker. Therefore, depending on which of these factors dominates, the effect of the credit risk 
variable on the Lerner Index cannot be determined a priori.  
                                                          
 
39
 As a robustness check, alternative measures of market structure were introduced. Specifically, the HHI based on total 
assets and deposits and four-firm concentartion ratio were used in place of the loans based HHI .Estimation with the 
alternative definitions of HHI produced insignificant and/or wrong signs for coefficients while using the four-firm 
concentration ratio led to significant loss of observations. Therefore we retained the loans based HHI in the regression.     
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The next variable considered captures regulatory intensity on banks‟ exercise of market power. 
Banks are required by law to hold a certain proportion of risk-weighted assets as regulatory capital. 
Since banks thrive by engaging in risk lending, minimum capital requirements serve to ensure that 
banks have a sufficient capital buffer to cover liabilities in an event of bank failure. However, higher 
regulatory capital requirements could potentially endanger competitiveness by increasing market 
power. Thus, to capture the impact of regulatory capital requirements (regulatory burden) on market 
power, we include the capital adequacy ratio  CAPRATIO . It is expected that the intensity of 
regulatory burden would induce banks to raise their margins in order to build up a sufficient revenue 
buffer necessary for solvency. Thus, a positive sign is expected on CAPRATIO . 
Cost inefficiency in banking is often associated with high mark-ups because banks tend to mask 
their operating inefficiency through wide spreads, the cost of which is borne by customers. In fact, 
some have interpreted large mark-ups as indicators of cost inefficiency (Vera, Zambrano-Sequin, & 
Faust, 2007). Thus, when cost inefficiency is a binding constraint, this leads to high market power 
and may be exacerbated by agency problems. However, it is also possible that banks‟ high price-cost 
margins could move in tandem with better cost efficiency performance, mainly because efficient 
banks are able to contain costs and therefore post wide mark-ups.  This is the basis for the efficiency-
structure hypothesis which submits that cost efficient banks tend to be more profitable than less 
efficient ones because of better management performance. For these reasons, the relationship 
between cost efficiency and mark-ups is unclear.  
Another important performance indicator for Zambian banks is the proportion of other income 
to total assets  OITASS . In the previous chapter, it was established that the degree of competition 
with respect to fee and other income is defined by oligopolistic conduct. We have also observed that 
Zambian banks generate 16.8 percent of total income in form of fees, commissions and foreign 
exchange gains. Therefore, banks with better non-interest revenue performance would exert greater 
market power, and may use this as an entry barrier. A positive coefficient is expected on the variable
OITASS . We also control for the ratio of interbank deposits to total customer and short-term funds 
to account for diversity of bank funding  DEPMIX on banks‟ exercise of market power. We 
conjecture that banks with a high proportion of interbank deposits relative to total deposits will have 
a low mark-up depicting weaker market power. A negative coefficient is therefore expected on this 
variable. 
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Price-cost margins have also been known to vary with the macroeconomic conditions and the 
monetary policy rule. For instance, during a recession, mark-ups tend to decrease and increase in 
boom times. Received evidence shows that procyclicality in mark-ups is especially prevalent in 
manufacturing industries. For the financial services industries, and the banking sector in particular, 
only limited evidence exists. Small (1998) found that mark-ups in both manufacturing and financial 
services sector in the United Kingdom were procyclical, indicating that they were high during boom 
times and when the economy was facing a downturn, mark-ups narrowed. However, Carbo´, et al. 
(2003) argue that buoyant economic growth and a stable macroeconomic environment tend to 
negatively affect prices and costs, although the extent to which these variables are influenced may be 
significantly different. Further evidence by Toolsema (2004) suggests that procyclical monetary 
policy (increase in policy rate in good times and decrease in bad times) reinforces the countercyclical 
movement of the Lerner Index, indicating that there is an inverse relationship between monetary 
conditions and market power. These studies show that the relationship between market power on one 
hand and the business cycle or monetary policy stance on the other, is ambiguous.   
For the present study, the sample period includes some years of economic turbulence as well as 
episodes of relative macroeconomic stability. Therefore, it is expected that these macroeconomic 
phenomena would significantly alter banks‟ pricing and cost behaviour. To evaluate the effects of the 
business cycle and macroeconomic environment on market power, we include the rate of inflation 
 INFLATION as an indicator of cyclicality. The rate of inflation is also an important indicator of 
broad macroeconomic uncertainty.
40
 We expect a positive coefficient on INFLATION , suggesting 
that a high rate of inflation induces banks to increase the price of their bank products whilst cutting 
down on operating costs to remain competitive. We also include the 91-day Treasury bill rate  TBR
as a measure of monetary policy conditions given that the central bank uses auctions of Treasury 
securities to raise funds for the government and also as a monetary policy tool for mopping up excess 
liquidity from the banking system. Therefore, a positive coefficient is expected onTBR .  
In view of the foregoing, we estimated Equation (6.9) below to assess the determinants of 
market power in the Zambian banking sector 
                                                          
 
40
 In Zambia, the exchange rate is also widely viewed as an important signal of macroeconomic uncertainty. However, its 
inclusion in the regression yielded poor results, see discussion below. Therefore, we posit that given the strong 
passthrough effects, see for instance, Mutoti (2006) the rate of inflation adequately captures movements in the exchange 
rate.    
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(6.9). 
 
The variables in Equation (6.9) are respectively, Lerner Index  LI , Hirschman-Herfindahl index
 HHI , a measure of business cycle and/or macroeconomic policy stance  INFLATION , bank 
credit risk  RISK , cost efficiency index  EFF , regulatory capital intensity  CAPRATIO , 
 
a 
measure of deposit mix  DEPMIX , a revenue scaling factor  OITASS . Finally, ν denotes a 
random error term and as before, i denotes observation per bank while t is the time of observation in 
quarters.   
 
6.4.4 Sample and data  
As in the preceding chapters, all operating commercial banks between 1998 and 2006 were 
included in the estimations. Due to entry and mergers, this resulted in unbalanced sample with 359 
observations. Since most variables have already been defined in the previous sections, here we only 
discuss the newly introduced ones (see Table 6.1). 
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 Table 6-1: Variables used in estimating the Lerner Index of market power 
Variable Variable Name Description and measurement Mean Median Std Dev. Source 
       
iEFF  Cost efficiency Bank-specific cost efficiency score 0.917 0.950 0.099 
Stochastic 
frontier 
estimates 
       
iDEPMIX  
Deposit mix 
Share of interbank deposits in total 
deposits 
0.233 0.044 3.341 BS 
       
ip  
Price of bank 
output  
Total individual bank revenue/total 
bank assets Total revenue 
0.022 0.021 0.010 
 
IS and BS 
       
1
N
i
i
p
P
N


 
Market Price of 
output 
Average of all bank-level output 
prices 
0.022 0.023 0.001 IS and BS 
       
iMC  
Bank-specific  
marginal cost 
Estimated from the translog cost 
function 
0.011 0.010 0.003 
Translog cost 
function 
estimates 
       
i i
i
i
p MC
LI
p

  Bank-specific 
Lerner Index 
Bank-specific Lerner Index of market 
power 
0.509 0.528 0.021 
Estimates of 
price and 
marginal cost 
       
P MC
LI
P


 
Industry- average 
Lerner Index 
Industry average Lerner Index of 
market power 
0.507 0.511 0.141 
Estimates of 
price and 
marginal cost 
1
i
i N
i
i
LOANS
s
LOANS


  
 
Loan market 
share 
 
Share of individual bank‟s  loans in 
total loans 
7.438 2.871 9.553 BS 
       
2
1
100
N
i i
i
HHI s

 
 
Hirschman-
Hirfindahl index 
Market structure concentration index 1970.818 2000.929 182.584 BS 
Note: IS – Income statement, BS – Balance Sheet 
Source: Bank of Zambia (BoZ) and author‟s own computations 
 
6.5 Empirical results of market power 
Empirical results of the Lerner Index were obtained through joint estimation involving a system 
of equations given by (6.4) and (6.5) by applying Zellner‟s (1962) ISURE approach (see Appendix V 
for parameter estimates of the related cost function). The estimated parameters of the cost function 
pass the diagnostic tests, with plausible coefficients for the key variables. Most of the coefficients are 
also significant and of expected signs. These results were used to calculate the bank-specific 
marginal cost defined by Equation (6.6) which was then used in conjunction with the output price to 
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estimate the corresponding Lerner Index for each bank  iLI as given by Equation (6.7). Averaging 
across all banks yields the industry level Lerner Index  LI , depicted by Equation (6.8).  
 
6.5.1 Characteristising the Lerner Index and its evolution 
The evolution of the approximate output price, marginal cost and the corresponding Lerner 
Index are given in Figure 6.1 below. Panel (a) of Figure 6.1 shows that output price had been on the 
decline throughout the study period, except for a small spike in early 2005. From 2005, bank output 
price exhibited some degree of stability. This picture is consistent with developments in the banking 
sector which illustrate a drastic fall in yield rates on securities and a slight decline in bank lending 
rates. Accordingly, bank interest revenue decreased. A similar observation was made regarding non-
interest income, particularly after the implementation of the broad based interbank foreign exchange 
market (IFEM) system in July 2003, which induced some stability in the exchange rate. In turn, this 
led to a diminution of foreign exchange gains and as a result non-interest income dipped. Prior to 
July 2003, banks earned approximately 25.8 percent of total revenue through foreign exchange 
transactions, shored up by a rapidly depreciating currency. However, this share shrunk to 17.4 
percent after the implementation of the IFEM system. 
The evolution of banks‟ marginal cost (Panel b) followed a similar trend as that of bank output 
price, underpinning the banks‟ quest to realign their cost structure with slowing growth in revenues 
from both traditional and non-traditional sources. The reduction in marginal cost accelerated from 
around 2003 reflecting a decrease in operating and financial costs. This trend continued throughout 
the remainder of the sample period. The net effect of the decrease in the price of bank output and 
marginal cost does not necessarily translate into a lower mark-up. Rather, it depends on which one 
falls faster.  
Over the study period, the fall in price of bank output was less rapid compared with the decline 
in marginal costs. As a result, the Lerner Index trended upwards for most part of the sample period 
except between 2003q1 and 2004q4 when marginal cost decreased less proportionately than the fall 
in output price. This can be seen in Panel (c) of Figure 6.1. For the full sample period, the average 
Lerner Index was estimated to be 50.9 percent, indicating that banks priced above marginal cost by 
more than 50.0 percent. However, the mark-up decreased from an average of 52.6 percent between 
1998 and 2001 to an average of 49.6 percent between 2002 and 2004. Although the Lerner Index 
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bottomed out slightly from about 2005 and 2006, it remained below the pre-2002 level, averaging 
49.4 percent over the last two years of the study period.  
 
Figure 6.1: Output price, marginal cost and the Lerner Index (industry average) 
                    
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
 
    
 
    
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
Source: Author‟s own computations from BoZ data 
 
The above analysis shows that between 1998 and 2001, Zambian banks enjoyed greater latitude 
in setting prices. Therefore, during this period, the Lerner Index was driven more by the high price of 
bank output than by falling costs. On the other hand, from 2002 onwards the banks‟ marginal costs 
decreased precipitously mainly due to a fall in deposit interest rates. At the same time, the price of 
output also decreased, as banks‟ lending rates eased in line with a fall in yield rates on Treasury 
securities. Consequently, the Lerner Index declined marginally, implying a slight decrease in market 
power over this period. 
The estimates of market power based on the Lerner Index corroborate the evidence adduced by 
the results of the PR approach on the H - statistic, which showed that Zambian banks operated in an 
imperfectly competitive environment defined by oligopolistic conduct. This oligopolistic behaviour 
may be due to risk aversion or inadequate predatory strategies that prevented a majority of banks 
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from engaging in intense competition. This is more compelling for state banks (see Panel (d)) which, 
for reasons of poor credit risk screening mechanisms shied away from engaging in further risky 
lending. Instead, and supported by soft budgets to cushion them from asset deterioration, they 
accumulated risk-free securities to boost their revenues. This is evidenced by the relatively higher 
Lerner Index compared with other bank subgroups. Clearly, the greater exercise of market power by 
public sector banks was a manifestation of these soft budgets which created an uneven competition 
platform with other banks.  
In view of the above, we could argue that public ownership of commercial banks appeared to 
have had a strong relevance for Zambia as an entry barrier.  As these guarantees were eased, we 
observe a steep reduction in the Lerner Index from about 2004, even to the point of converging with 
estimates for other bank categories. Therefore, taking the Lerner Index as an indicator of 
competitiveness, the evidence given by Figure 6(d) shows that competition among private and 
foreign banks was tighter while public sector banks operated as a monopoly mainly due to state 
incentives and guarantees.  
 
6.5.2 Market structure and other determinants of market power 
One of the main objectives in this chapter was to study the determinants of market power. To 
execute this task, the Lerner Index was regressed on measures of market structure, regulatory and 
macroeconomic variables and bank-specific factors. In 
Table 6-2 below we present results of the fixed effects model for the explanatory factors of 
market power.
41
 To control for potential heteroscedasticity, the estimation was conducted using 
robust standard errors.  
 
 
 
                                                          
 
41
 The regression equation for the determinants of market power was estimated in the context of a static panel, which 
does not assume endogeneity of the expanatory variables. If, on the other hand, we suspect that the error term is 
correlated with any of the explanatory variables, then the system GMM estimation will be the appropriate methodology, 
in which case the lagged Lerner Index could be used an the instrument.  
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Table 6-2: Determinants of market power in Zambian banking sector 
 
Coefficient Parameter t-statistic p-value 
     
Intercept 0  -6.166 -2.348 0.019** 
ln  HHI  1  0.869 2.332 0.020** 
ln  EFF  2  0.585 2.385 0.018** 
ln  CAPRATIO  3  0.130 2.011 0.045** 
ln  RISK  4  -0.041 -1.824 0.069* 
ln  OITASS  5  0.216 4.184 0.000*** 
ln  DEPMIX  6  -0.055 -2.117 0.035** 
ln  INFLATION   7  -0.232 -3.040 0.003*** 
ln  TBR  8  0.164 3.633 0.000*** 
     σu   
0.331 
  
σ   
0.366 
  
  
 
0.449 
  
No. of Obs. 
 
359 
  
 
Wald  2χ 8  10.730   
p-value 0.000*** 
  
2
R  0.180   
Hausman test 27.390 
  
p-value 0.000*** 
  
Significance level: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent 
Source: Author‟s own calculations based on BoZ data 
 
The Wald-statistic for model adequacy is statistically significant at 1 percent. However, the 
independent variables explain only 18 percent of the Lerner Index. Given the nature of our sample, 
this appears rather low. Nonetheless, it is not uncommon for most panel data estimations and cannot 
be used to authenticate the research findings. Instead, the significance of individual coefficients is 
more informative in making a case for the usefulness of the results as is evident in Table 6.2 . Details 
of the these findings are discussed below. The results are indicative of the strong effect of market 
structure on the Lerner Index power, as depicted by the positive and highly significant (at 5 percent) 
coefficient on the Herfindahl Hirschman index  HHI . The implication of this result is that market 
structure is an important factor in explaining banks‟ market power. This finding is consistent with 
theoretical predictions and renders support to the assertion that firms operating in concentrated 
markets tend to exercise market power.  
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The effect of cost efficiency  EFF is also robustly significant and of the expected positive sign. 
This finding deserves special mention in light of the ambiguity in the market power- efficiency 
relationship discussed earlier. The intuition for this result is that conceptually, cost efficient banks 
have the ability to exert market power in the Zambian banking sector. In the context of the Zambian 
banking market, it may be the case that the estimated market power was driven by efficiency gains, 
as propagated by the ESH theorists. This argument is partly supported by the relatively lower level of 
cost inefficiency estimated at 8 percent for all banks. This may suggest that most efficient banks 
could be using cost efficiency as a barrier to competitive behaviour by strengthening their position in 
the market. Indeed, banks that better manage their productive resources are also able to achieve 
significant market shares and strategically reposition themselves by posting profits generated from 
high mark-ups.  
The credit risk variable  RISK has a negative but weakly significant and small coefficient. A 
unit increase in the ratio of impaired assets to gross loans reduces the size of the mark-up by only 0.4 
%. At first glance this finding appears counterintuitive. However, it must be interpreted as follows. 
Zambian banks have shied away from extending loans to a majority of Zambians, causing many to 
be shut out of the credit market. Instead, commercial banks have opted for much safer Treasury 
securities or accumulation of excess reserves (Oxford Policy Management, 2007). In view of this, the 
risk of default is much less, which means that the role of risk variable in driving market power is 
weakened. Even when banks have extended credit to the private sector, a majority of these banks 
(largely foreign owned) have employed robust screening techniques before loan disbursement. As a 
result, the ratio of NPLs to gross loans is smaller for this category of banks relative to say, public 
sector banks.
42
 Thus, by pre-screening their customers foreign owned banks are able to trade low risk 
for a small amount of rent. Therefore, the negative parameter estimate on the risk variable must be 
viewed in the context of the high level of risk averseness which characterises the Zambian banking 
sector. Furthermore, by establishing lending relationships with their customers, banks acquire 
                                                          
 
42
 From the available data, of the three categories of banks, namely foreign owned, domestic private and public owned 
banks, the latter had the highest proportion of non-performing loans (NPLs) relative to gross loans. At an average of 34 
percent of gross loans, NPLs for public banks was double that for domestic private banks (18 percent) because this group 
of banks does is not exemplary with screening loan applicants. Therefore, public owned banks tend to load the risk of 
default and other charges on the loan rate, thereby intensifyng the degree of market power. On the other hand, foreign 
banks which boast of better screening techniques had the lowest proportion of NPLs of only 6.8 %. Therefore, it is clear 
to see that conservative lending, especially by foreign banks, resulted in lower estimate of market power as Panel (d) of 
Figure 6.1 illustrates. 
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privileged information their borrowers thereby reducing frictions in the credit market through lock-in 
effects (Moshe, Kristiansen, & Bent, 2005). This also tends to weaken market power in the banking 
sector. 
As expected, the effect of regulatory capital  CAPRATIO is positive and statistically 
significant at 5 percent. This means that well capitalised banks tend to exercise greater market power 
by virtue of their strength and reputation which manifests itself in capturing a large market share as 
these banks are deemed safer. Therefore, in the context of the capital buffer theory, this result 
highlights the fact that banks build up capital to hedge against possible insolvency.
43
 Controlling for 
diversity in revenue sources, the study shows that banks with a greater proportion of other income 
(fees, commissions, foreign exchange gains, etc.) use this as a device for perpetuating market power. 
The parameter estimate of OITASS is positive and significant at 1 percent level. Therefore, we 
submit that including a measure of non-interest revenue in the market power regression helps address 
the important role other sources of income play in the Zambian banking sector. As demonstrated in 
preceding discussions, Zambian banks generally continue to charge high fees and commissions and 
generate significant amount of revenue through foreign exchange transactions. The same can be said 
about the effect of theTBR on the Lerner Index. Since Zambian banks have historically enjoyed 
buoyant revenues from investing in Treasury securities, this is captured by the coefficient on theTBR
, which was found to be positive and statistically significant at 5 percent.   
The negative coefficient on the inflation variable indicates that banks operating under 
conditions of macroeconomic uncertainty tend to enjoy relatively less market power.
44
 Therefore, the 
main prediction from the analysis is that ceteris paribus, bringing down the rate of inflation and 
improving the economic environment has the possibility of creating incentives for increased market 
power in the Zambian banking industry. Comparatively, Aboagye, et al. (2008) also found a negative 
impact of inflation on market power for Ghanaian banks.  
                                                          
 
43
 It is worth noting that the relationship between capital requirements and bank stability is a subject of ongoing debate, 
with no conclusive evidence of the direction of causality (Rochet, 1992).  
44
 An alternative predictor of macroeconomic conditions would be the gross domestic product (GDP). However, quarterly 
GDP data for Zambia are unavailable. Therefore, overall macroeconomic stance is proxied by the rate of inflation rate on 
the premise that macroeconomic uncertainty is inimical to economic growth and therefore high inflation would 
reasonably approximate deterioration in economic conditions.  
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The impact of deposit mix  DEPMIX on the Lerner Index was found to be negative and 
significant. This result shows that banks with significant recourse to interbank funds suffered a 
reduction in the relative mark-up. For such banks, short-term interbank borrowing constitutes a 
fundamental source of funding. 
 
6.6 Summary of findings and comparison with previous studies 
In this chapter, we have shown that Zambian banks exercised market power between 1998 and 
2006. The estimated average Lerner Index for the full sample was 50.9 percent. The mark-up 
increased steadily from 1998 until 2001 before petering out in subsequent years.  
The findings also indicate that state banks operated as a monopoly, mainly due to soft budgets, 
which sustained their market power by keeping costs artificially low. The easing of guarantees and 
other operating incentives levelled the playing field somewhat, thereby narrowing the divergence in 
the price-cost mark-up between public sector banks and other bank categories. The results also show 
that bank-specific and environmental factors are important in explaining banks‟ exercise of market 
power. 
Broadly, these results are comparable with the investigation of market power in previous 
studies, especially for developing countries. Based on the estimate of the Lerner Index, the overall 
implication of our findings is that Zambian banks exercised greater market power than other studies 
have shown. For example, in developing countries, Aboagye, et al. (2008) reported smaller (and in 
some cases negative) Lerner indices. According to Solis and Maudos (2008), a negative Lerner Index 
may be evidence of „super-competition‟. Further results by Tovar, et al. (2007) showed that the 
nominal Lerner Index estimated from the loans market averaged between 20 and 40 percent. In 
developed countries, Fernandez de Guevara, et al. (2005) and Fernandez de Guevara & Maudos 
(2007) also found lower estimates of the Lerner Index than those obtained in our study. 
Regarding determinants of market power, our results generally confirm those from previous 
studies. For example, Aboagye, et al. (2008) and Fernandez de Guevara, et al. (2005) showed that 
cost efficiency is significant in explaining market power, indicating that most efficient banks enjoy 
higher mark-ups, driven perhaps by lower marginal costs. The authors also find a case for lower 
inflation in increasing the Lerner Index. Tovar, et al. (2007) argue that the impact of low inflation is 
pronounced when market power is measured by a real Lerner index. However, our results are at 
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variance with Tovar, et al. (2007) on the role of credit risk. Our findings show that banks with an 
impaired credit portfolio do not raise their price-cost margins to cover up for the risk. Unlike Moshe, 
et al. (2005) and Tovar, et al. (2007) our results indicate that the level of concentration is a robust 
predictor of market power, counteracting our earlier hypothesis that high concentration levels may 
not be sufficient to explain competition in the Zambian banking sector.   
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C h a p t e r  S e v e n   
 
Conclusions and policy implications  
 
7.1 Introduction  
This research has taken a systematic and an in-depth analysis of the performance of commercial 
banks in Zambia in the post-liberalisation era. In particular, due to data constraints, we focussed on 
the period after the banking crisis, that is, the sample covering 1998-2006. The study was presented 
in seven chapters, including the introductory one. Of the seven chapters, three were devoted to 
empirical analysis of inter-related research issues. Chapter two, which followed the introductory 
section looked at the financial landscape in Zambia and presented some performance indicators of 
the banking sector. Chapter three was an overview of some of the microeconomic theories of 
banking, with a particular focus on those related to the issues addressed in the thesis. Chapters four, 
five and six provided an empirical investigation of the main themes of the study as presented below.   
The first theme, examined in chapter four, relates to banks‟ efficiency performance and the 
factors that explain cost inefficiency in the Zambian banking industry. This issue is central to 
continued viability of the banking industry and stems from a broader policy concern that Zambian 
banks operate inefficiently. The second issue, addressed in chapter five, is an evaluation of 
competitive conditions in the Zambian banking system. Based on reduced form revenue equations, 
we estimated the degree of competition relating to the market structure which characterised the 
Zambian commercial banking sector. Chapter six addressed an important element of banks‟ conduct 
in terms of pricing and cost decisions, namely, exercise of market power approximated by the Lerner 
Index. The Lerner Index is an important concept in banking markets which exhibit oligopolistic 
characteristics. Since the Lerner Index can be estimated for individual banks and across time, we 
used this to assess the evolution and intensity of competition in the banking industry. This provided a 
robustness check to the results of chapter five.  
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7.2 Main findings  
The main objective of the study was to provide an assessment of the three pillars of bank 
performance and conduct in the Zambian commercial banking system in the context of a liberalised 
environment. Specific research objectives were articulated in each of the empirical chapters to serve 
as a guide for testing of the stated hypotheses. The main findings from each of the issues tackled are 
discussed below.  
  
7.2.1 Cost efficiency and its determinants  
Cost efficiency is an important aspect of performance monitoring of the banking industry and it 
is one area bank regulators focus on when conducting an analysis of the viability of the industry. 
This study went beyond the financial ratio analysis often employed by managers and regulators to 
benchmark performance. In this study, one of the objectives was to estimate cost efficiency 
(inefficiency) of commercial banks and its evolution over time during 1998-2006. A common 
stochastic frontier approach was estimated jointly with the inefficiency model in a single step 
approach in order to simultaneously investigate the level of cost inefficiency and the factors that 
affect it. In this regard, we evaluated the importance of both bank-specific and environmental 
variables as determinants of efficiency performance.  
 
The main findings from the analysis are:  
i. During the period of investigation, an average Zambian bank deviated from the best-practice 
frontier. The average cost efficiency level for all banks was 92 percent. This estimate 
suggests that an average bank could have incurred about 8 percent less in actual costs if it had 
been utilising its input resources in an optimal fashion.  
 
ii. The results reveal that the most cost efficient bank had the efficiency level of 96.2 percent, 
implying that to match the best-practice frontier estimate, this bank could have cut its costs 
by 3.8 percent. At the polar end of the efficiency ranking was the least efficient bank with 
cost inefficiency level of 30.8 percent.  
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iii. The investigation of the relationship between bank ownership structure and cost efficiency 
indicated that government owned banks were better positioned relative to other bank 
catergories, that is, domestic private and foreign owned banks. However, this performance 
must be viewed in the context of guarantees and other incentives extended to public sector 
banks aimed at ridding the balance sheet of toxic assets for these institutions. In all 
likelihood, these soft budget provisions propped up cost performance of the public owned 
institutions, thereby raising the level of efficiency beyond what would otherwise have been 
the case in the absence of these support mechanisms.  
 
iv. The study revealed a sustained uptake in the level of efficiency of domestic private banks, 
surpassing even that of foreign owned banks in the latter period of the sample. This 
improvement came against a backdrop of dynamic positive changes in the broader 
macroeconomic enviornment. This means that the domestic private banks responded 
favourably to conditions induced by favourable macroeconomic developemnts. The leap in 
cost efficiency was also underpinned by the merger in 2004 between two of the small 
domestic private banks. This merger stimulated the average efficiency level well above that 
which existed before the merger was authorised. 
 
v. Results from the regression of the determinants of cost inefficiency show that regulatory 
policy did not exert a distortionary impact on banks‟ efficiency peformance. However, output 
quality measured by bank credit risk exacerbated cost inefficiency of Zambian banks. A high 
proportion of assets held in Treasury scurities also had a detrimental effect on efficiency 
performance.  
 
vi. Generally, the study has established that instability in the macroeconomic environment 
created uncertainty in the banking market. As a result, banks failed to perform efficiently. 
This was evidenced by the positive impact of the rate of inflation on cost inefficiency.   
 
7.2.2 Structure and competition in the banking system 
This study estimated a competitiveness index in order to address the ambiguity between 
concentration and competition in the banking industry. This test also sought to dispel claims that the 
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dominance of foreign owned banks and continued state ownership of some banks may have stifled 
competition in the banking system. The broad conclusions from this analysis are summarised as 
follows:  
 
i. The study finds evidence of oligopolistic behaviour in the Zambian banking sector. The 
estimated H  statistic which denotes competitiveness was positive and significantly different 
from zero and unit across all revenue specifications. This finding indicated that Zambian 
banks earned their revenue in a monopolistically competitive environment. Consequently, the 
results rejected any form of perfect competition and monopoly as possible explanations of 
market behaviour. The results were also robust to different definitions of bank classes.  
 
ii. The magnitude of the H  statistic varied among different bank subgroups and revenue 
measures. Based on the estimates from total revenue, the intensity of compeition was greater 
for foreign owned banks than among domestic banks. The converse was the case using 
interest revenue. Domestic banks had the largest H  statistic compared with foreign owned 
banks. Results of the estimated competitive index from both total and interest revenue 
equations suggested that small banks were inclined to behave more competitively than large 
counterparts. This may be attributed to the small banks‟ quest to capture the elusive market 
share in the banking system from the large competitors.  
 
iii. The validity of the test for long-run equilibrium gave further impetus to the results, 
suggesting that the reduced form revenue equations correctly captured the state of 
competition in the Zambian banking system.  
 
7.2.3 Banks‟ exercise of market power: evolution and sources 
The chapter on the banks‟ exercise of market power and its determinants extended the analysis 
of the preceding discussion by evaluating the evolution of pricing and cost decisions at bank level 
and over time. The specific focus of the study was the measurement of market power proxied by the 
Lerner Index using information on output price and marginal cost derived from a translog cost 
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function. Knowledge of banks‟ exercise of market power is of particular relevance for regulatory 
policy because it provides information on the actual behaviour regarding the banks‟ influence over 
price and output in the banking sector. Banks also need to have a clear view of their market position 
to ensure that they are not the focus of monopoly regulators. The main conclusions drawn from this 
chapter are presented below:  
 
i. Analysis of results shows that the banks‟ output price was more sticky than the decrease in 
costs, especially during 1998-2001. This translated into an average Lerner Index of about 
50.9 percent implying a relative mark-up of price over marginal cost in excess of 50 percent. 
This finding provides evidence that for the industry as a whole, market power was no where 
near the monopoly case and was still further away from the polar end of perfect competition.   
 
ii. The Government‟s support mechanisms to state owned banks perpertuated the exercie of 
market power by these institutions by keeping costs artificially lower relative to the price of 
aggregate output. Thus, it was observed that the estimated Lerner Index of public sector 
banks was larger than for domestic private and foreign owned banks. However, this conduct 
dissipated in the later years as government tightened its grip on inflation, causing a cessation 
in the provision of balance sheet incentives to public owned banks. On the other hand, 
domestic private and foreign owned banks exhibited similar degree of market power. For 
both cases, the estimate of the Lerner Index was around 53 percent, marginally higher than 
the sample average.  
 
iii. The results also show that the level of concentration had a positive impact on the Lerner 
Index. This indicated that market dominance may have been reflected in greater influence 
over price of output. The response of the Lerner Index to the increasing level of concentration 
was found to be around 0.9 percent. Moreover, cost efficient banks posted solid mark-ups. 
This means that by managing their productive resources in an efficient manner, banks gained 
control over price and costs and therefore acquired greater market power. The study also 
established that banks with substantial share of non-intermediated sources of revenue enjoyed 
greater market power.  
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iv. The study also revealed an important issue relating to the response of banks‟ markups to 
macroeconomic conditions. It was observed that market power in the Zambian banking 
system is affected by the degree of macroeconomic stance, high in bad times and lower under 
stable macroeconomic conditions. This finding fits nicely with the estimated parameters on 
the rate of inflation in the revenue equations for the Panzar-Rosse competitiveness measure 
which showed that instability in the macroeconomic environment constrains the banks‟ 
competitive conduct by dampening the sensitivity of revenue to macroeconomic currents.  
 
v. Regulatory intensity fosters market power. This result, consistent with the capital buffer 
proposition suggests that highly capitalised banks use their capital strength as a premium on 
price-cost margins. In this streak, raising capital standards beyond the existing threshold may 
endanger competitiveness in the banking sector. In contrast, banks with a high proportion of 
impaired assets exerted a weak dampeding influence on output price. The result follows from 
the credit rationing model which posits that through better screening of borrowers banks are 
only able to make safe loans, thereby reducing risk. As a result, this entrenches their position 
in the market.  
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7.3 Policy implications and recommendations 
Results derived in this thesis provide some valuable policy lessons. These are broadly 
summarised as follows: 
 
i. An important factor that policy makers should take note is that, while the deregulation of 
the banking sector was introduced to remove constraints in the market and increase bank 
efficiency, the distortions caused by years of administered interest rates and excessive 
government intervention in the banking industry continue to persist. Therefore, banks could 
record additional efficiency gains through further deepening of reforms and dealing with 
some of the outstanding performmance impediments, such as instability in the 
macroeconomic environment. Specifically, containing inflation will create incentives for 
improved bank performance.  
 
ii. Although the results from the analysis of competition and market power provide evidence 
of departure from monopolistic behaviour, there is room for exploiting possibilities to 
strengthen the degree of competition and dampen market power. Therefore, regulatory 
authorities should design measures aimed at creating further incentives for enhanced 
competitiveness in the banking sector. In particular, the regulatory authorities should 
endeavour to create an enabling environment for contestability in the banking industry, for 
example contuining with the open policy of allowing foreign as well as domestic bank entry 
into the sector. This will intensify competition and propagate efficiency gains across the 
banking market. Furthermore, the policy of setting up a credit reference bureau (CRB) 
should be welcomed in that it will help lower informational costs related to screening and 
monitoring of borrowers which in turn will enhance the quality of loans by reducing the 
probability of default.  
 
iii. Where banks have been able to sustain their risk aversion by holding a large poroportion of 
risk-free Treasury securities, the Government should step up its efforts of reducing its 
borrowing requirements from the banking sector. This will inevitably remove the 
cushionining effect banks currently enjoy from holding large amounts of Government debt 
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and stimulate them to innovate and develop better mechanisms of coping with risk related 
to private sector lending.  
 
iv. At the same time, government should refrain from providing gaurantees and other 
incentives that distort the operating environment for commercial banks. Previously, implicit 
and explicit state support extended to the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZNCB) kept 
the bank‟s costs artificially low, allowing it to operate as a monopoly to the detriment of 
other banks in the industry. Therefore, it is gratifying to note that government decided to 
relinquish its direct involvement in the banking sector by concluding the privatisation of 
ZNCB. This is critical to achieving the highest degree of impartiality in the credit decision-
making process and creating a competitive level playing field in the industry. 
 
v. Past legislative and regulatory changes have certainly benefited the efficiency of Zambian 
banks and if sustained could improve contestability as well. Therefore, looking ahead, there 
are economic reasons to suggest the importance of continuing to implement policies that 
promote efficiency and competition in the banking sector and the financial services industry 
in general. In particular, the authorities should place emphasis on the legal and institutional 
framework for resolving problem credit situations, including setting up a commercial court 
to expedite recovery of collateral. This is because a relatively high incidence of problem 
loans remains a daunting challenge for many commercial banks.   
 
7.4 Contributions and limitations of the study  
Hitherto, there has been no study to our knowledge that addresses the core elements of banks‟ 
performance in an integrated framework. Thus, this thesis presents an initial effort at quantifying 
the performance of Zambian banks since the end of the crisis that affected the industry in the mid-
1990s. The structure of the empirical sections enabled us to isolate the key elements of the banks‟ 
behaviour, inter alia cost efficiency, market structure and banks‟ mark-ups, all important for 
regulatory policy.  
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By conducting an in-depth investigation of these pertinent research issues, the thesis has 
extended the frontier of knowledge by providing another dimension for analysing the cost 
performance and competitive behaviour of Zambian banks. Although the analysis is specific to the 
Zambian banking sector, the approach taken and results derived can be applied to other developing 
countries, especially in SSA where banking sector reforms have been implemented. This is the 
main contribution of the thesis. 
However, the study suffers from some limitations as well. The key ones are highlighted 
below:  
 
i. Failure to make a comparison of banks‟ performance during pre-reform and post-reform 
period is a major shortcoming of this thesis. From the results obtained, we cannot say with 
certainty whether  or not there has been a change in the level of competition and market 
power and indeed cost efficiency stemming from the implementation of financial and 
regulatory reforms.  
 
ii. In the course of conducting this research, it has become clear that a major constraint on a 
more precise study of the issues considered is a shortage of relevant detailed data on 
product/service specific prices and costs. Certainly, this precluded us from conducting an 
investigation of the degree of market power in each of the banks‟ business lines in order to 
gain a better perspective on banks‟ price setting and cost behaviour.  
 
iii. Finally, we have not been able to determine the welfare implications associated with the 
banks‟ exercise of market power. Consequently, it is premature to state categorically if the 
estimated degree of market power led to loss of social welfare during the study period. 
 
7.5 Possible areas for future research  
In view of the limitations of this study, future research efforts may explore ways of adequately 
incorporating the implications of risk taking behaviour on the banks‟ performance. This is 
particularly relevant given the recent experience of global financial crisis, which has exposed 
banks‟ risk taking on the viability of financial institutions and other sectors of the economy. 
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Related to this, research has suggested that competition in banking leads to more risk taking with 
potential for bank runs. However, the trade-off between bank competition, risk and financial 
stability has remained an unresolved empirical issue.  
Thus, to the extent that high competitiveness of Zambian banks may lead to instability in the 
financial sector, and drawing from past experiences bank failures, new research should assess the 
extent to which increased competition poses a threat to the soundness and stability of the banking 
system. Furthermore, future research should interrogate whether or not high competition in the 
banking sector fosters increased access to finance, particularly by small firms.  
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Appendices 
Appendix I: Selected policy reforms: 1992-2003 
Liberalised of commercial banks' interest rates Sept. 1992 
Exchange rates unified Dec. 1992 
Introduction of Open Market Operations in primary Treasury bills   Jan. 1993 
28-day Treasury bills  auctions introduced               Mar. 1993 
182 day Treasury bills introduced             Aug. 1993 
Bank of Zambia  foreign exchange dealing system introduced Dec. 1993 
BoZ rate on unauthorised overdrafts increased by 5 % to 20 % above the 28-day yield rate Dec. 1993 
Shortfall on statutory reserves in excess of K1.0 billion set at 70 % above the 28-day yield rate Dec. 1993 
Foreign Exchange Controls Act revoked         Jan. 1994 
Statutory reserve requirements for foreign currency accounts equal to domestic currency accounts Feb. 1994 
The Banking and Financial Services Act (BFSA) version of 1995 introduced Jun. 1994 
Government bond auctions introduced           Dec. 1994 
Introduction of daily BoZ Open Market Operations   in credit and deposit auctions           Mar. 1995 
Abolition of Off-Tender window and commercial banks become sole participants at Treasury bill auctions Dec. 1996 
Enactment of the Bank of Zambia Act No. 43  Dec. 1996 
Surplus funds from the 1996  fiscal budget set aside to liquidate Treasury bills stock to reduce interest rates Jan. 1997 
Government bonds listed on the Lusaka stock Exchange Mar. 1998 
18-month Government bonds re-introduced Oct. 1998 
Risk-based supervision implemented 1999 
Introduction of 273-day Treasury bills and 24 months Government bond Oct. 2000 
Early warning system introduced 2000 
BoZ introduced new guidelines  for foreign exchange access and dealing Feb. 2001 
Conversion of kwacha equivalent foreign currency reserve balances into foreign currency reserve deposits commenced Apr. 2001 
Broad based foreign exchange interbank system introduced Jul. 2003 
Source: Bank of Zambia 
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Appendix I-1a: Total revenue PR results for domestic and foreign banks 
 
Dependent Variable: ln  TREVASST  
 
Domestic banks 
 
Foreign banks 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept -1.936 -1.191 0.235 
 
-2.105 -2.718 0.005*** 
Input prices 
       
ln(wL) 0.255 2.854 0.005***  
0.307 4.277 0.000*** 
ln(wF) 0.194 4.465 0.000***  
0.293 9.418 0.000*** 
ln(wK) 0.143 2.957 0.004***  
0.084 1.793 0.075* 
        
Bank-specific and regulatory  factors 
ln(OPPCOST) -0.066 -1.036 0.301 
 
-0.089 -3.051 0.003*** 
ln(CAPRATIO) 0.001 0.039 0.969 
 
-0.019 -0.407 0.685 
ln(RISK) 0.004 -0.158 0.874 
 
-0.041 -1.828 0.069* 
ln(INTERMED) -0.008 -0.162 0.872 
 
0.073 1.219 0.225 
ln(BRANCH) -0.062 -0.418 0.676 
 
0.059 0.696 0.488 
        
        
Macroeconomic variables 
ln(INFLATION) -0.125 -1.659 0.099* 
 
-0.191 -2.834 0.005*** 
ln(EXR) 0.166 1.080 0.282 
 
0.242 2.564 0.011*** 
ln(TBR) 0.121 1.246 0.215 
 
0.137 2.814 0.005*** 
H-statistic 
 
0.591 
   
0.684 
 
H=0 (p-value) 
 
0.000*** 
   
0.000*** 
 
H=1 (p-value) 
 
0.000*** 
   
0.001*** 
 
Market Structure       Monopolistic Competition 
 
          Monopolistic Competition 
Diagnostics               
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.000*** 
   
0.000*** 
 
u  
 
0.248 
   
0.348 
 
  0.216    0.172  
  
 
0.528 
   
0.804 
 
2R  0.580    0.472  
No. of  Obs  
195 
   
184 
 
F-statistic (p-value)   0.000***    
0.000***   
Significance level: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent 
ln  TREVASST - Log of Total Interest Revenue/Total Assets 
Source: Bank of Zambia and author‟s own estimations 
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Appendix I-1b: Total revenue PR results for domestic and foreign banks 
 
Dependent Variable: ln  TREVASST  
 
Small banks 
 
Large banks 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept -1.905 -1.991 0.048** 
 
-3.088 -1.717 0.089* 
Input prices 
       
ln(wL) 0.309 4.932 0.000***  
0.183 1.782 0.078* 
ln(wF) 0.276 8.774 0.000***  
0.153 3.115 0.002*** 
 ln(wK) 0.083 2.198 0.029**  
0.196 2.399 0.018** 
        
Bank-specific and regulatory factors 
ln(OPPCOST) -0.064 -1.999 0.047** 
 
-0.199 -1.821 0.072* 
ln(CAPRATIO)  0.003 0.078 0.938 
 
0.082 1.153 0.252 
ln(RISK) -0.016 -0.839 0.402 
 
-0.009 -0.221 0.825 
ln(INTERMED) 0.076 1.677 0.095* 
 
-0.075 -0.939 0.350 
ln(BRANCH) 0.035 0.031 0.726 
 
0.129 1.118 0.267 
        
Macroeconomic variables 
ln(INFLATION) -0.171 -2.681 0.008*** 
 
-0.196 -1.781 0.078* 
ln(EXR) 0.204 1.864 0.064* 
 
0.300 1.233 0.221 
ln(TBR) 0.095 1.843 0.067* 
 
0.295 2.044 0.044** 
H-statistic 
 
0.668 
   
0.533 
 
H=0 (p-value) 
 
0.000*** 
   
0.000*** 
 
H=1 (p-value) 
 
0.000*** 
   
0.001*** 
 
Market Structure       Monopolistic Competition 
 
          Monopolistic Competition 
Diagnostics               
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.099* 
   
0.079* 
 
u  
 
0.280 
   
0.075 
 
  0.198    0.181  
  
 
0.667 
   
0.146 
 
2R  0.655    0.645  
No. of  Obs.  
270 
   
109 
 
F-statistic (p-value)   0.000***    
0.000***   
Significance level: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent 
ln  TREVASST  - Log of Total Interest Revenue/Total Assets 
Source: Author‟s own estimations based on Bank of Zambia data 
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Appendix I-2a: Interest revenue PR results for domestic and foreign banks 
 
Dependent Variable: ln  INTRASST  
 
Domestic banks 
 
Foreign banks 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept -6.117 -5.183 0.000*** 
 
-4.183 -5.983 0000*** 
Input prices 
       
ln(wL) 0.350 4.448 0.000***  
0.175 2.914 0.004*** 
ln(wF) 0.198 3.604 0.000***  
0.379 12.211 0.000*** 
 ln(wK) 0.135 2.253 0.026**  
0.024 0.523 0.601 
        
Bank-specific and regulatory factors 
ln(OPPCOST) -0.124 -2.259 0.025** 
 
-0.071 -2.487 0.014*** 
ln(CAPRATIO) -0.026 -0.569 0.570 
 
-0.080 -1.808 0.072* 
ln(RISK) -0.046 -2.032 0.044** 
 
-0.022 -0.968 0.334 
ln(INTERMED) 0.006 0.095 0.925 
 
0.124 2.205 0.029** 
ln(BRANCH) 0.277 1.814 0.071* 
 
0.112 1.335 0.184 
        
Macroeconomic variables 
ln(INFLATION) -0.184 -2.008 0.046** 
 
-0.135 -1.956 0.052** 
ln(EXR) 0.578 4.526 0.000*** 
 
0.345 3.559 0.000*** 
ln(TBR) 0.233 2.618 0.010*** 
 
0.107 2.288 0.023** 
H-statistic 
 
0.683 
   
0.577 
 
H=0 (p-value) 
 
0.000*** 
   
0.000*** 
 
H=1 (p-value) 
 
0.004*** 
   
0.000*** 
 
Market Structure       Monopolistic Competition 
 
          Monopolistic Competition 
Diagnostics               
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.047** 
   
0.028*** 
 
u  
 
0.423 
   
0.344 
 
  0.240    0.162  
  
 
0.756 
   
0.819 
 
2R  0.347    0.540  
No. of  Obs.  
196 
   
184 
 
F-statistic (p-value)   0.000***    
0.000***   
Significance level: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent 
ln  INTRASST - Log of Total Interest Revenue/Total Assets 
Source: Bank of Zambia and author‟s estimations 
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Appendix I-2b: Interest revenue PR results for small and large banks 
 
Dependent Variable: ln  INTRASST  
 
Small banks 
 
Large banks 
Variable Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
 
Coefficient t-statistic p-value 
Intercept -5.178 -6.711 0.000*** 
 
-5.873 -3.519 0.001*** 
Input prices 
       
ln(wL) 0.268 4.755 0.000***  
0.273 2.898 0.005*** 
ln(wF) 0.329 9.978 0.000***  
0.162 3.175 0.002*** 
 ln(wK) 0.089 1.984 0.048**  
0.176 1.578 0.118 
        
Bank-specific and regulatory factors 
ln(OPPCOST) -0.077 -2.342 0.020** 
 
-0.265 -2.604 0.011*** 
ln(CAPRATIO) -0.038 -1.000 0.318 
 
0.117 1.377 0.172 
ln(RISK) -0.063 -3.604 0.000*** 
 
-0.265 -2.604 0.011*** 
ln(INTERMED) 0.127 3.623 0.000*** 
 
-0.095 -0.911 0.365 
ln(BRANCH) 0.218 2.337 0.020** 
 
0.156 1.266 0.209 
        
Macroeconomic variables 
ln(INFLATION) -0.131 -1.812 0.071* 
 -0.384 -2.658 0.009*** 
ln(EXR) 0.461 4.277 0.000*** 
 0.689 2.858 0.005*** 
ln(TBR) 0.150 2.779 0.006*** 
 0.479 3.371 0.001*** 
H-statistic 
 
0.686 
   
0.611 
 
H=0 (p-value) 
 
0.000*** 
   
0.000*** 
 
H=1 (p-value) 
 
0.000*** 
   
0.013*** 
 
Market Structure       Monopolistic Competition 
 
          Monopolistic Competition 
Diagnostics               
Hausman Test (p-value) 0.000*** 
   
0.093* 
 
u  
 
0.311 
   
0.128 
 
  0.204    0.215  
  
 
0.699 
   
0.262 
 
2R  0.507    
0.532 
 
No. of  Obs.  
271 
   
109 
 
F-statistic (p-value)   0.000***    
0.000***   
Significance level: *** 1 percent, ** 5 percent and * 10 percent 
ln  INTRASST - Log of Total Interest Revenue/Total Assets 
Source: Bank of Zambia and author‟s estimations 
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Appendix III: Cost efficiency scores, quarterly estimates 
Quarter 
Bank 
1 
Bank 
2 
Bank 
3 
Bank 
4 
Bank 
5 
Bank 
6 
Bank 
7 
Bank 
8 
Bank 
9 
Bank 
10 
Bank 
11 
Bank 
12 
Bank 
13 
Bank 
14 
Bank 
15 
(All Banks) 
1998q1 0.917 0.943 0.943 … … - 0.914 … 0.759 0.860 0.935 0.534 0.379 0.910 - 0.809 
1998q2 0.950 0.963 0.949 … … - 0.896 0.799 0.905 0.888 … 0.916 0.373 0.934 - 0.857 
1998q3 0.890 0.965 0.940 … … - 0.786 … 0.961 0.707 0.966 0.952 0.409 0.965 - 0.854 
1998q4 0.943 0.941 0.964 … … - 0.883 … 0.920 0.873 0.951 0.943 0.330 … - 0.861 
1999q1 0.937 0.964 0.967 … … - 0.949 … 0.954 0.929 0.957 0.945 … 0.923 - 0.947 
1999q2 0.935 0.975 0.959 … … - 0.949 … 0.956 0.887 0.957 0.972 0.617 0.898 - 0.910 
1999q3 0.951 0.969 0.961 … … - 0.949 … 0.964 0.892 0.949 0.974 0.684 0.911 - 0.921 
1999q4 0.961 0.959 0.976 … … - 0.944 … 0.961 0.957 0.943 0.956 0.678 0.911 - 0.925 
2000q1 0.971 0.976 0.961 … … … 0.959 … … 0.937 0.948 0.970 0.624 0.945 - 0.921 
2000q2 0.972 0.974 0.946 … … … 0.896 … … 0.964 0.915 0.960 0.650 0.955 - 0.915 
2000q3 0.977 0.977 0.947 … … … 0.927 … 0.946 0.957 0.934 0.922 0.579 0.953 - 0.912 
2000q4 0.977 0.937 0.972 … … … 0.946 … 0.890 0.898 0.945 0.934 0.506 0.901 - 0.890 
2001q1 0.960 0.942 0.969 … … … 0.936 … 0.960 0.922 0.963 0.959 0.748 0.957 - 0.932 
2001q2 0.958 0.953 0.970 … … … 0.938 … 0.951 0.945 0.975 0.967 0.751 0.963 - 0.937 
2001q3 0.952 0.977 0.975 … … … 0.926 … … 0.941 0.927 0.970 0.702 0.968 - 0.927 
2001q4 0.947 0.957 0.979 … … 0.979 0.937 … … 0.980 0.948 0.932 0.936 0.939 - 0.953 
2002q1 0.961 0.964 0.978 … … 0.945 0.894 … … 0.977 0.954 0.920 0.941 0.966 - 0.950 
2002q2 0.900 0.904 0.977 … … 0.739 0.945 … 0.966 0.980 0.953 0.884 0.857 0.965 - 0.915 
2002q3 0.871 0.944 0.972 … … 0.762 0.969 … 0.951 0.978 0.960 0.916 0.797 0.932 - 0.914 
2002q4 0.841 0.959 0.973 … … 0.817 0.928 … 0.931 0.974 0.822 0.943 0.834 0.918 - 0.904 
2003q1 0.952 0.953 0.975 … … 0.723 0.860 … 0.966 0.949 0.976 0.941 0.962 0.960 - 0.929 
2003q2 0.955 0.936 0.952 … … 0.775 0.971 … 0.962 0.966 0.958 0.937 0.944 0.966 - 0.938 
2003q3 0.940 0.942 0.958 … … 0.930 0.972 … 0.964 0.968 0.977 0.936 0.941 0.966 - 0.954 
2003q4 0.884 0.956 0.957 … … 0.538 0.952 … 0.963 0.983 0.967 0.913 0.916 0.950 - 0.907 
Notes: 
… Missing data for some variables resulting in no estimated scale economies 
-Not applicable due to mergers or late entry into industry 
Source: Author's own computations, based on BoZ data 
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Appendix III-1 continued 
2004q1 0.954 0.962 0.954 … 0.736 0.734 0.773 … 0.962 0.957 0.917 0.885 - - 0.931 0.888 
2004q2 0.939 0.947 0.921 … 0.703 0.753 0.871 … 0.933 0.950 0.942 0.848 - - … 0.881 
2004q3 0.939 0.964 0.974 … 0.738 0.668 0.883 … 0.966 0.954 0.964 0.948 - - 0.949 0.904 
2004q4 0.912 0.970 0.967 … 0.803 0.686 0.883 … 0.973 0.950 0.982 0.964 - - 0.964 0.914 
2005q1 0.902 0.970 0.973 … 0.705 0.928 0.906 … 0.974 0.958 0.979 0.971 - - 0.968 0.930 
2005q2 0.688 0.971 0.970 … 0.693 0.936 0.941 … 0.963 0.964 0.976 0.957 - - 0.941 0.909 
2005q3 0.933 0.967 0.970 0.972 0.854 0.925 0.921 … 0.968 0.952 0.980 0.949 - - 0.945 0.945 
2005q4 0.951 0.965 0.966 0.967 0.782 0.902 0.950 … 0.956 0.934 0.942 0.969 - - 0.956 0.937 
2006q1 0.964 0.976 0.976 0.974 0.925 0.925 0.947 … 0.959 0.968 0.980 0.979 - - 0.969 0.962 
2006q2 0.962 0.975 0.957 0.951 0.900 0.952 0.968 … 0.948 0.955 0.981 0.977 - - … 0.957 
2006q3 0.963 0.981 0.948 0.934 0.893 0.946 0.969 … 0.957 0.956 0.984 0.973 - - 0.970 0.956 
2006q4 0.901 0.982 0.923 0.974 0.934 0.931 0.975 … 0.957 0.964 0.979 0.974 - - 0.964 0.955 
Mean 0.931 0.960 0.962 0.962 0.805 0.833 0.923 0.799 0.947 0.938 0.954 0.933 -0.008 -0.006 0.956 0.917 
Notes: 
… Missing data for some variables resulting in no scale economies estimates 
-Not applicable due to mergers or late entry into industry 
Source: Author's own computations, based on BoZ data 
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 Appendix IV-1: Economies of scale, quarterly estimates 
Quarter 
Bank 
1 
Bank 
2 
Bank 
3 
Bank 
4 
Bank 
5 
Bank 
6 
Bank 
7 
Bank 
8 
Bank 
9 
Bank 
10 
Bank 
11 
Bank 
12 
Bank 
13 
Bank 
14 
Bank 
15 
Mean Scale Economies (All 
`Banks) 
1998q1 1.114 1.127 1.149 … … - 1.214 … 1.085 1.182 1.242 1.316 1.256 1.336 - 1.202 
1998q2 1.102 1.114 1.150 … … - 1.225 1.337 1.076 1.199 … 1.315 1.243 1.332 - 1.209 
1998q3 1.094 1.092 1.132 … … - 1.200 … 1.083 1.178 1.243 1.297 1.232 … - 1.172 
1998q4 1.105 1.091 1.114 … … - 1.178 … 1.075 1.166 1.260 1.290 1.199 1.345 - 1.182 
1999q1 1.086 1.074 1.106 … … - 1.158 … 1.067 1.163 1.233 1.297 … 1.320 - 1.167 
1999q2 1.070 1.068 1.086 … … - 1.151 … 1.059 1.167 1.237 1.290 1.271 1.321 - 1.172 
1999q3 1.062 1.064 1.078 … … - 1.137 … 1.051 1.159 1.227 1.273 1.265 1.334 - 1.165 
1999q4 1.047 1.076 1.087 … … - 1.156 … 1.054 1.156 1.224 1.303 1.239 1.328 - 1.167 
2000q1 1.064 1.082 1.083 … … … 1.134 … … 1.150 1.223 1.282 1.257 1.320 - 1.177 
2000q2 1.056 1.080 1.084 … … … 1.145 … … 1.146 1.203 1.279 1.254 1.308 - 1.173 
2000q3 1.056 1.073 1.078 … … … 1.138 … 1.061 1.147 1.199 1.265 1.252 1.293 - 1.156 
2000q4 1.061 1.051 1.081 … … … 1.137 … 1.045 1.143 1.198 1.254 1.239 1.301 - 1.151 
2001q1 1.031 1.055 1.078 … … … 1.120 1.205 1.047 1.144 1.204 1.238 1.225 1.306 - 1.150 
2001q2 1.024 1.044 1.065 … … … 1.095 1.182 1.038 1.132 1.175 1.222 1.217 1.301 - 1.136 
2001q3 1.027 1.043 1.057 … … … 1.079 1.188 … 1.111 1.166 1.214 1.255 1.284 - 1.142 
2001q4 1.028 1.044 1.056 … … 1.184 1.086 1.222 … 1.101 1.141 1.214 1.266 1.284 - 1.148 
2002q1 1.031 1.042 1.050 … … 1.143 1.085 1.219 … 1.096 1.138 1.193 1.261 1.278 - 1.140 
2002q2 1.031 1.040 1.046 … … 1.136 1.071 1.217 1.024 1.095 1.137 1.199 1.272 1.271 - 1.128 
2002q3 1.030 1.043 1.043 … … 1.130 1.080 1.252 1.023 1.088 1.148 1.184 1.265 1.269 - 1.129 
2002q4 1.022 1.026 1.046 … … 1.102 1.059 1.246 1.018 1.079 1.162 1.172 1.251 1.262 - 1.120 
2003q1 1.024 1.032 1.044 … … 1.096 1.070 1.240 1.021 1.080 1.155 1.174 1.263 1.255 - 1.121 
2003q2 1.029 1.027 1.032 … … 1.100 1.063 1.254 1.023 1.081 1.155 1.178 1.255 1.256 - 1.121 
2003q3 1.026 1.030 1.029 … … 1.099 1.067 1.260 1.021 1.075 1.154 1.179 1.237 1.260 - 1.120 
2003q4 1.032 1.027 1.036 … … 1.115 1.068 1.267 1.028 1.073 1.165 1.170 1.343 1.168 - 1.124 
Notes: 
… Missing data for some variables resulting in no estimated scale economies 
-Not applicable due to mergers or late entry into industry 
Source: Author's own computations, based on BoZ data 
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Appendix IV-1 continued 
2004q1 1.034 1.038 1.042 1.099 1.174 1.117 1.084 1.263 1.038 1.076 1.173 1.168 - - … 1.109 
2004q2 1.033 1.033 1.040 1.092 1.179 1.125 1.093 1.272 1.036 1.075 1.175 1.161 - - … 1.110 
2004q3 1.031 1.031 1.034 1.091 1.185 1.125 1.088 1.257 1.038 1.070 1.147 1.146 - - 1.172 1.109 
2004q4 1.025 1.034 1.036 1.072 1.170 1.116 1.083 1.239 1.035 1.064 1.158 1.119 - 
 
1.149 1.100 
2005q1 1.025 1.029 1.029 1.058 1.159 1.112 1.083 1.242 1.037 1.048 1.147 1.107 - - 1.140 1.093 
2005q2 1.020 1.032 1.024 1.039 1.177 1.112 1.074 1.253 1.031 1.045 1.147 1.102 - - 1.132 1.091 
2005q3 0.999 1.035 1.013 1.052 1.166 1.113 1.078 1.246 1.034 1.051 1.156 1.107 - - 1.140 1.091 
2005q4 1.009 1.019 1.024 1.045 1.153 1.117 1.080 1.215 1.034 1.051 1.147 1.102 - - 1.125 1.086 
2006q1 1.002 1.019 1.026 1.052 1.153 1.113 1.071 1.167 1.028 1.053 1.142 1.097 - - … 1.077 
2006q2 1.004 1.016 1.023 1.036 1.143 1.116 1.070 1.125 1.030 1.035 1.130 1.091 - - … 1.068 
2006q3 1.002 1.016 1.009 1.002 1.137 1.113 1.061 1.114 1.028 1.029 1.120 1.090 - - 1.123 1.065 
2006q4 0.998 1.151 1.153 1.366 1.119 1.211 1.358 1.089 1.180 1.261 1.330 1.316 - - … 1.211 
Mean 1.125 1.053 1.063 1.084 1.160 1.124 1.115 1.223 1.047 1.110 1.182 1.206 1.253 1.293 1.140 1.136 
Notes: 
… Missing data for some variables resulting in no scale economies estimates 
-Not applicable due to mergers or late entry into industry 
Source: Author's own computations, based on BoZ data 
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Appendix IV-2: Technological progress, quarterly estimates 
Quarter Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 
Bank 
4 
Bank 
5 
Bank 6 
Bank 
7 
Bank 8 Bank 9 
Bank 
10 
Bank 
11 
Bank 
12 
Bank 13 
Bank 
14 
Bank 
15 
All Banks 
1998q1 -0.011 -0.009 -0.011 … … - -0.013 … -0.011 -0.016 -0.017 -0.017 -0.016 -0.013 - -0.013 
1998q2 -0.011 -0.009 -0.006 … … - -0.008 0.991 -0.013 -0.011 … -0.017 -0.017 -0.014 - 0.089 
1998q3 -0.010 -0.009 -0.008 … … - -0.010 … -0.009 -0.013 -0.016 -0.015 -0.016 … - -0.012 
1998q4 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 … … - -0.013 … -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 -0.016 … - -0.011 
1999q1 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 … … - -0.013 … -0.011 -0.011 -0.013 -0.014 … -0.012 - -0.011 
1999q2 -0.010 -0.009 -0.012 … … - -0.013 … -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 -0.016 -0.011 -0.011 - -0.012 
1999q3 -0.010 -0.009 -0.012 … … - -0.013 … -0.008 -0.011 -0.014 -0.016 -0.011 -0.009 - -0.011 
1999q4 -0.012 -0.006 -0.009 … … - -0.010 … -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 - -0.010 
2000q1 -0.008 -0.005 -0.008 … … … -0.010 … … -0.011 -0.010 -0.013 -0.011 -0.008 - -0.009 
2000q2 -0.006 -0.003 -0.007 … … … -0.009 … … -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.007 - -0.008 
2000q3 -0.004 -0.003 -0.006 … … … -0.008 … -0.004 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.007 - -0.007 
2000q4 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 … … … -0.008 … -0.007 -0.007 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 - -0.007 
2001q1 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 … … … -0.008 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.006 - -0.007 
2001q2 -0.007 -0.004 -0.005 … … … -0.008 0.003 -0.006 -0.004 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.006 - -0.006 
2001q3 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 … … … -0.010 0.005 … -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 -0.005 - -0.005 
2001q4 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 … … -0.010 -0.007 0.009 … -0.005 -0.012 -0.009 -0.003 -0.006 - -0.005 
2002q1 -0.003 -0.001 -0.003 … … -0.010 -0.007 0.012 … -0.004 -0.012 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 - -0.004 
2002q2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 … … -0.007 -0.009 0.006 -0.003 -0.003 -0.011 -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 - -0.004 
2002q3 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 … … -0.004 -0.005 0.013 -0.002 -0.001 -0.007 -0.009 -0.001 -0.003 - -0.002 
2002q4 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 … … -0.009 -0.004 0.014 -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 - -0.002 
2003q1 0.000 0.001 0.000 … … -0.007 -0.004 0.009 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 -0.002 - -0.002 
2003q2 0.002 0.001 -0.001 … … -0.004 -0.003 0.014 -0.001 0.000 -0.005 -0.008 0.000 -0.002 - -0.001 
2003q3 0.002 0.002 0.000 … … -0.002 -0.002 0.015 0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.006 0.003 0.000 - 0.001 
2003q4 0.003 0.003 0.001 … … 0.000 0.002 0.017 0.003 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.011 0.002 - 0.002 
Notes: 
… Missing data for some variables resulting in no estimated scale economies 
-Not applicable due to mergers or late entry into industry 
Source: Author's own computations, based on BoZ data 
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Appendix IV-2 continued 
2004q1 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.010 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.018 0.006 0.005 0.002 -0.002 - - … 0.004 
2004q2 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.010 -0.004 0.002 0.003 0.019 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.000 - - … 0.005 
2004q3 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.013 -0.003 0.004 0.005 0.016 0.009 0.004 0.000 0.001 - - 0.006 0.006 
2004q4 0.007 0.009 0.006 0.012 -0.003 0.003 0.004 0.015 0.007 0.005 0.002 0.001 - - 0.005 0.006 
2005q1 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.009 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.017 0.008 0.004 0.003 0.001 - - 0.006 0.006 
2005q2 0.010 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.017 0.008 0.004 0.005 0.002 - - 0.007 0.007 
2005q3 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.016 0.010 0.006 0.009 0.004 - - 0.010 0.008 
2005q4 0.007 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.004 - - 0.008 0.007 
2006q1 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.014 0.009 0.007 0.006 0.005 - - … 0.007 
2006q2 0.007 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.004 0.007 0.008 0.015 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.006 - - … 0.008 
2006q3 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.017 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.007 - - 0.012 0.010 
2006q4 0.009 -0.012 -0.010 -0.016 -0.006 -0.014 -0.014 -0.012 -0.018 -0.019 -0.014 -0.015 - - … -0.012 
Mean -0.012 0.000 -0.002 0.007 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 0.011 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.006 0.008 0.000 
Notes: 
… Missing data for some variables resulting in no scale economies estimates 
-Not applicable due to mergers or late entry into industry 
Source: Author's own computations, based on BoZ data 
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Appendix V: Iterated cost function estimation results 
  Coefficient  Parameter 
 
Standard error 
 
t-statistic 
 
p-value 
Intercept  0   4.419  
0.718 
 
6.151 
 
0.000*** 
ln(wL)  1   0.074  
0.238 
 
0.311 
 
0.756 
ln(wK)  3   1.069  
0.241 
 
4.439 
 
0.000*** 
ln(tass)  y   0.312  
0.140 
 
2.236 
 
0.025** 
1/2 (ln(tass))2  yy   0.052  
0.014 
 
3.662 
 
0.000*** 
1/2 (ln(wL)
2  1   0.063  
0.035 
 
1.783 
 
0.075* 
1/2 (ln(wK))
2  3   0.017  
0.037 
 
0.463 
 
0.643 
ln(wL)ln(wK)  13   -0.057  
0.032 
 
1.779 
 
0.075* 
ln(wL)ln(tass)  1y   -0.011  
0.016 
 
-0.699 
 
0.484 
ln(wK)ln(tass)  3y   0.037  
0.015 
 
2.479 
 
0.013*** 
t   t  
 -0.005 
 
0.011 
 
-0.450 
 
0.653 
2t   tt  
 0.000 
 
0.000 
 
-0.309 
 
0.758 
t ln(tass)  ty  
 0.001 
 
0.001 
 
1.154 
 
0.248 
t ln(wL)  tL  
 0.002 
 
0.002 
 
1.136 
 
0.256 
t ln(wK)  tK  
 -0.004 
 
0.002 
 
-2.748 
 
0.006*** 
Control Variables  
 
 
       
ln(BRANCH)  1   0.042  
0.012 
 
3.449 
 
0.001*** 
ln(RISK)  2   0.012  
0.008 
 
1.606 
 
0.108 
ln(INTERMED)  3   0.030  
0.010 
 
2.926 
 
0.003*** 
Diagnostics  
 
 
       
Equation  
 
Obs. Parameters 
 
RMSE 
 
2R  
 
p-value 
Cost Function  
 
388 17 
 
0.146 
 
0.995 
 0.000*** 
Labour input share   
 
388 3 
 
1083.940 
 
0.698 
 0.000*** 
Capital input share  
 
388 3 
 
141.579 
 
0.405 
 0.000*** 
 Significance level:  * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01           
 Source: Author's own computations based on BoZ data 
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